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INTRODUCTION

An old woman from Missouri enjoyed recounting her memory
of her parents' divorce.' She was five years old, crying in the county
court house, because she didn't know what would happen to her. The
judge took her by the hand and sat her on his lap. Then he asked her,
"Do you want to live with your mother or your father?" With a sense
of certainty and pride she said, "I told him, 'I want to live with my
mother.' The judge said, 'Then you will.' " The young judge, Harry
S Truman, later became the thirty-third President of the United
States. Known for his common sense 2 and decisive actions, President
Truman led the country through World War II with a sign on his desk
reading "The buck stops here."
The woman told her story with a sense of accomplishment. It made
good listening because the judge was Harry Truman. It made good telling because this important man had asked her to make the most important decision in her own life. He used his power to empower her. To
* Associate Professor, Loyola Law School of Los Angeles; J.D., 1982, New York

University School of Law; Ph.D., 1975, City University of New York; B.A., 1966, University of
Wisconsin. I wish to thank Scott Altman, Gilbert Holmes, and Christopher May for their

thoughtful suggestions on earlier drafts; David Noble, for the speediest research assistance on
Earth; and Tamar Kandel, B.A. 1993, Bard College, for her excellent research on psychological
issues.
1. My thanks to Robert J. Foss of El Rescate Legal Services for sharing this anecdote about
an old family friend.

2. "President Truman believed in common sense and common decency." President Bill
Clinton, Weekly Radio Address (July 30, 1994).
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every child caught in a custody battle, the judge is a very important
person; a person with the awesome power to decide one's fate. Not all
children are as lucky as the one in the story. Most feel confused, dislocated and disempowered as a result of their parents' divorce.3 Most
judges, and the law as a whole, do not respect children enough to "pass

the buck" in their direction.
Today, although child custody law permits discretionary consideration of the child's preference, that preference carries only as much
weight as each judge sees fit to give it,4 using a multi-factorial "best
interests" calculus.' Even if the judge determines that the child is
mature and intelligent enough for her preference to be considered, the
child's preference is treated as mere evidence;6 important for what it
reveals about the child, but of de minimis legal significance for its con3. The California Children of Divorce Project, a ten-year follow-up on children who were
between six and eight years old (early middle childhood) at the time of their parents' divorce,
found continuing feelings of powerlessness. Judith S. Wallerstein, Children of Divorce: Report
of a Ten-Year Follow-Up of Early Latency-Age Children, 57 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 199
(1987); see also Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan B. Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce:
Experiences of the Child in Later Latency, 46 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 256, 264 (1976)
(describing sense of powerlessness and isolation of children ages eight to ten at time of parents'
divorce).
4. In every jurisdiction, the stated preference of a child under 14 years old is only as
significant as the particular judge deems it to be, after considering the child's intelligence, age,
and maturity, together with all other factors, in determining the best interests of the child. There
are four types of child's preference statutes. Statutes modeled on Section 402 of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act state that the court "shall" consider the "wishes of the child as to his
custodian," but allow the court to determine the weight to give such wishes. UNIFORM MARRIAGE
& DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1988). Other statutes require a finding of sufficient
mental capacity before the court may consider the child's preference. A third category allows the
judge complete discretion in considering the child's preference. Finally, "mandatory" statues give
the child's preference controlling weight if the child is of a certain age. See David M. Siegel &
Suzanne Hurley, The Role of the Child's Preferencein Custody Proceedings, 11 FAM. L.Q. 1, 18
(1977). Three of these types of statutes are virtually functional equivalents-giving exceptionally
broad discretion to the court in weighing and interpreting the child's stated preference. Judges
commonly deem the child mature enough to exercise discretion if the child's choice agrees with
what the judge considers sensible and appropriate. Thus, the child's choice can support the
court's position but rarely determines it. Further, even if the child is obviously "mature," the court
may decide contrary to the child's preference if it deems a different custodial arrangement to be in
the child's "best interests."
5. Courts in every jurisdiction use the amorphous standard of the child's "best interest" to
effect custodial placements. In some jurisdictions, a statute sets forth the factors to be considered;
in others they are fleshed out by common law. Section 402 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act states that the court shall consider, in addition to the child's preference, the wishes of the
parent as to the child's custody; the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parents,
his sibling(s), and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests; the
child's adjustment to home, school, and community; and the mental and physical health of all
individuals involved. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1988).
6. See, e.g., Marcus v. Marcus, 248 N.E.2d 800, 805 (Il. App. Ct. 1969) (14 year old young
man's "adamant refusal... to have any contact with his mother" indicates that giving her custody
is not in his best interest, although it is not controlling); Siegel & Hurley, supra note 4, at 10-11
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tent. Diagnosed, rather than respected, children's stated preferences are

subjected to analysis by mental health professionals as custody evaluators and expert witnesses according to doctrines derived from psycho-

logical theories sometimes even distorted versions of theories.7 It is as
though the child has "legal laryngitis."8 The child's voice is heard as a

symptom of the child's condition rather than as a statement of the child's
intentions.
This Article proposes a simple rule for empowering children in
contested child custody cases: the rule of children's choice. In deciding

between fit parents who cannot agree on their child's custodial allocation, the stated preference of any child over the age of six years should
be legally dispositive of that child's custody. 9 On one level, this Article
is a straightforward argument for the right to choose one's parental custodian from middle childhood onward, supported by constitutional law,
child development theory, and practical policy concerns.
On a deeper level, this Article is a critical reexamination of the
relationship between legal theory and psychological theory in the law of
child custody, and of the vision and treatment of children resulting from
it. In speaking of children, the theories emphasize vulnerability over
resilience, protection over freedom, and "needs" over "rights." 10 The
("In determining the appropriate weight to give an expressed preference, the courts will closely
scrutinize those factors which have influenced the child in making his choice .... ").
7. See Frederica K. Lombard, Judicial Interviewing of Children in Custody Cases: An
Empiricaland Analytical Study, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 807, 826-28 (1984). The author counsels:
The interviewer must assess the extent to which information received from the child
represents reality .... [W]hile some children may be unwilling or unable to express
a preference, an examiner would be foolish to accept the preference of those who do
at face value ....
Even if the only question the interviewing judge posed were,
"with whom do you want to live?" and the child responded quickly, "my mother,"
the interviewer could not confidently conclude . . . that this was the child's true
preference.
Id. at 826-28 (citation omitted).
8. Even scholars who encourage listening to children do not necessarily mean this literally.
Professor Woodhouse recommends developing a paradigm of children's thoughts derived from
children's literature and survey research. Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A ChildCentered Perspective on Parents'Rights,14 CARDozo L. REV. 1747, 1829-37 (1993). Professor
Fitzgerald imagines children crying out for care, protection, security, and other positive rights.
Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children'sPerspectives and the Law,
36 ARIz. L. REV. 11, 16 (1994).

9. Richard Farson, a leading advocate of children's rights, lists the right to "SelfDetermination" as the most important right of children. Almost as important are the rights to
"Alternate Home Environments" and to "Educate Oneself" by designing one's own education.
RICHARD FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS

(1974); see also JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD (1974)

(advocating making adult rights and responsibilities available to all children). Contra LAuRA M.
PURDY, IN THEIR BEST INTEREST?

THE CASE AGAINST

EQUAL

RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN

(1992)

(arguing that parents are the best judges of what children will need to be in the future).
10. The scholarly writing on best interests is not monolithic. Martha Fineman argues for a
return to a maternal rights-based analysis of child custody issues. Martha Fineman, Dominant
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law conceptualizes children as hypersensitive beings who must be in the
care of "psychological" parents in "stable environments," and who are
traumatized by "conflict." Their adventurousness, individuality, and
thirst for independence are ignored."'
Downplayed in this legal vision of the child, are those aspects of
the human personality in which legal "personhood" is grounded: the
intelligence to make expressive statements of one's feelings and beliefs,
Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101
HARV. L. REV. 727, 768-74 (1988). Others reason that both parents should not begin with equal
claims to custody, rather the one who has demonstrated nurturing and caretaking competency
should have preference. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood,98 YALE L.J. 293,
295 (1988); Marcia O'Kelly, Blessing the Tie that Binds: Preferencefor the Primary Caretaker
as Custodian, 63 N.D. L. REv. 481, 485, 533-34 (1987); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism,Parental
Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 617 (1992); Woodhouse, supra note 8, at
1844-58 (arguing courts should award custody to the parent who has demonstrated the more
competent and consistent child care). Some scholars would tie their legal guidelines more closely
to the clinical and empirical studies of psychologists. See generally David L. Chambers,
Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 477 (1984).
Presumably these authors would be willing to change their ideas as new psychological insights
emerge. Throughout this vast literature, however, parents' rights are contrasted with children's
needs. Even when children are deemed to have rights, those rights are of a different kind than
parents' rights. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 37-45. Parents' rights are "negative"
rights-the right to free speech, choice, decision-making autonomy, and the right to raise one's
family as one sees fit, without government involvement. Children, by contrast, have "positive"
rights-the right to food, clothing, shelter, and nurturing. No one would deny the importance of
both positive and negative rights. But since our Constitution and legal system are built on
negative rights, to grant children only positive rights is, in some sense, to give them no rights at
all. Even assuming arguendo that the law were to recognize the positive rights of food, clothing,
shelter, nurturance, and education for children (a position which I heartily advocate for all age
groups), the attribution of only negative rights to parents and only positive rights to children
places the two groups in distinct legal positions.
11. The Runaway Bunny, a famous children's story that my mother often read to me,
illustrates the stifling of the child. MARGRET W. BROWN, THE RUNAWAY BUNNY (1972). In the
story, a baby bunny shares with his mother his fantasies of freedom. He tells her how he is going
to run away: "'I will become a little sailboat, and I will sail away from you.' " Id. Anything to
be an individual. But his mother is too strong for him. Whatever he proposes she has an answer
ready. She will become a big wind on the sea and blow the bunny ship home. Id. There is simply
no escape. My mother loved this story, but I hated it with a passion. In a personal interview, Dr.
Istar Schwager, noted educational psychologist and advisor to Sesame Street Magazine, made this
comment about The Runaway Bunny:
Margaret Wise Brown is usually right on point when it comes to children's
feelings and sensibilities. But The Runaway Bunny treads upon children's desire
for autonomy and shows an overbearing mother who won't let her child escape,
even in fantasy. The boundaries between mother and child are not clear. Wherever
the bunny escapes to, the mother shows up and recaptures him. I think children who
want to see themselves as independent may squirm when they hear this.
Personal interview, June 1994; see also Francis Schrag, Children: Their Rights and Needs, in
WHOSE CHILD: CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER

237 (William

Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980) (arguing that recognizing children's "rights" will interfere
with the satisfaction of their "needs"); cf HOWARD COHEN, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN (1980)
(suggesting giving blanket equal rights to children-but creating "child agents" whose capacities
children may "borrow" to perform tasks or make judgements they cannot make for themselves).
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and the autonomy to make legally binding decisions about one's life.
Although children obviously lack the maturity and wisdom of adults,
whenever the law takes a parentalistic approach,' 2 depriving one group
of rights that others enjoy, the danger that the will to dominate will overshadow the concern for protection13 cautions us to restrict rights no more
than necessary. Yet in child custody law, that susceptibility to harm and
risk which "justifies" the curtailment of individual freedom for "the
good" of the individual is magnified. In the curious amalgam of legal
and psychological theory' 4 which dominates child custody law, the
child's personhood is reconceived as "patienthood,"' 5 and the child's
12. In comparing the children's liberation movement with the civil rights and women's
movements, Ann Palmeri observes "[tihat blacks and women have so often been thought to be
'childlike' and, on the basis of that claim, been paternalistically treated shows how much deeper
the claims for paternalistic practices with respect to children are entrenched." Ann Palmeri,
Childhood's End: Toward the Liberation of Children, inWHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN'S RIGHTS,
PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 105, 109 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds.,
1980). Gay men and indigenous peoples have received similar treatment:
Colonel Fred Peck ...expressed love for his gay son, he also used the occasion to
support the policy banning his son from serving in the military .... Colonel Peck
explained that. . . his policy position was indeed inspired by his paternal love. He
did not want his son in the armed forces because he was afraid that soldiers would

kill or maim Scott because of his homosexuality.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives,46 STAN. L. REv. 607, 640 (1994) (citations omitted); Chris Tennant, Indigenous Peoples, InternationalInstitutions, and the International Legal
Literaturefrom 1945-1993, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 6 (1994) (discussing the vision of indigenous
peoples in international law as both "noble" and "ignoble," but always as "primitive").
13. See HOWARD COHEN, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN 10-12 (1980) (pointing out three
fallacies in the dominant approach of child protectivism: that adults are better able to perceive
what is in a child's best interest than are the children themselves, that there is harmony between
the adults and children involved in child protection, and that the quality of care can be improved
by passing control over children from adult to adult.)
14. An eminent scholar in the field of law and psychology bemoans the distortions of
psychological theory which sometimes pass as judicial notice of psychological facts:
The problems with the notice doctrine acquire special significance when applied to
children's cases ....Judges in family law cases often seem compelled to use their

opinions as fora about the nature of the family as a social institution. These
discussions are often mythological, expounding the nature of the child and the
family.... Therefore, formidable obstacles may stand in the way of consideration
of child development research by the judiciary. First, even clearly mistaken
conclusions may be believed to be so intuitively correct and no evidence is needed
to support them and no evidence will be sufficiently strong to rebut them. Second,
although stated empirically, statements of social fact about children and families
Even though their decisions ostensibly
may be more normative than descriptive ....
rest on psychological foundations, these assumptions actually may never have been
empirical, or at least may never have been applied critically.
GARY B. MELTON, JudicialNotice of 'Facts' about Child Development, in REFORMING THE

LAW:

232, 238-40 (1987).
15. Numerous medical sociologists and anthropologists have analyzed the role of the medical
"patient" in Western society as including a prescribed dependent passivity, a suspension of
liberties, and an obligation to submit to the directions of professionals privileged with the
IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH

authority to lead one on the course to well-being. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE
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"best interests" is approached therapeutically.
The therapeutic paradigm which informs the "best interests" standard for inter-parental custody cases seems irreproachable. Law and
psychology use similar terms for seemingly similar concepts: person,
identity, responsibility, autonomy, harm, and risk, for example. The
interdisciplinary apparatus attached to child custody determinations
seems to combine the best of intentions with the best of science.
Yet the objectivity is illusory. Even assuming arguendo that law
and psychology do not share a common class and cultural bias, 16 the
CLINIC: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF MEDICAL PERCEPTION (1973); DAVID LANDY, The Position of the
Afflicted in Society, in CULTURE, DISEASE, AND HEALING: STUDIES IN MEDICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

385 (1977); TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 475-79 (1951). Failure to accept the
diagnosis, or to conform to ameliorative directions (like a child's disobedience to authority
figures) becomes, in and of itself, a sign of illness or pathology. Just as physicians authoritatively
constrain their patients' environments and monitor their progress towards health with "objective"
measures (temperature, blood pressure, blood cell count), the child's special status in the law of
custody imposes certain roles upon children. The law authorizes the curtailment of certain
liberties for the healthy child's own benefit, which are identical to restrictions imposed upon adult
patients by virtue of their illness or disease. These are: (1) The child's special sensitivities to
environmental instability, interpersonal hostility, change, and adverse influences constitute "risks"
which the law must accommodate; (2) The child's need for special treatment, a special
environment, or special curative conditions which justify the need for differential treatment, even
at the loss of autonomy and decision-making authority; (3) The special qualities and risks of their
condition obligate them, and may even compel them to submit to the directions and decisions of
others deemed to act in their interests; (4) Their condition, improvement and development are
monitored by others, especially professionals according to external and purportedly "objective"
standards reflecting desired social norms, such as school achievement, good behavior, and selfesteem, rather than by individual autonomous desires. Philosopher Ann Palmeri enumerates these
same characteristics as definitive of "paternalism." Palmeri, supra note 12, at 106-07.
16. Many of the measures which are used to assess post-divorce adjustment are class and
culturally biased. Measures such as school achievement and obedience reflect EuropeanAmerican middle class norms. Even progress through the developmental stages of childhood is
culturally variable. Different ethnic groups value different personality types and behaviors in
adults, raise their children to express such traits, and expect and reward different behaviors and
attitudes from them at different stages. See, e.g., Alexander L. Hinton, Prolegomenon to a
ProcessualApproach to the Emotions, 21 ETHOS 417, 431-32 (1993). At a somewhat later stage
of childhood, self-identification with an ethnic group also intensifies such differences in behavior,
perception, and cognition. See generally, CHILDREN'S ETHNIC SOCIALIZATION: PLURALISM AND
DEVELOPMENT (Jean S. Phinney & Mary J. Rotheram eds., 1987); BARaARA GOLDSMITH, LITTLE
HAPPY AT LAST (1987) (analyzing how the judge who tried the Gloria Vanderbilt
GLORIA ...
custody trial misunderstood the aloofness of the upper classes towards their children and the
degree to which child raising was entrusted to nurses, governesses and other servants as signs of
neglect rather than means to building character); CATHERINE A. LUTz, UNNATURAL EMOTIONS:
EVERYDAY SENTIMENTS ON A MICRONESIAN ATOLL & THEIR CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THEORY
(1988) (asserting that emotions are socially constructed and culturally distinctive and taught
through processes of child rearing); RICHARD A. SCHWEDER, THINKING THROUGH CULTURES:
EXPEDITIONS IN CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY (1990) (discussing the cultural construction of
psychological makeup). On the causal relationships among child raising, culture, and personality,
see generally RUTH BENEDICT PATTERNS OF CULTURE (1934); SIX CULTURES: STUDIES OF CHILD
REARING (Beatrice B. Whiting ed., 1963); BEATRICE B. WHITING & CAROLINE P. EDWARDS,
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law's use of psychology is not value-free.1 7 When law turns to psychology for answers, it does so much as a lawyer turns to an expert witness,
with a set of hypothetical questions based upon assumptions derived
from the legal vision of the child. The law asks, "What are the risks and
traumas of divorce?" and "How can the state make benevolent decisions
for children unable to do so on their own behalf?"
The law strives to make decisions for children to protect them from
harm rather than helping and supporting them to make decisions for
themselves. Thus, in applying the best interests standard, the law turns
to psychology and asks, "Given that the child is incompetent to make
important decisions, and given that divorce is a time of stress, what custody rule should the state employ?" The law does not ask, "When are
children rational, mature, or experienced enough to exercise a particular
right?" Nor does it consider the importance to the child of exercising
self-determination and autonomy.18
The problem with this line of questioning is that it assumes what it
should try to discover; namely, what psychology can reveal about when
in the child's development it becomes oppressive rather than protective
to deem the child legally incompetent to decide his own custody. When
law turns to psychology and asks, "Given that the child is a developing
person, when is it appropriate for the child to exercise autonomy in family matters?" a very different answer results.
This Article compares and appraises these two very different
approaches to the use of psychology in the development of custody law
doctrine-the protectivist/patienthood paradigm which assumes the
incompetency and delicacy of the child, and the empowerment/personhood paradigm which envisions the child as a developing (legal) person. Section I traces the history of the protectivist/patienthood paradigm
to show that its present psychological cast masks a centuries-old power
struggle for control of the child, that eclipses the child's autonomy without adequate justification. Section II addresses the need for change in
the legal vision of the child to an empowerment/personhood paradigm
on the basis of constitutional law, psychological theory, and practical
policy concerns.
CHILDREN OF DIFFERENT WORLDS:
WHITING & IRVIN

L.

THE FORMATION OF SocIAL BEHAVIOR

CHILD, CHILD TRAINING AND PERSONALITY

(1988);

JOHN W.

(1953).

17. Cf. Martha L. Fineman & Annie Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal
Policymaking: Custody Determinationsat Divorce, 1987 WIs. L. REv. 107 (1987) (arguing that
social science data is selectively used and interpreted to support gender-neutrality in custody
determinations).
18. Ann Palmeri argues that we should reject the "mental immaturity" argument (children are
neither rational nor experienced), recognizing instead the rights of children as "developing
persons." Palmeri, supra note 12, at 110-21.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

II.
A.

[Vol. 49:299

THE HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CHILD AS PATIENT

Habeas Corpus Homonymous: How Children Lost Their Voices

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the writ of
habeas corpus was a major vehicle for determining the custody of children. 19 In hearings on the writ, the voices and wishes of children regarding their custody were audible and often heeded. At first, courts
interpreted their authority under the writ strictly; the judge was under an
obligation to determine whether the child was under an illegal restraint.
If, however, no restraint existed, or once any restraint was removed;
courts held it improper to use the summary vehicle of habeas corpus to
decide questions of guardianship or custody.2 0 If the child seemed competent to form and state an opinion, the child was free to leave the courthouse with whomever she wished. 2 As time passed, courts
progressively redefined their latitude pursuant to the writ. Habeas
corpus, as used to determine child custody, mutated into a vehicle for
full-scale custody proceedings in which the voices of mothers and
fathers were heard over that of the child, in the name of the child's "best
interests."
Before the dawn of the nineteenth century, the voices of children
were heard in the first two English cases (adopted as precedent in the
United States) to challenge absolute parental authority. The courts used
the writ of habeas corpus as a vehicle to recognize the child's decisions
against the claim of paternal right for the first time in 1763, in Rex v.
Delaval.2 2 Lord Mansfield determined that, "[i]n cases of writs of
habeas corpus directed to private persons, 'to bring up infants,' the
19. Prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity, the writ was used in child custody

determinations much as orders to show cause are used today. In addition to initiating speedy
judicial action, the use of habeas corpus to determine custody served another important purpose in
the nineteenth century. Because it was difficult to obtain a legal divorce or separation, many

couples simply lived apart. The writ enabled the court to make changes in the custody of the
children of such separately-dwelling couples independent of the jurisdiction conferred by divorce
or separation actions. For a discussion of the nineteenth century jurisdictional problem, see

Latham v. Latham, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 307 (1878).
20. By the latter part of the nineteenth century, the writ was used, for purposes of child

custody, more as a vehicle for the control of children than for their liberation. ROLLIN C. HuPRD, A
TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPus 453

(Albany, W.C. Little & Co., 2d ed. 1876).
21. See In re Wollstonecraft, 4 Johns. Ch. 80 (N.Y. Ch. 1819) (court allows 12 year old child

to determine her own custody). In another case decided that same year, the court used the same
doctrine to protect the mother indirectly. State v. Cheeseman, 5 N.J.L. 522 (1819). There, a
thirteen year old boy was living with his widowed mother and her second husband. Although the
court had appointed someone else as guardian, the state sought a writ to transfer custody of the
boy. The court held that custody appropriately belonged with the state, that custody could not be
changed under the writ, and that the court could only release the restraints and let the boy go
wherever he wanted. Id. at 525-26.
22. 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B. 1763).
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Court is bound, ex debito justitiae, to set the infant free from an
improper restraint: but they are not bound to deliver them over to any
body nor to give them any privilege. ' 23 The "infant" at issue in Delaval
was an eighteen year old woman who chose to go home with her lover
rather than her somewhat unsavory father. But the courts quickly
applied the rule to the custody of chronological (rather than simply
legal) children. Eleven years later, in Blissets Case,24 the same court
refused to change the custody of a six year old girl from her mother and
maternal grandfather to her bankrupt and abusive father. The court
explicitly recognized the significance of the child's wishes, finding that
she desired to stay with her mother.25
American courts immediately adopted the English precedent.26 A
series of apprenticeship cases made it clear that the courts recognized
the child's liberty interest to include a right of independent choice. In
the 1810 case of Commonwealth v. Hamilton,27 a mother petitioned for
custody of her daughter who had been apprenticed by contract in Canada. The court found that the girl was not bound by the contract, yet did
not return her to her mother's custody. Instead, "the chief justice
23. Id. at 914.
24. 98 Eng. Rep. 899 (K.B. 1774).
25. Id. at 899-900. The court interpreted Delaval to mean that the previously absolute power
of the father over his child could now be subordinated to the power and constitution of the state
when the father deviated from his "natural" role. Although two subsequent English cases, De
Manneville v. De Manneville, 33 Eng. Rep. 78 (Ch. 1806) and Rex v. Greenhill, 4 L.R.-Adm. &
Eccl. 624 (1836), took a more absolutist position towards paternal rights, the law developing
simultaneously in the United States limited them. In United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30
(C.C.D.R.I. 1824) (No. 15,256), Justice Story firmly incorporated the limitations on paternal
custody rights into American law, reasoning:
As to the question of the right of the father to have custody of his infant child, in a
general sense it is true. But this is not on account of any absolute right of the father,
but for the benefit of the infant, the law presuming it to be for his interest to be
under the nurture and care of his natural protector, both for maintenance and
education. When, therefore, the court is asked to lend its aid to put the infant into
the custody of the father, and to withdraw him from other persons, it will look into
all the circumstances, and ascertain whether it will be for the real, permanent
interests of the infant ....It will ...

endeavor, as far as possible, to administer a

conscientious, parental duty with respect to its welfare. It is an entire mistake to
suppose the court is at all events bound to deliver over the infant to his father, or
that the latter has an absolute vested right in the custody.
Id. at 31-32.
26. In Nickols v. Giles, 2 Root 461 (Conn. 1796), the court denied the writ to a father who
sought custody of his child, then living with the mother at the maternal grandfather's home.
while finding that the child was being cared for properly, the Nickols court did not enunciate
whether the denial of the writ was based upon the court's discretion or the child's decision. For a
fascinating and elegant history of the role of the English and early American child custody habeas
corpus cases in shaping the modem law of adoption, see Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a
Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 N.W.U.
L. Rav. 1038 (1979).
27. 6 Mass. 273 (1810).
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inquired of the child if she was restrained against her wishes; to which
she answered that she was not," but that she was very desirous of staying
with the master.28 The court then decreed, "[L]et the child be discharged, with liberty to remain in the defendant's family, as she has
requested .... "
In a case decided the following year, a New York court demonstrated even more respect for a child's autonomous decision. In In re
M'Dowle,30 two boys, aged 8 and 11, had been apprenticed to a carpenter and blacksmith of the Shaker community with which the mother was
religiously associated.3 1 After the mother's death, the boys' father petitioned for their return to his custody. The court found the apprenticeship
contracts were technically defective. Because the boys had not signed
them they were not bound, but their father was. 32 The court determined
that they were free from illegal restraint and could go with whom they
chose. After the boys chose the Shaker masters, counsel for the boys'
father suggested that the boys had been unduly influenced by the
Shakers. 33 In response, the court convened a committee of three members of the Massachusetts bar to speak with the boys privately. 34 The
boys confirmed that
they wanted to remain with the Shakers, and were
35
allowed to do so.

The strong preference for a child's choice emerging in cases like
Hamilton and M'Dowle was curtailed where the battle was between the
natural parents rather than with third parties. Thus in Commonwealth v.
Addicks,36 the court interpreted its responsibility under the writ quite
differently than the M'Dowle court had. Although the children in both
cases were virtually the same ages, the Addicks court determined that it
had discretion to decide the children's custody, and granted custody to
'37
their mother although she was an "adulteress.
28. Id. at 275.
29. Id.
30. 8 Johns. 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
31. Id. at 328, 332.
32. Id. at 331.
33. Id. at 331-32.
34. Id. at 332; see State v. Scott, 30 N.H. 274, 278 (1855) (court may appoint committee to
examine child to determine his wishes); see also Commonwealth ex rel. Gilkeson v. Gilkeson, 5
Pa. 131, 134 (1851) (holding apprenticeship contract involving fifteen year old girl invalid,
leaving her free to choose with whom she would live).
35. In re M'Dowle, 8 Johns. at 332. Similarly, in In re Wollstonecraft, 4 Johns. Ch. 80 (N.Y.
Ch. 1819), the court stated that the object of the proceedings was "only to deliver the party from
illegal restraint; and if competent to form and declare an election, then to allow the infant to go
where she pleased .... " Id. at 82-83. Finding her competent to make the choice, the court
released the girl to the mother's custody. Id.
36. 5 Binn. 520 (Pa. 1813).
37. Id. at 521. The court stated, "[s]o far as regards her treatment of the children, she is in no
fault .

. .

. It is to them, that our anxiety is principally directed; and it appears to us that,
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After Addicks, courts continued to determine that they had the
power to decide custody cases between natural parents. In 1836, the
court in New York ex rel. Ordronaux v. Chegaray,38 struggled over
whether it was appropriate to consult three children (ages fifteen, thirteen, and nine ) when their mother petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
seeking a change in custody because she was allowed only infrequent
visits with the children. The Ordronaux court recognized that this child
custody habeas corpus proceeding was not "for the purpose of relieving
the [children] from any improper restraint; but [rather] . . . a contest

between parents in relation to the future charge and custody of their
children. ' 39 Contemporaneously, in the celebrated case of In re Burrus,4 ° the U.S. Supreme Court observed that "to take away an infant
child from the parent having it in nurture and keeping, upon the allegation that such keeping is a wrongful imprisonment... is a bold figure of
speech, or rather fiction ..
By the mid-nineteenth century, the rule governing habeas corpus
petitions for child custody allowed a court to use its discretion in determining whether a child should choose which parent she preferred or
whether the court should choose based on "best interests." In 1851,
Kent's Commentaries summarized this rule:
The [parent] may obtain the custody of his children by the writ of
habeas corpus, when they are improperly detained from him; but the
courts, both of law and equity, will investigate the circumstances, and
act according to sound discretion, and will not always, and of course,
interfere upon habeas corpus, and take a child, though under fourteen
years of age, ..

.

and deliver it over to the [parent] against the will of

the child. They will consult the inclination of an infant, if it be of a
sufficiently mature age to judge for itself, and even control the right
of the [parent] to the possession and education
of his child when the
41
nature of the case appears to warrant it.
The courts' rationale for assuming broad discretion in deciding
child custody was the impossibility of determining whether the child
was under an illegal restraint without knowing to whom custody propconsidering their tender age, they stand in need of that kind of assistance, which can be afforded
by none so well as a mother." Id.
38. 18 Wend. 637 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836).
39. Id. at 643-44.
40. 136 U.S. 586, 602 (1890).
41. 11 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 194 (7th ed. 1851). The law
remained sufficiently stable throughout the mid-nineteenth century for Kent's statement of the law
to be quoted verbatim in 1876. See HuRD, supra note 20, at 454-55. Even one hundred years
later, the standard remains virtually unchanged. See, e.g., Ross v. Pick, 86 A.2d 463, 469 (Md.
1952) ("[w]e adopt the rule that there is no specific age of a child at which his wishes should be
consulted and given weight by the court. The matter depends upon the extent of the child's
mental development.").
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erly belonged. Since paternal right was no longer absolute, courts could
not decide custodial rights without inquiring into the relevant facts and
circumstances.
The law ultimately vested in the courts a double discretion. First,
the court could decide whether to use the "best interests" test or, if the
child was of suitable age and maturity, it could let the child make the
decision. Second, as there was no set age of maturity, the court could

use its own discretion in determining the maturity of the child. 42 Naturally, the court was likely to find the child to be sufficiently mature if the
child made a decision which the court thought was correct.4 3 Courts

developed a practice of asking the child with which party she would like
to live, but would follow the child's request only when the court thought
it was appropriate. Thus, the child's preference, which had carried dispositive weight in custody cases, now provided only evidence for the

court to utilize.44 Within a few years, courts were finding reasons, such

as immaturity, 45 or undue influence by relatives, 4 6 to disregard even the
42. See Marshall v. Reams, 32 Fla. 499 (1893). The Marshall court held:
Welfare, controls 'choice,' and the court will not permit the choice of the infant to
lead it into an improper custody .... The decisions in this country do not fix any
definite number of years when the age of discretion begins, but mental capacity is
the test, and when the minor shows sufficient capacity mentally to exercise an
intelligent choice, and no objection can be made to the person chosen, the court will
ordinarily allow such choice to prevail.
Id. at 503-04 (emphasis added).
43. The converse was also true. For example, in Rust v. Vanvacter, 9 W. Va. 600, 613
(1866), the court awarded custody of a nine year old girl, who had lived most of her life with her
maternal grandparents, to her father. The court disregarded the girl's wish to remain with her
grandparents, finding her immature and unlettered. Id.
44. See New York ex rel. Wilcox v. Wilcox., 22 Barb. 178 (N.Y. App. Div. 1854). For
various reasons, a nine year old girl had been living with her paternal grandparents since birth.
When the maternal grandfather died, the child inherited a substantial estate. The mother was
named trustee, and, thereafter, petitioned to regain custody. Id. at 179-81. The child wanted to
stay with her grandparents. Id. at 183. While the court praised the child's intelligence and
maturity, it, nonetheless, awarded custody to the mother. Id. at 194; see also Albert v. Perry, 14
N.J. Eq. 540, 545 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1862) (explaining that the court interviewed the child for the
purpose of evaluating her care, not so that it could consider her wishes in determining custody).
45. In State v. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272 (1860), the court ignored the wish of a seven-year-old
to stay with a distant relative rather than return to her father, and held the opinion of a child
younger than fourteen was subordinate to a father's right to custody. Id. at 276. Although a
consistent trend was developing against honoring the child's choice, the courts were not
unanimous. See, e.g., Ellis v. Jesup, 74 Ky. (11 Bush.) 403 (Ky. 1875) where the court respected
the wish of an "intelligent" child of nearly fourteen years. Relying on Delaval, Smith, M'Dowle,
and Woolstonecraft, the court stated that the child's "choice should control the action of the court
in the matter." Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
46. In Wilson v. Mitchell, 111 P. 21, 30 (Colo. 1910) the court granted custody of a 10-yearold to his mother despite the boy's desire to remain with his paternal grandparents who had raised
him. The court advised,
It is urged that as... Russell's preference was to stay with his grandparents .... we
should recognize that preference and let the child remain where it is .

. .

. In
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firmly-stated preferences of teenagers.4 7
By the end of the nineteenth century, the writ of habeas corpus in

child custody cases had become a mere homonym with the writ in adult
improper imprisonment cases. 48 The child had lost the liberty to deter-

mine custody for himself. By 1887, the District Court of Alaska
asserted: "The habeas corpus proceeding would be a mockery if, after
all, the child should be permitted to decide for himself where he will go,

or under whose roof he will shelter. '49 The state's traditional interest in
raising children to be moral citizens was heightened by the social-engineering approach of the "child savers;" 50 with burgeoning immigration,
intrusive parentalism seemed justified to "civilize" children into good
considering the aversion to his mother it must be remembered that prior to this
contest there was . . . the tenderest love and affection .... [T]he aversion is the
result of ... the bitterness aroused by this contest ... [that] has been... instilled in
the child ....

Id.
47. E.g., In re Neff, 56 P. 383, 384 (Wash. 1899) (In a contest between the stepfather and
father for custody of a 15-year-old, a 13-year-old, and a 10-year-old, the court stated: "But little
weight.., can be attached to the wishes of the children, as it appears they had not seen their father
for years, and had been surrounded by influences that perhaps would not make them think
favorably of him."); see also Giffin v. Gascoigne, 47 A. 25, 26 (N.J. Ch. 1900).
48. See Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States 1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243,
270-74 (1964). The conventional wisdom, challenged here, assumes that this distortion of the
writ's function allowed the courts flexibility in making decisions about the child.
49. In re Can-Ah-Couqua, 29 F. 687, 690 (D. Alaska 1887) (emphasis added). A nativeAlaskan mother sought to reclaim her nine year old son who, four years earlier, had been placed at
a Presbyterian mission school pursuant to a five-year verbal apprenticeship agreement. The
presiding judge stated: "I can only look to the capacity, information, intelligence, and judgment
of the child, and I am clearly of the opinion that [he] has not yet reached that discretion which
would enable him to choose wisely." Id. at 690. Can-Ah-Couqua forms a stark contrast to earlier
cases such as Hamilton, M'Dowle, and Fox. No doubt, the court's misplaced cultural chauvinism
propelled it to find a need to "civilize" the Native American child and therefore make a
disposition contrary to decisions regarding young recruits to the Christian, work-oriented Shakers.
Still, in 1810, a boy of nine was deemed mature and intelligent enough to choose his custodian. In
1890, he was not.
50. The efforts of the social reforming "child-savers" were focused in areas such as adoption,
neglect and abandonment, and delinquency. In these instances the state intervened to remove
children from the custody of their parents. See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY
To CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 92-119 (1994).
Intrafamilial custody adjudication was inevitably affected by the spillover from legal institutions
expanding the parens patriae role of the state and by the xenophobically-tinged, do-gooder
ideology to which exploding cultural and economic diversity gave birth. Certainly, immigrant
slum children were not to be given voices of their own.
The cause of immorality among poor children was traced to an improper
environment; but the slum child was to be saved less for his own sake than because
he was a potential threat to society. As Charles Loring Brace [founder of the
Children's Aid Society] warned, "This dangerous class has not yet begun to show
itself as it will in eight or ten years, when these boys and girls are matured....
[t]hey will have the same rights as ourselves.... [T]hey will poison society."
BERNARD WIsHY, THE CHILD AND THE REPUBLIC 16 (1968) (quoting CHARLES L. BRACE, FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY 12-13 (1854)).
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citizenship."1 Children's choices were used to "break ties" if the law
was unclear, if the equities were equally balanced, 2 or if the court
wanted to go against the general weight of the law by awarding custody
to a non-parent.53

Otherwise, children's wishes were disparaged. The 1930s case of
Alan Glendening, the son of heiress Alicia Maddox DuPont, is illustrative.5 4 In a petition for change of custody from his father to his mother,
Alan, who was almost seventeen, and the top student in his class at the
prestigious Lincoln School, stated emphatically that he wanted to live
with his mother.5 5 Yet the court denied his request, 56 using the same
rationale for this elite, educated young man that had been applied fifty
51. Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REv. 177, 182
(1916). Pound claims:
It is important to distinguish the individual interests in domestic relations from the
social interest in the family and marriage as social institutions. This social interest
must play an important part in determining what individual interests in such
relations are to be secured, how far they are to be secured and how they are to be
secured ....
Today certain social interests are chiefly regarded. These are on the
one hand a social interest in the maintenance of the family as a social institution and
on the other hand a social interest in the protection of dependent persons, in
securing to all individuals a moral and social life and in the rearing and training of
sound and well-bred citizens for the future.
Id. Thus, courts make their own decisions about what is good for the child. See, e.g., In re Steele,
81 S.W. 1182 (Mo. Ct. App. 1904) (explaining that custody cases are difficult because the affections of the claimants and the child oftentimes run contrary to the best interests of the child).
52. See Illinois ex rel. Hickey v. Hickey, 86 I11.App. 20 (III. App. Ct. 1899) (considering a
child's wishes in a custody suit between two adulterous parents); Rallihan v. Motschmann, 200
S.W. 358, 363 (Ky. 1918) (holding that the child's wishes will be considered only where the
court's decision is unclear).
53. See Neville v. Reed, 32 So. 659 (Ala. 1902) (holding child's preference to stay with his
guardian was controlling although the law would place the child with a surviving parent); see also,
Garrett v. Mahaley, 75 So. 10 (Ala. 1917) (relying on the wishes of nine year old girl to uphold
custodial award to putative father who otherwise had no parental rights); Arkansas ex rel.
Rosenstein v. Hoover, 229 S.W. 15 (Ark. 1921) (denying change in custody from guardian to
mother's sister because of child's desire to remain with guardian). Rollin Hurd states: "It is not
the whim or caprice of the child which the court respects, but its feelings, its attachments, its
reasonable preference, and its probable contentment." HuRD, supra note 20, at 533. However,
Hurd explains that the wishes of children of sufficient capacity to choose for themselves should be
given special consideration when their parents have for a long time voluntarily allowed them to
live in the family of another. Id. at 535-40.
54. New York ex rel. Glendening v. Glendening, 19 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1940).
55. Id. at 697-700.
56. The court stated it was "firmly convinced that the boy's welfare, his real and enduring
happiness and his true and best interests will be served by continuing custody in the father...
especially now when the boy is of an age that requires more than ever before the strong, loving
paternal influence and guidance the father has demonstrated he can give." Id. at 700. Justice
Callahan wrote an outraged dissent:
The boy has grown to be almost seventeen years of age. He is well through his
high school course .... In a very short time the boy will be able to make a choice
over which the courts shall have no control .

. .

. The father has had far more

opportunity to win the boy's affection than has had the mother. Yet, he has not been
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years earlier in In re Can-Ah-Couqua, where the District Court of
Alaska denied a native-Alaskan child the freedom to return to his
mother. The court reasoned: "To rule otherwise is to disregard the
established facts, practically to abandon the jurisdiction of the court, and
make a boy of sixteen the sole judge of his own moral, intellectual,
physical and spiritual welfare."" Childhood itself had become a disenfranchised minority status.5
Fortunately there were a few notable exceptions.5 9 An Ohio statute
operative during the 1940s6 ° and a Utah statute in effect until 1969,61
granted children ten years of age and older a legally binding choice as to
their custodial parent, provided that parent was fit. 62 The Ohio statute
actually gave children a significant amount of control over their own
lives. For example, in Dailey v. Dailey,6 3 two children were originally
in their mother's custody. The court held that the older daughter's tenth
birthday constituted a change of circumstances sufficient to permit a
determination as to change of custody.' In making that determination,
the girl's request to live with her father was binding on the court as a
matter of law.65 The older girl's decision also affected her sibling, since
the appellate court found that the older child's move constituted a
change of circumstances, enabling the trial court to rule that the siblings
should not be separated.6 6
able to prevent his boy from preferring to be with his mother ....
He is of sufficient
maturity to warrant our respecting his choice.
Id. at 702-03 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 700.
58. See Stapleton v. Poynter, 63 S.W. 730, 731-32 (Ky. 1901), where the preference of a nine
year old boy to remain with his grandparents was subordinated to his mother's claim to custody as
a matter of right.
59. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Humex v. Phelps, 109 N.Y.S. 625, 627-28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1908) (relying on the established reciprocal affective ties as expressed by a "remarkably
intelligent" 10 year old girl to deny the mother's petition for change of custody from the foster
parents).
60. 1945 Ohio Laws 568 stated, in pertinent part: "[I]f. ..children be ten years of age or
more, they must be allowed to choose which parent they prefer to live with, unless the parent so
selected, by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness or incapacity, be unfitted to take
charge of such children, in which event the court shall determine the custodian ...."
61. 1895 Utah Laws 30-3-5 (amended 1969). In Anderson v. Anderson, 172 P.2d 132, 136
(Utah 1946), the Utah Supreme Court held that the child's preference was controlling in an initial
custody determination but not in a modification of custody. The 1969 change to the statute
deleted all mention of the child's preference. 1969 Utah Laws 30-3-5.
62. Cf.GA. CODE AN. § 19-9-3 (1994) (allowing children 14 years of age and older to
choose their custodians provided they are fit).
63. 64 N.E.2d 246 (Ohio 1945).
64. Id. at 247.
65. Id.
66. Id. The statute was routinely applied. E.g., Rauth v. Rauth, 57 N.E.2d 266, 268 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1943). It was sometimes strictly interpreted. See Godbey v. Godbey, 44 N.E.2d 810 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1942). In the few brief years in which this statute was in place, the Ohio courts dealt
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Children's rights were soon abridged. By 1950, the Ohio statute
had been modified to allow only children ages fourteen and older to
have a dispositive choice regarding the custodial parent.67 By 1956, the
statute had been modified further: "must be allowed to choose" was
changed to "may be allowed to choose"-replacing the child's judgment
8

6
with the court's.

Beginning around World War II, judicial treatment of the child's
preference changed again. Rather than merely being weighed lightly by
the court, that preference became subject to intense scrutiny by psychiatrists and psychologists. For example, in the 1945 case, In re Heller,69
one of the first published decisions relying on expert psychiatric testimony,7° the court convened a panel of three psychiatrists whose report
carried great weight in the ultimate conclusion that the mother of the
eleven year old boy should not have visitation rights.7 ' The psychiatrists
testified that visitation would be injurious to the child as "likely to produce a mental disorder of the folie a deux type and further cause conflicts and difficulties ...[and] a neurotic state ....
Gradually, the voice of the child was buried so deep under the
mental health expert's opinion that it could not be heard without expert
with many problems arising under it. In Schwalenberg v. Schwalenberg, 29 N.E.2d 617, 618
(Ohio Ct. App. 1940), though the mother charged that her son had been unduly influenced with
activities and gifts by his father, the appellate court sustained an award of custody to the father.
The court found that "this entertainment occurred in the natural course of events in the household"
and "was the natural expression of affection of a father for his son .... Id. Furthermore, the
court concluded that undue influence at the hearing was insured against by "agreement of counsel
[that] the boy was interviewed privately by the court before a stenographer as to his choice at a
time when he was divorced from the influence of both parents ...."Id.
67. See Rowe v. Rowe, 97 N.E.2d 223, 225 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950). Under the new statute, the
voices of the state investigators in their parens patriae functions were given more credence than
those of the child. Id. For example, in Newman v. Newman, 104 N.E.2d 707 (Ohio Ct. App.
1951) the appellate court reversed the trial court's determination that an eight-year-old should
remain in the custody of the father, based on her own statement of preference. Additionally, the
court awarded custody to the mother based on the investigator's report that "she is little less than a
scullery servant and required to look after and care for the small children of appellee and his
present wife, who curses and beats her .... Id. at 709.
68. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Anderson 1992); see, e.g., Watson v. Watson, 146
N.E.2d 443, 445-46 Ct. (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) (denying a 14-year-old's preference to live with her
mother under the new statute, because the mother had committed adultery by having an affair with
her second husband before he had succeeded in obtaining a divorce).
69. 54 N.Y.S.2d 734 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945).
70. During the mid to late 1940s courts routinely appointed mental health experts and custody
evaluators. Not all litigants, however, welcomed such use of experts. See Jones v. Jones, 161
P.2d 890, 893 (Wash. 1945) (father's attorney rejected court's recommendation that a social
worker visit the home).
71. Heller, 54 N.Y.S.2d at 735. Apparently the mother had a history of psychiatric illness,
though the opinion does not state this.
72. Id.

19941

CHILDREN'S CHOICE

excavation. Consider, for example, the case of Steve Daryl Doherty,73
whose parents provided in their divorce decree that when Steve "reaches
the age that he can express an intelligent preference with regard to his
custody, he shall have the right to express said preference and that the
parties hereto shall abide by that preference . .

. .-

When he turned

eleven, Steve decided to live with his mother.7 5 At trial a psychologist,
a psychiatrist, and two teachers testified, and, based on their testimony, a
special verdict was rendered that Steve had, indeed, reached the age at
which he could express an intelligent preference.7 6

The Heller court based its decision on an alchemical table of
mental horrors that denigrates the autonomy of the child in a way which
would have been inconceivable to the MDowle court. That court, 130
years earlier, had convened a panel of three attorneys to make certain
that a child of roughly the same age was forming his own decision about
his custody.7 7 Similarly, the adversarial diagnostics of the Doherty case

are a far cry from the helpful energies exerted by the M'Dowle court in
helping a boy of almost the same age to exercise his rights.
This brief history reveals that the therapeutic paradigm was neither
inevitable nor necessarily benign. With the demise of absolute paternal
right in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, a door opened
briefly on a legal vision of the child as a developing person who could
be assisted by the court towards the independent exercise of important
rights. That door soon slammed shut. To understand why, we must
examine the claims advanced by various family members, who competed for control of the child.
B. Mother's Tonic for Tender Years and Grandma's Glue of Earned
Affection
Many of the legal assumptions about the child's sensitivity and vulnerability used to justify a protectivist approach are rationalized today
by recourse to psychological theory. But their antecedents are the legal
arguments used by mothers and grandmothers during the nineteenth century to win custody of children in the face of paternal right claims.
Looking at the nineteenth century cases with a litigator's eye, we
can examine the relationship between nineteenth century law and nine73. Doherty v. Dean, 337 S.W. 2d 153 (Tex. 1960).
74. Id. at 155.
75. Id. at 156.
76. Id. at 159. The verdict was affirmed by an appeals court which found "that the best
interest of the minor required that his permanent custody be awarded in accordance with his
expressed choice." Id.
77. See In re M'Dowle, 8 Johns. 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811); and supra text accompanying
notes 30-35.
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teenth century family structure, to understand how legal doctrine became
the grist of legal arguments for adults seeking custody, and how legal
conflict among adults came to effectuate doctrinal changes. 78
Nineteenth century child custody law can be summarized as follows: "Best-interests," or as it was then known, the child's "welfare,"
was of paramount concern.79 The de facto presumption was that older
children belonged with fathers, who could suitably "educate" them,
younger children of "tender" years and sometimes girls or sickly children belonged with mothers, who could "nurture" them." The rules,
however, left room for argument; tender years was never age specific.81
78. This approach departs from standard doctrinal history, which focuses on the logic of
courts and the policies of legislatures while ignoring the ways law is shaped by its ordinary users.
It is also a departure from the approach of social historians of the law who see legal arguments as
accurate reflections of the social construction of controversies among ordinary users of the law at
different times. See generally ROBERT L. GRISWOLD, FAMILY AND DIVORCE IN CALIFORNIA,
1850-1890 (1982); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1985); ELAINE T. MAY, GREAT EXPECrATIONS: MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE IN POST-VICTORIAN AMERICA (1980); Nancy F. Cott, Eighteenth-Century Family and

Social Life Revealed in Massachusetts Divorce Records, 10 J. Soc. HIST. 20 (1976). Rather, it is
assumed that there is a body of legal doctrine and dicta which reflects the dominant values of the
period, and that litigants, in bringing their controversies to court, will emphasize, to the point of
exaggeration, those facts which give them the advantage when applying the existing doctrine to

their case and will ignore facts unrelated to the legal doctrine. If the doctrine is concerned with
the health of children, the law will ask many questions about illness, diet, and adjustment, and will
ask little or nothing about adventurousness, autonomy, or individuality. Ultimately, questions
asked and answered, judicial opinion, and dicta will result in the development of a legal vision of

the child which places significance only on certain parts of the child's personality. Cf. PHILIPPE
ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 25-32 (1962) (arguing

that there was no special vision of children during the Middle Ages); Janet E. Ainsworth, ReImagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile
Court, 69 N.C. L. Rv. 1081, 1084 (1991) (arguing that the distinctive characteristics of the
juvenile justice system are based on a faulty and obsolete vision of children).
79. Mary A. Greene, The American Mother's Right to Her Child, 52 AM. L. REV. 371, 373
(1918).
80. As compared to "education" (the masculine form of the concept of "rearing"), "nurture"
(the feminine form) carried an association with immaturity. Although the emphasis on "nurture"
was undoubtedly a boon to mothers in custody battles, the association of the "nurture" concept
with immaturity had several consequences which perpetuated the gender imbalance between
mothers and fathers. First, mothers gained custody of young children while fathers continued to
receive custody of older children, who were frequently considered financial assets. Second, the
"natural nurturer" stereotype, ironically promoted by many feminist groups, had the unfortunate
secondary effect of confining women to the domestic sphere. GROSSBERG, supra note 78, at 24450. "Tender years" ideology was a double-edged sword.
81. In the nineteenth century, the word "child" was "used loosely to cover the years from
infancy to what we now call early adolescence." WISHY, supra note 50. Theologian Horace
Bushnell distinguished developmental stages: an early stage in which the child was sensible to
impressions; and a later stage in which the child was sensible to influence and reason. He was not
precise about the associated ages, however. The earlier stage might have ended with toddlerhood
or continued until six or seven years of age. HORACE BUSHNELL, CHRISTIAN NURTURE 198-213
(1847), reprinted in CHILD-REARING CONCEPTS, 1628-1861, at 137 (Philip J. Greven, Jr. ed.,
1973). The term "adolescence" was invented in 1904. STANLEY HALL, ADOLESCENCE (1904).
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Parents could forfeit their presumptive rights by immorality or unfitness,
qualities which would make them unsuitable to perform the role "natural" to their gender. 82 The law was sometimes stated as a paternal right
to custody subject to a tender years exception; sometimes as a pair of
parental gender/offspring age presumptions-a difference which varied
jurisdictionally, temporally, and idiosyncratically.
Nineteenth century family structure was complex. The typical
nineteenth century litigated custody case involved an extended family,
often divided among three households. After dissolution of a marriage
by death or divorce, parents typically moved in with other family members. 83 While some cases were merely inter-parental custody battles at
divorce, two other scenarios were commonplace. In the first, a divorced
couple would leave their young children with grandparents while they
went to earn a living and reestablish their lives. Some years later,
recently remarried, with new home and household, mother or father

would again seek the children's custody. In the second scenario, the
mother would die in childbirth, and the father would leave the baby with
the grandparents until he remarried and would then seek to regain

custody.
The way custody battles took shape reflected the natural-law thinking of the period.84 In the judicial discourse, both fathers and mothers
82. During the mid-nineteenth century, leaving one's husband without cause was often
deemed a barrier to maternal custody. Further, often when the custodial preference seemed to tip
in favor of one gender, vicious allegations of drunken, violent, and gambling fathers, and wanton
and adulterous mothers, were mutually hurled. See, e.g., Van Buren v. Van Buren, 198 N.W. 584
(Mich. 1924) (overcoming tender years presumption because mother took child with her on an
adulterous escapade); Arix v. Arix, 180 N.W. 463 (Mich. 1920) (awarding custody to father
because mother had a lover). But see In re Pinnell, 198 P. 215, 217 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921)
(statutory tender years presumption prevails); Stafford v. Stafford, 132 N.E. 452, 458 (I11.1921)
(father prevails against maternal aunt only by proving through many witnesses that the charges of
drunkenness and gambling against him were fabricated); Sorge v. Sorge, 191 P. 817, 818 (Wash.
1920) (tender years presumption outweighs possible moral fault in awarding custody to the
mother). In fact, it was not until the 1950s that the reflexive application of the maternal
presumption made it almost impossible for fathers to obtain custody without attacking the
mothers' morality. The change in sexual mores, to which the law was pretending to be blind,
made it extremely easy to prove the "adultery" of one's estranged spouse. During that period, the
custody cases begin to read like a litany of vituperative attacks on the chastity of mothers.
83. These family members were most often parents, but included siblings, aunts, uncles, or
cousins. Further, parents who were "single," intending to live either on their own or in a boarding
house, were singularly disadvantaged in custody determinations. Courts found single parent
homes in which children would live among strangers unsuitable, where no preexisting bonds of
blood or association with the child existed. See, e.g., Jones v. Darnall, 2 N.E. 229, 230 (Ind. 1885)
(allowing grandparents to retain custody after mother's death because father "had no wife and no
family, and worked by the month, and went from place to place"); see also Gardenhire v. Hinds,
38 Tenn. (1 Head) 402 (1858).
84. Characteristic of the nineteenth century concept of child rearing was a Lockean
environmentalism, in which children were viewed as tabulae rasae, capable of being shaped into
ideal Americans through proper environment and parental role models; what was "proper" was
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fulfilled their natural functions as educators or nurturers by acting as
role models for their children. Mothers were believed to be fitted by
nature for the nurture of their children, while fathers were believed to be
naturally suited to their "education"-a broad term 5 which embraced
socialization to one's economic station in life, good republican citizenship, and Christian morality. 6 The father's natural right to educate his

children derived from his natural role.87
Because gender roles were conceived as inherently different, children, envisioned in Lockean style as toddler tabulae rasae,were deemed
to need parents of both genders as appropriate role models.88 In making
largely based on an essentialist idea of development. See Lee E. Teitelbaum, Correspondence,
Moral Discourse and Family Law, 84 MICH. L. REv. 430, 431-32 (1985).
85. MARY CABLE, THE LITTLE DARLINGS: A HISTORY OF CHILD REARING IN AMERICA 77
(1975). Cable explains:
Book learning was still a small and rather unimportant part of what was understood
to be meant by the word education. According to The Parent'sMonitor and Young
People's Friend, one of the many parents' magazines that began to appear after
1830, education meant 'the implanting of right dispositions, the cultivation of the
heart, the guidance of the temper, the formation of character.'
Id.
86. For at least the first half of the nineteenth century, the most influential books on child
rearing were written by theologians. Although the puritan Calvinistic tone had lightened, the
emphasis was nonetheless moral. The goal of American child rearing was "to guarantee that
every child could be as just in resisting the world as he was powerful in commanding it, or, put
another way, that a child could be raised without sacrificing Christian faith and morality, worldly
success, and the happiness implied in the American ideals of 1776." WISHY, supra note 50, at 1012. Wishy suggests that the very task of rearing children to fulfill such contrary goals may have
contributed to the child-as-patient paradigm: "the very way in which moralists defined the
alternatives for the child doubled anxiety about his possibilities and deepened frustration with his
failures." Id. at 10.
87. Johnson v. Terry, 34 Conn. 259, 263 (1867) ("That the father is entitled to the custody
and control of his minor children, even to the exclusion of the mother, is elementary law. The
right arises necessarily from and is incident to his duty to maintain, protect and educate them.")
Throughout the nineteenth century, the father's custodial right and responsibility was phrased in
terms of his educative function. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Barry v. Mercein, 3 Hill 399, 415
(N.Y. 1842) ("[The father] ... is qualified, and eminently so, for the moral and mental instruction
of this child .... "). In Verser v. Ford, 37 Ark. 27 (1881), the court explained:
[I]n the great majority of cases, his greater ability and knowledge of the world
renders him the fittest protector, although that is not the test. The preference is
conceded to the ties of duty and affection, and attends the primary obligation of the
father to maintain, educate and promote the happiness of the child, according to his
own best judgment and the means within his power. Any system of jurisprudence
which would enable the Courts, in their discretion and with a view solely to the
child's best interests, to take from him that right and interfere with those duties,
would be intolerably tyrannical, as well as Utopian.
Id. at 30.
88. WIsHY, supra note 50, at 32. According to the author, "[E]nvironment, persuasion,
example, precept, carefully formed habits were thus stressed by both the orthodox and the more
benign nurture enthusiasts." Id. Furthermore, the maternal custody presumption was by no means
universal. In the late nineteenth century, in Welch v. Welch, 33 Wis. 534 (1873), a court
considered custody of a boy aged 14, well beyond his tender years. The father had married the
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or changing a custodial placement, therefore, nineteenth century courts
pragmatically appraised the entire household constellation, and the relationship between the custody-seeking parties. When maternal custody
was considered, it was assumed that a grandfather, male sibling, or uncle
would play the role of the paternal parent. In making a choice for maternal custody, therefore, there was no question but that the child would
also have an in-house male role model who would provide the educative
prong of the child's rearing. Similarly, when paternal custody was at
issue, there had to be no doubt in the judicial mind that the "nurture"
prong would be fulfilled by a woman. 89 Thus, in reaching a determination the court considered who in the paternal home might fulfill the
female nurturant prong. 90
In essence, the issue in the nineteenth century was not which parent
could do a better job, but whether the father should have custody as the
child was "nurtured" by women from the father's family, or the mother
should have custody as the child was "educated" by men from the
mother's family. The necessity for the child to have both nurturing and
education led to the exercise of broad judicial discretion dependent
mother because she was pregnant and was suing him for support. He deserted her a year later and
never supported or visited his son. Id. at 535-38. At the time the father sought custody, the
mother was remarried and was living in a Christian community with a good school and church,
both of which the boy regularly attended. The father was running a gambling saloon. Id. Yet the
Wisconsin Supreme Court found that an award of custody to the father was not an abuse of
discretion. Although Wisconsin had a seemingly progressive statute governed by the child's
welfare, and authorizing the courts to use their discretion in awarding custody to either parent, the
court turned its discretionary authority against the mother by reading a common law paternal
preference into the statute. Id. at 541-42.
89. For example, in In re Turner, 19 N.J. Eq. 433, 434-35 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1868) the court
considered the family household constellation in deciding between the paternal and maternal
grandfathers as possible custodians of an orphan girl. "[M]uch evidence was taken on both sides,
as to the capability of the paternal and maternal grandfathers, and their families to take care of and
educate the child. Each grandfather has in his family several unmarried daughters, willing and
able to care for and attend to the infant." Id; see also Wand v. Wand, 14 Cal. 512, 518 (1860)
("Indeed, if the dominion of the child should be given to the father, it is very evident that he must
confide her to some female to care for and keep her .... "); Foster v. Alston, 4 Miss. 406, 459
(1842) (granting custody of children to remarried mother over bachelor uncle because no female
would be available to perform motherly duties); New York ex rel. Rhoades v. Humphreys, 24
Barb. 521 (N.Y. App. Div. 1857) (sustaining father's claim to custody because he took his six
month old baby from his estranged wife and placed it in the care of his mother).
90. E.g., Umlauf v. Umlauf, 21 N.E. 600, 601 (Ill. 1889) (awarding custody of nine year old
boy to father, in part because mother was employed and would be unable to devote sufficient time
to the child; in the father's home, the child's older sister would attend to him); see also New York
ex rel. Barry v. Mercein, 3 Hill 399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842). In Barry, so closely matched in their
suitability as parents were the mother and father, that the father had to petition for habeas corpus
four times before the court finally determined that the child was past her tender years and should
be placed in the custody of her father. Id. at 404. Significant in the decisional calculus of each
case was the availability of a father-figure in the mother's home, and mother-figures in the
father's home, so that each household was capable of fulfilling both the educative and nurturance
prongs.
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heavily upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 9 1
Throughout the century, many courts acknowledged claims of
paternal right, 92 while mothers needed fact-specific arguments to tip the
balance in their favor. The "tender years" doctrine was developed as a
maternal rights strategy on the theory that biological mothers were naturally better at nurturing. Beginning as a narrowly crafted exception for
nursing babies or seriously sickly children, the doctrine grew to encompass all small children, all female children, and those children of "delicate health."
The "tender years" doctrine did not follow a linear course in overtaking paternal rights. 93 Later courts tried to introduce a "moral threshold" for triggering the "tender years" inquiry. 94 Judges feared that
permitting mothers who left their spouses without just cause to retain
custody of their children would cause divorces to proliferate, destroying
the integrity of the family,95 the institution considered to be the central
91. Courts also considered the household's financial ability to support a child. Although
child support was occasionally awarded during the nineteenth century, it was neither obligatory
nor common. The rule seems to have been, "when husband and wife are divorced, if they agree
that he shall support the children, although she retains them, he will be liable. But a mere divorce
gives her no authority to bind the husband for the child's support." Brow v. Brightman, 136 Mass.
187 (1883) (citation omitted).
92. The "idea" of paternal authority seems to have outlived the reality. Bernard Wishy
observes that the same authors who wrote child-rearing advice directed to mothers also wrote
books for children portraying the father as the head of the family. WiSHY, supra note 50, at 55.
93. Some of the earlier nineteenth century cases awarded custody to the mother, even in the
presence of her moral fault. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. Later American cases
temporarily retreated from this liberal position. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text;
see also New York ex rel. Nickerson, 19 Wend. 16, 16 (N.Y. 1837) (applying a seemingly
distorted interpretation to New York statute authorizing the court to give mother custody of
children as the case might require, deeming its provisions applicable only where the separation
was upon cause or by consent). In the latter half of the twentieth century, courts seem to have
again shifted towards liberalism, with the issue of mothers' moral fault returning to the focus
again.
94. New York ex rel. Brooks v. Brooks, 35 Barb. 85 (N.Y. App. Div. 1861), held that if the
parties were equally lacking in moral fault, the father had superior rights, but where fault existed
in either party, it should be determinative. Id. at 92-93.
95. Courts thought that mothers were more likely to remain with their children than were
fathers. E.g., Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203, 204 (1834) ("[u]nless there is
some justifiable cause of separation, the Court ought not to sanction the unauthorized separation
of husband and wife by ordering the child into the custody of the mother, thus separated and out of
the custody of the father."). The dissenting opinion in New York ex rel. Barry v. Mercein, 3 Hill
399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842), which favored the mother, was silent on the implications of the
doctrine, limiting its language to a discussion only of the child's health, as though "tender years"
were a neutral and child-centered doctrine. Id. at 423-26 (Nelson, C.J., dissenting). The majority
opinion gives ample expression to this concern, and its potential for destroying the father's
primary right to custody, by extending the "tender years" doctrine throughout the length of the
child's minority.
When we are told ... that this child is still in such delicate health as to require a
mother's care, the first answer which strikes the mind is the generality and
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building block of the new American society. Especially after passage of
the Married Woman's Property Acts96 in the late nineteenth century,
conservative courts worried that gender equality would sound the death
knell for the family as an institution. Courts, therefore, established
stricter standards for invoking the "tender years" doctrine. 97 Evidence to
support granting a divorce was examined in tantalizing detail. Thereafter, the matter of a parent's moral fault in causing the divorce resurfaced
in various guises as a bar to custody. 98
Thus, courts applied the "tender years" doctrine more stringently to
mothers they regarded as less "moral." In the mid-nineteenth century,
where a mother would seek a divorce without what a court considered
just cause, the court recognized a "tender years" exception to the paternal right to custody only where very sick babies were involved. 99 The
unsatisfactory nature of the allegation-an allegation by which, if allowed, the
[father] may still be baffled till his child is twenty-one.
Id. at 413. When a court deemed the wife had deserted the husband without just cause it might
award the father custody to induce her to return to the marital relationship. See, e.g., Carr v. Carr,
63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 168, 174-76 (1872).
96. Under early common law, a married woman was under severe economic disabilities; the
husband had ownership and control of her property under the theory that the couple were "one."
In the 1800s, state legislatures enacted a series of statutes to eliminate the wife's financial
disabilities. These were known as The Married Woman's Property Acts. PETER N. SWISHER ET
AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 281-82 (1990).
97. The seemingly stricter standards which courts applied to potential custodial mothers
during the mid-nineteenth century represented a broad based attempt to counteract the liberalizing
tendencies surfacing in legislatures and society in general. Two influential books of the period,
both directed primarily towards mothers, emphasized gently guiding and nurturing the child
towards Christian virtue. LYDIA H. SIGOURNEY, LETTERS TO MOTHERS (1938); BUSHNELL, supra
note 81. These books mark the decisive point of change from previous stem Calvinistic views.
See CRISPUS (ANONYMOUS), ON THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN (1814), reprinted in CHILDREARING CONCEPTS, 1628-1861, supra note 81, at 99 ("The root and foundation of misconduct in
children is human depravity; depravity in the parent, and depravity in the child. This ought never
to be overlooked, nor forgotten in any of our systems of education .... ). Maternal associations,
and mothers' magazines encouraging mothers to gently steer children toward Christianity at their
own pace also emerged during this period. See WISHY, supra note 50, at 28-30; see also CABLE,
supra note 85, at 90-91. Taking a more secular approach to the moralistic child care experts of
the nineteenth century, Cable also acknowledges the emergent gentleness and says that such books
as JOHN ABBOTT, THE MOTHER AT HoME (1833) and THEODORE DWIGHT, THE FATHER'S BOOK
(1834), both extremely popular in the 1830s, "tempered their Calvinism with compassion ...
CABLE, supra note 85, at 91.
98. During the twentieth century, adultery, rather than separation without cause, became the
primary moral failing which served as an argument against custody. See, e.g., Duncan v. Duncan,
80 So. 697 (Miss. 1919) (awarding custody to father in part because of mother's adultery); Jensen
v. Jensen, 170 N.W. 735, 736 (Wis. 1919) (accepting argument that mother's remarriage prior to a
statutory waiting period constituted adultery sufficient to deprive mother of custody).
99. In Carr v. Carr, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 168 (1872), a young wife had too hastily left her
husband who, though rude, petulant, and ill-tempered, was not violent toward her. For three
years, the husband entreated her to return. The court granted the mother neither custody nor
visitation and postponed the divorce decree for six months, noting that both parties were to blame,
and urging the couple to work out their differences. Id. at 176. Carr is an example of the efforts
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harder it was to prevail on the exception, the harder mothers tried to
convince courts that their children were sickly, nervous, and
dependent.'00
to constrain the "tender years" doctrine by finding the wife's unjustified desertion of her husband,
in and of itself, to constitute a type of immoral conduct because of its threat to family integrity.
Although, in the court's view, the blame regarding the problems in the relationship was equally
distributed, id. at 175, the mother's moral failure in leaving, without just cause, a marriage which
the husband desired to continue served as a limitation upon her "tender years" claim. The fouryear-old had been living with the mother since the separation. The court, decided "[the tender
nursing period has passed by, and the time for moral training and impressions has arrived .... "
Id. at 174. The court stated further, "she hag undertaken, of her own accord, to disregard and
sever the sacred bond of marriage ...we are asked to compel the father and deserted husband to
allow his innocent and unoffending daughter to share with the mother this undefined, ambiguous
position, this burden of disgrace, during the critical period of moral training and education ......
Id.
In a later case, relying heavily on Carr and Barry, the court further restricted the "tender
years" doctrine to a special case exception. Latham v. Latham, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 307 (1878). In
Latham, the court denied custody to a mother, finding no legal basis for the divorce or separation
and that "the infant is a male child four years of age-not sickly or feeble-with nothing in its
condition requiring the special attention of the mother beyond that of any other infant of like age."
Id. at 335. It stated the law thus:
In this country the doctrine is not materially different from that now held by the
English Courts. The father is universally considered as having claims paramount to
those of the mother, his legal authority only yielding to the claims of the infant,
whenever the morals or interests of the others strongly require it. Whenever the
father so conducts himself that it will not be for the benefit of the children to live
with him, if his domestic habits, associations or opinions are such as tend to the
injury of his children, the court will withdraw them from him and confer the custody
of them upon the mother, or take the children from both and commit them to some
third person to nurture and educate .... In passing upon the claims of the parents,
the court will enquire who is most to blame for the separation, giving the preference
to the innocent party, because with such a party the infant is most likely to be cared
for properly.
Id. at 332-33 (citation omitted); see also New York ex rel. Rhoades v. Humphreys, 24 Barb. 521
(N.Y. App. Div. 1857). Without even considering "tender years," this harsh decision sustained
the removal of a six-month-old from the mother, awarding custody to the father, and finding that
the mother had no right to the child. Although the husband
has been wanting in respectful and kind attentions to her, and has often used harsh,
profane and vituperative expressions to her, and to others concerning her.., there is
no proof or pretense that he has used or threatened any violence to her person, or
failed to provide for his family in a suitable manner, or that it would be unsafe for
her to cohabit with him. A complaint by the wife for a separation or limited divorce
could not, upon the facts disclosed, stand a moment.
Id. at 522.
100. In Parrish v. Parrish, 82 S.E. 119 (Va. 1914), a father petitioned for a change of custody,
arguing that his eight year old son was past his "tender years," and that his best interests
demanded that he be reared and educated by his father. Id. at 120. The custodial mother argued
that by virtue of his physical delicacy, the boy's "tender years" extended through his middle
childhood, alleging "that the child is of an extremely nervous temperament, and by reason of his
[delicate] physical condition requires the constant and watchful care of a mother .... " Id. The
court adopted the mother's health-based argument, affirming the trial court's decision to give the
mother custody during the nine winter months and the father custody during the three summer
months. Id. at 121.
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In the arguments mothers used throughout the nineteenth century to
expand the doctrine of "tender years" lies the germ of the legal vision of

the child-as-patient-a vision which began with an evidentiary emphasis
on childhood diseases a century before it developed into the current psychotherapeutic paradigm. In the context of high child mortality rates the
"tender years" idea was reasonable enough. Through its application in
accumulating decisions, and its common law case-by-case development,
the doctrine of "tender years" became inextricably associated with testimony about the ill-health or delicacy of particular children, and the
expert testimony of attending physicians.'0 1
Several cases illustrate this point. In State v. King, 0 2 an 1841

Georgia case, expert testimony of two physicians helped a mother separated from her husband gain custody of her daughter and son. The phy-

sicians testified that the children "will be better attended to and more
closely watched" by their mother.'03 In another case, the testimony of a
physician assisted a mother in winning custody of her six year old
son.'0 4 In making its determination, the court considered the "tender"
age of the child, his delicate health, and his tendency toward illness and

relied on the physician's judgment, in finding that he still required the
care of his mother. 0 5 Similarly, in McKim v. McKim, 0 6 although the
court disapproved of a young wife who left her husband without just
cause, it awarded her custody of their four year old child because of the
child's health. 10 7 The physician who had attended the child for two
101. Around this time, pediatrics became a specialized field of medical study and physicians
joined the ranks of theologians in writing guides for parents. See WILLIAM ALco-rr, THE YOUNG
MOTHER (1836); P.H. CHAVASSE, ADVICE TO MOTHERS ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THEIR
OFFSPRING DURING THE PERIODS OF INFANCY, CHILDHOOD, AND YOUTH

A

(1844); ANDREW COMBE,
(1840); WILLIAM P.

TREATISE ON THE PHYSIOLOGICAL AND MORAL MANAGEMENT OF INFANCY

A TREATISE ON THE PHYSICAL AND MEDICAL TREATMENT OF CHILDREN (1825). In the
popular advice-to-mothers writing of this period, the "law of nurture" is an admixture of health
and morality. See WISHY, supra note 50, at 34-37.
102. 1 Ga. 93 (1841).
103. Id. at 95. A year later, however, in New York ex rel. Barry v. Mercein, 3 Hill 399 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1842), the New York court considered the father's third habeas corpus petition for
custody of his daughter, then four and one-half years old. The parties, though not divorced, were
living separately pursuant to a signed agreement. Id. at 401-44. The father retained a steadfast
interest in reconciliation, yet the mother refused to return to him. He had been denied custody one
and one-half years earlier because of the child's tender years, ill-health, and feeble constitution.
Id. at 405. The sole issue was whether the specific health needs of the daughter justified
continued custody with the mother. The court held that the father should gain custody because the
child was older now, and no longer in poor health. Id. at 420-21. While the court did not find
either parent guilty of such immorality as might impugn their parental fitness, the court regarded
the mother's refusal to return to her husband as wrong. Id. at 413.
104. In re GREGG, N.Y. LEGAL OBSERVER, July, 1847, at 265 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1847).
105. Id. at 531-34.
106. 12 R.I. 462 (1879).
107. Id. at 464. CompareMcKim with Latham v. Latham, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 307 (1878) (A
DEWEES,
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years testified:
[The child] is afflicted with a bronchial affection, and with another
trouble which impairs her health; that she is better now than formerly,
but is still delicate, requiring constant watchfulness and care by some
person who is familiar with her character and constitution, and that,
in his opinion, she would suffer if taken from her mother, who is
devoted in attention to her.' 0
Another case illustrating the trend toward "medicalizing" custody
proceedings is Umlaufv. Umlauf'0 9 The father petitioned for a change

in custody of his nine and six year old sons. The physician who testified
described the boys' conditions; he had treated the younger for typhoid
and malarial fevers, and the older was extremely delicate and nervous.11 0
The physician's testimony was fraught with symptomatology."'
At first, the tender years doctrine was a narrow exception, applied
in situations involving the ill-health or special delicacy of a small child.
Gradually, however so many cases, such as Umlauf, appeared before the
courts, and so many judges elaborated on them, that the sickly, needy
child became the typical child of the common law, and the heavily-litigated "tender years" exception enlarged into a judicial presumption.
The presumption evolved into the concept of childhood itself as a state
of delicacy, risk, and potential ill-health.
For a substantial period of American history, every time a mother
wanted to obtain custody of a child, in the absence of parental fault, she
was required to depict her children as ailing, especially sensitive, or particularly at risk of harm.1 2 The maternal muscle beneath the "tender
years" doctrine was a significant force in shaping the present legal construction of the child as patient. On the cusp of the century, the discovery of the unconscious prompted the transition from emphasizing
physical symptomatology to psychology.1 3 The precursor to the lexical
court declined to use the "tender years" doctrine to award a mother custody of her healthy four
year old son, opining in the process that the cause of the couple's marital troubles was the wife's
arbitrary refusal to have sex with her husband.).
108. Id. at 462.
109. 21 N.E. 600 (II1. 1889).

110. Id. at 601.
11. Id. After a detailed consideration of the two households, the court decided that the
younger boy's condition still required nurturance, but transferred the older boy's custody to the

father because the need for education outweighed any possible health risk. Id.
112. Historical studies of court records suggest that mothers were most often awarded custody

of their children-even in the face of a paternal presumption. See GRISWOLD, supra note 78, at
153; GROSSBERG, supra note 78, at 251; MAY, supra note 78, at 173.
113. From the 1870s forward, the children's upbringing became medicalized and subject to
empirical study.
[S]cientific and medical studies proliferated and deepened, gaining public prestige

from their fight against disease, their seeming disinterestedness, and the hope they
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shift is evident in child custody decisions beginning in the last quarter of
the nineteenth century. Fathers, in an effort to rebut the "tender years"
4
presumption, offered extensive evidence of mothers' flaws as parents,'"
which courts subjected to a microscopic analysis of emotions, relationships, and parenting skills.' 15 The individual personalities of parents
emerge through a wealth of specific behavioral details, distinguishing
these opinions from the earlier, more shorthand and stereotyped summations. Gradually, over the course of the century the concept of "tender
years" expanded in substance to encompass all minor children, at least
well into their teenage years. The biological mother's personal and individual attentions enlarged from a talisman against specific childhood
diseases, for children specially at risk, to a salubrious prophylactic, a
vital tonic essential to the health of all children. While this extension of
the "tender years" doctrine increasingly helped mothers gain or retain
custody, it had a curious side-effect. It introduced into child custody
discourse the notion of the child as a person at risk, a patient whose
supposed "needs" must be met even at the sacrifice of his own desires.
Finally, by the end of the nineteenth century the "tender years" doctrine
became virtually synonymous with the nurturance prong of custody.
The father's right, or educative prong, disappeared, paving the way for
the replacement of the child-as-property with the child-as-patient paraheld out for longer and healthier lives. This reputation, along with the rapid
accumulation of what seemed realistic indisputable facts about the child's
development, obviously contrasted with advice on nurture cast in abstractions ....
[i]t seemed impossible to ignore 'the claims of science.'
Wisr', supra note 50, at 105.
114. E.g., New Jersey ex rel. Landis v. Landis, 39 N.J. 274, 280 (N.J. 1877) (finding
insufficient evidence of ill-treatment or neglect by mother to deny her custody); McNeir v.
McNeir, 129 N.Y.S. 481, 490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1911) (scrutinizing the minutiae of Mrs. McNeir's
parenting skills). Fathers' parenting skills were criticized in a way which emphasized the
expectation that they would display emotion and nurture children. For example, in Ex parte Bell,
153 P. 240 (Cal. 1915), a father failed to obtain custody of his daughter from her maternal aunt
after the mother's death, in part because he did not "caress" his daughter when he visited. Id. at
241. In Goodrich v. Goodrich, 44 Ala. 670 (1870), more than 20 witnesses testified about the
parenting skills and attitudes of both the mother and father, claiming that the mother was "tender,
diligent and affectionate, and that she nursed them with untiring care and assiduity when sick,
even at the peril of her own health" while the father "spoke of them as 'damned dirty babies'
.... " Id. at 678.
115. For example, in New York ex rel.Wilcox v. Wilcox, 22 Barb. 178 (N.Y. App. Div. 1854),
aff'd, 14 N.Y. 575 (1856), in changing custody of a nine year old girl from her paternal
grandparents who raised her from infancy, to her mother, who had raised the younger sister, the
court surmised the parenting challenge the mother would face:
[s]he will have to gain the affections of a child literally weaned from her, and whose
affections have for so many years been bestowed upon another .... [I]t will require
all of a mother's tenderness and fortitude to meet all the conflicting interests, and
rear these children amid the jealousies and difficulties which naturally arise amongst
children of the same family after so long a separation.
Wilcox. 22 Barb. at 186.
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digm. Eventually, psychology replaced morality as the measuring stick
of the "good."
While mothers' arguments advanced the vision of the child as delicate, dependent, and at risk, grandparents promoted the idea that children needed the stability and continuity of established relationships and
familiar places. In a typical scenario, a mother died in childbirth, and
for a number of years the maternal grandparents raised her baby. The
father of the child returned with his new wife, and wanted his child.
What strategy could such grandparents assert against parental rights? 1 6
In seeking to retain custody of grandchildren who for years were in
their de facto custody, grandparents could no longer easily assert that
they were legally equivalent to either natural or adoptive parents. From
the mid-nineteenth century on,117 new statutes formalizing the adoption
process' 18 left grandparents with de facto custody in legal limbo. The
adoption statutes created different rights between parents and all third
parties, so that grandparents could no longer rely on natural rights
derived from a blood relationship. These statutes also established standards for legal adoption contracts which could rarely be satisfied by the
informal transfer of children during family crises. While the general
preference for blood relatives over outsiders as custodians continued,
grandparents, when opposing parents for custody, legally were "strangers" to the child.
In response mid-nineteenth century grandparents seeking custody
employed three strategies. First, nurturing grandmothers tried to use the
116. In general, extended family members were treated better on custody issues than third
parties with the exception of apprentice masters, and legal adoptors. See Note, Relinquishment of
Parent's Right of Custody of Child to Third Person, 6 VA. L. REv. 470, 479 (1882).
117. Earlier cases regard it as appropriate to grant grandparents legal custody where they have
been exercising de facto custody with the parents' permission. For example, in In re Waldron, 13
Johns. 417 (N.Y. 1816), a child was born at the grandparents' home, where the father had taken
the mother because of his financial difficulties. Id. at 418. Upon the mother's death, the father
petitioned for custody of the child. The court denied the writ of habeas corpus, leaving custody
with the grandparents, whom the court found were not improperly restraining the child. Id. at 421.
In the later case of Ward v. Roper, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 110 (1846), the paternal grandfather, as
testamentary guardian, petitioned to change custody of an 11 year old girl who had been living
with her maternal grandparents since infancy. Id. at 111. Acknowledging the agreement between
the parents that the maternal grandparents raise the girl, the court treated the contest between the
paternal and maternal grandparents as an issue of paternal rights versus the child's "best interests",
much as it would have treated a case between the parents. Because the girl was of "delicate
health," the court allowed the maternal grandparents to retain custody, reasoning that the paternal
"legal right will not be impaired, but will be controlled, in a case where the interest of the child
obviously requires that it should be done .... Those strong ties, arising from nature and nurture,
between her and her grandmother should not be broken." Id.
118. The first modern adoption statute was passed in Massachusetts in 1851. Within the next
25 years, more than 20 states passed such statutes, most modeled on the Massachusetts law.
Zainaldin, supra note 26, at 1042-43.
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"tender years" doctrine." 9 The courts, however, were less deferential to
the nurturing instincts of mother substitutes;
grandmothers and step20
mothers lost more often than parents.'
Second, grandparents asserted versions of the theory that the natural parent or parents had made a voluntary parole contractual transfer of
custodial rights and responsibilities. While verbal contracts transferring
children to extended family members for nurture until the age of eighteen had previously been quite common, their legal status was ambiguous. Arguments grounded in such contracts steadily lost force as the

courts failed to uphold the contracts. The courts refused to find contracts implied by the behavior of the parties, 12 holding that contracts to
transfer control of the child must be written, and definite and certain in

their terms.1 22 Courts would find verbal contracts to be only temporary
agreements to help cope
with crisis conditions, 123 or valid contracts
24
voidable by the parent.'

119. See, e.g., Verser v. Ford, 37 Ark. 27, 30-31 (1881) ("In this case, the motherless infant,
two days old, was taken by the maternal grand-mother... and tenderly guarded through all the
perils of infancy. There has been all of a mother's care, and scarcely less than a mother's
affection."); Hussey v. Whiting, 44 N.E. 639, 640-41 (Ind. 1896), (determining that because of the
delicacy of her health, a 13 year old girl should remain in the custody of her grandparents, rather
than move with her father); Indiana ex rel. Sharpe v. Banks, 25 Ind. 495 (1865); Ward v. Roper,
26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 110, 111 (1846) ("The daughter was of very delicate health, and the
grandmother has much skill as well as great tenderness in the treatment of children .. "); Rust v.
Vanvacter, 9 W. Va. 600, 604 (1866) (grandmother alleges that when her grandchild was brought
to her at the age of five months she "was almost in the arms of death, and that nothing but the
motherly love and constant nursing of the grandmother saved her life .... ").
120. E.g., in Anonymous, 55 Ala. 428, 433 (1876), a mother retained custody when the child's
father petitioned for habeas corpus. The court found it to be a material consideration that if the
father received custody he would rely upon his mother or sister to provide care, which would not
be superior to care from the natural mother. Id.
121. E.g., Jones v. Darnall, 2 N.E. 229, 231 (Ind. 1885) (failing to find evidence of an
unconditional gift of the child to the grandparents); Kinnaird v. Lowry, 59 So. 843, 844 (Miss.
1912) (returning custody of daughters to mother who had sent them, during a period of marital
difficulty, to live with the grandmother); Armstrong v. Stone, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 102, 108 (1852)
(holding that "[the conduct of the mother in permitting the child to remain with the defendant
whilst she herself was laboring for her own support, does not impair her right to the custody.").
122. See, e.g., Miller v. Wallace, 76 Ga. 479, 487 (1886) (determining that a contract to
transfer control of the child would have to be "clear, definite, and certain" and that it is "more than
doubtful whether the [father] ever consented to relinquish the control of his child .. " Id. at 487
(citation omitted)); Weir v. Marley, 112 S.W. 798, 800 (Mo. 1890) (advising that father's
custodial rights and responsibilities can only be transferred through adoption or apprenticeship,
both of which required written agreements).
123. See Jamison v. Gilbert, 135 P. 342, 343 (Okla. 1913); see also Montgomery v. Hughes, 58
So. 113, 115 (Ala. Ct. App. 1912) (holding that any transfer in custody made by a parent of his
child is presumed temporary).
124. Stapleton v. Poynter, 62 S.W. 730, 732 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901) (voiding contract signed by
mother to transfer custody to paternal grandparents unless and until a reconciliation with the father
was effected); Tillman v. Tillman, 66 S.E. 1049, 1055 (S.C. 1910) (voiding an agreement that
would have transferred custody of two children to their paternal grandparents without the
knowledge or consent of the mother). Contra Ex parte Collins, 125 N.W. 389, 390 (Mich. 1910)
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The third argument-ultimately the most potent and durable one
advanced by grandparents-emphasized their position as de facto custodians. It drew on the potential of blood ties, simulating and even
improving upon them through stable nurturing. It was an amalgam of
two factors: (1) the existence of established reciprocal affective ties
between grandparents and grandchild; 125 and (2) the importance, for the
moral upbringing and education of children, of remaining in the commu126
nity, position, and general "station" in life for which they are situated.
In arguing for the status quo, grandparents could assert a claim which
put them in a position superior to their children. But in so doing, the
grandparents must convince the courts that disruptions of routine and
personality are dangerous; and that children benefit from stability, continuity, and routine. This new perspective challenged the previous
socio-legal construct of children as more adaptable than adults and better
(validating mother's contractual transfer of her child to the mother's sister-in-law; requiring
mother to prevail on a best interests test to reclaim the child's custody).
125. See Verser v. Ford, 37 Ark. 27, 31 (1881) ("[t]ies have been woven between the grandmother and grand-daughter, which [the father) is under strong obligation to respect .... ");
Richards v. Collins, 17 A. 831, 832 (N.J. 1889) (denying parents petition for custody of child
cared for since birth by the mother's sister and her husband, based on "the fact that all [the child]
knew of home and family ties grew up with the parental care and love bestowed upon it" by
them.); In re Murphy, 12 How. Pr. 513, 514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856) (sustaining custody of a nine
year old boy to his aunt and uncle "to whom the lad himself naturally now clings with more than
filial affection."); Coffee v. Black, 82 Va. 567, 569 (1866), (refusing parental custody "where the
father has voluntarily relinquished the custody of an infant, to a female, or other relatives, or
suitable persons ... [and applies] to the court to interpose to break up formed ties of affection.
[T]he question is no longer to be viewed in the light of the father's legal rights... but in the light
of a cautious regard for the happiness and welfare of the infant."); cf In re Gould, 140 N.W. 1013,
1016 (Mich. 1913) (holding father forfeited his paternal rights to consent to adoption through
irresponsibility, and using the concept of established reciprocal affective ties to resolve the
custody dispute on a best interests basis); Exparte Davidge, 51 S.E. 269, 270-71 (S.C. 1905) (The
court, in denying a father custody of his son who had lived with his grandparents since his
mother's childbirth-related death, determined "[t]he infant ... has been extremely delicate from
birth, and [his maternal grandmother] has nurtured him with the most intelligent care .... It is
clear his health and life would be greatly imperiled by depriving him of her experienced
attention."); Peese v. Gellerman, 110 S.W. 196, 199 (Tex. 1908) ("After the child has become
endeared to [her aunt and uncle], it might be the refinement of cruelty to break up the tender
realities and destroy happy associations merely to carry out a sentimental theory about the
brutality of disturbing the strongest, purest, and holiest love of a father for his daughter.").
126. E.g., Albert v. Perry, 14 N.J. Eq. 540, 545 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1862) (denying maternal
custody because "[t]he interest of the infant could not be promoted by a change in her position,
social relations, habits of life, and mode of training at her present age."); In re Murphy, 12 How.
Pr. 513, 514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856) (The court, in leaving a nine year old boy in the custody of the
aunt and uncle with whom he lived since the age of II weeks, stated "his education, his
inclination, his prospects in life, all, as far as can now be seen or foreseen, will be best promoted
by his remaining with his adopted parents."); Commonwealth ex rel. Gilkeson v. Gilkeson, 5 Pa.
31, 34 (1851) (denying paternal custody of a 15 year old girl who lived with an aunt since aged
nine, because she "has been estranged from the customs and government of her father's house...
[and] has formed new habits and views, and become accustomed to different associations and
modes of living.").
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able to form, dissolve, and reform deep emotional ties to nurturing relatives or other adults. 27 Throughout the nineteenth century, and into the
twentieth, these 2 two
versions of children competed in the discourse of
1 8
legal opinions.

The growth of the "status quo" and "social ties" doctrines as offensive weapons employed by grandparents and other family members
against a claim of parental right spans the mid-nineteenth century. In
1881, the future Supreme Court Justice David J. Brewer, authored an
influential opinion1 29 enunciating a balancing test between parental
rights and established ties, giving the latter greater weight.130 Custodial
claims of non-parent family members and other foster parents were
thereafter to be favored during the child's early years, aided by the modem concept of psychological parenthood.
By the end of the nineteenth century, virtually all jurisdictions had
established, either by statute or common law, the principles that (1)
127. For example, in Wilcox v. Wilcox, 22 Barb. 178 (N.Y. App. Div. 1854), the court
removed custody from the paternal grandparents, with whom the girl has lived all nine years of
her life, and awarded custody to the mother. Id. at 183. While commenting that the child clearly
wanted to stay with the grandparents, the courts regarded the child's desires as "the infant heart
speaking its simple language." Id. at 183. The court then concluded, "as regards the child, I
entertain no doubt but if placed with her mother she will soon become attached to both her and her
sister; that she will soon learn to love her mother as she has loved her grandparents." Id. at 184.
In Wilson v. Mitchell, 111 P. 21 (Colo. 1910), the court philosophized that "the feeling of
attachment to those with whom [a 10 year old boy] has most recently been associated will soon
yield to that affection, regard, and love which none but a mother can feel and manifest toward her
own offspring." Id. at 28. But cf. New York ex rel. Humex v. Phelps, 109 N.Y.S. 625, 627-28
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1908), where the court found that an 11 year old girl should stay with her foster
parents because of the strong affective ties between them. Had she been younger, the court
reasoned, it would have been easier to break such ties. Id. at 627.
128. Hutchison v. Harrison, 107 S.E. 742, 750 (Va. Ct. App. 1921) ("Children of [tender years]
will react to new surroundings and adjust themselves to new conditions. The childish memories
will soon grow dim. But not so when dealing with a child of maturer years and more fixed
affections ....

).

129. Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881).
130. Judge Brewer wrote:
[W]hen... the child has been left for years in the care and custody of others, who
have discharged all the obligations of support and care which naturally rest upon the
parent, then, whether the courts will enforce the father's right to the custody of the
child, will depend mainly upon the question whether such custody will promote the
welfare and interest of such child ....
[W]hen reclamation is not sought until a
lapse of years, when new ties have been formed and a certain current given to the
child's life and thought, much attention should be paid to the probabilities of a
benefit to the child from the change. It is an obvious fact, that ties of blood weaken;
and ties of companionship strengthen, by lapse of time; and the prosperity and
welfare of the child depend on the number and strength of these ties, as well as on
the ability to do all which the promptings of these ties compel.
Id. at 653. By 1882, a law review article complained of the large number of cases in which
parents lost custody of their children, mostly to extended family members, without an express
agreement to relinquish custody. Note, supra note 115.
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parental rights were subordinate to the child's best interests; (2) paternal
rights were either superior to or equal to maternal rights, yet mothers

presumptively had custody of children of "tender years";13 1 and (3)
parental custody could be forfeited because of unfitness. Successful litigation ultimately led to the extension of "tender years" into adolescence,

while minors fourteen years of age and older had virtually absolute
rights to choose their own custodians. By the beginning of the twentieth

century mothers had a custodial preference in practice, whether or not it
was acknowledged by statute or common law.
Many interrelated changes no doubt influenced this result. First,
the household changed from a unit of production to a unit of consumption. Second, the transfer of children's education to public sector
schools and the prolongation of formal education and the childhood
years consequent to industrialization made children economic liabilities
rather than economic assets. Finally, increasing urbanization led to an
increase in the father's time away from home. Thus, the father's role as
family "educator" melted away with the paternal right to custody. At
the same time, the ideology of the domestic sphere as a woman's
domain developed, 32 and popular theories of child-raising changed their
33
emphasis from strict governance to gentleness, persuasion, and guilt.

The Victorians envisioned the child as innocent, sensitive, and in
need of a nurture separate from the adult world. Children were sources
of invention, inspiration, and change. 134 The study of children became
131. A typical statute of this type stated in pertinent part: "As between parents adversely
claiming the custody, neither parent is entitled to it as of right; but other things being equal, if the
child is of tender years, it should be given to the mother; if it is of an age to require education and
preparation for labor and business, then to the father." Horsley v. Horsley, 175 P.2d 580, 583
(Cal. Ct. App. 1946) (quoting CAL. CIv. CODE § 138 (replaced 1970)).
132. MARGARET E. SANGSTER, RADIANT MOTHERHOOD (1905), a turn-of-the-century child care
book begins, "[T]his book is not addressed to fathers. They would not have time to read it. Who
ever heard of fathers in congress, conferring over the best methods of training children... striving
to learn from one another what might best be done for the next generation?" Id. at forward. This
passage was later quoted in CABLE, supra note 85, at 163-64.

133. See generally JACOB

ABBOTT, GENTLE MEASURES IN THE MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING OF

THE YOUNG (1871). "Abbott told the late-Victorian mother exactly what she wanted to hear: that
hers was an exalted and difficult mission; that it was possible to be both gentle and authoritative at
the same time; and that she need not feel guilty if she were, in certain areas, permissive." CABLE,
supra note 84, at 101; see WIsHY, supra note 50, for excellent examples of the change from
whipping, to "this-hurts-me-more than-it hurts-you," to the "Oh, I'm so disappointed in you" style
of child discipline.
134. In discussing the vision of children in children's literature between 1860 and 1880, Wishy
observes:
After the Civil War ...everything seems to intervene between the best will in the
world and moral or material victory. There is still the 'happy ending' but not
without young people learning how much more life costs than their predecessors
realized and how less often and more slowly the rewards of character and piety
come. Above all, although the notion endured that only the pure and innocent could

CHILDREN'S CHOICE

19941

part of the Victorian naturalist's zeal, and the new scientific approach to
child raising, combining elements of empiricism and Darwinism,
35
emphasized hereditary potential through environmental regulation.1
By 1900, the Victorian vision of the innocent and delicate child had
shattered with the introduction of Sigmund Freud's theories of infant
sexuality and repression, Stanley Hall's description of "adolescence" as
136 and John Dewey's practical empiricharged with pulsating sexuality,
37
cist approach to education.
While contemporaneous popular child-rearing manuals emphasized
strict discipline and training, 138 none of the power or precocious insight
of children, which the psychologists revealed, is reflected in child custody opinions. The struggle among adults for the child's control has
persisted throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The arguments which have furthered interests of particular parties have persisted
across the metonymic divide between the natural law/morality lexicon of
the nineteenth century and the scientific/psychological lexicon of the
twentieth century. The discourse of the previous century encoded the
psychological within the moral, and today's discourse encodes the moral
within the psychological.
The children still cannot talk; they are only talked about. What is
said about them sounds in the language of psychopathology, a science
which found its way into the popular literature on child raising in the
1920s and 1930s. Linguistic and cognitive precursors of the psychotherapeutic model of child care such as diseases of the "nerves" and
save the world, it was increasingly feared that the world might be too much for the
pure and innocent.
WsHY, supra note 50, at 930. In the 1880s, new literature of children's fantasy developed where
"the child had near-magical powers to do what adults had failed to do or to put right what adults
had bungled." Id. at 171. In the post-Civil War period, child-care books recommended yet gentler measures, and took a social Darwinist approach to the perfectibility of the child through
environmental influences. See generally ABBOTT,supra note 133.
135. "[T]he child was no longer merely a beloved offspring or the nation's future in microcosm
but a home-laboratory experiment as well." WISHY, supra note 50, at 119.
136. HALL, supra note 81.
137. SIGMUND FREUD, INTERPRETATION OF DREAMs (1899), and JOHN DEWEY, SCHOOL AND
SOCIETY (1899), were both published in the same year. In 1909, the same year that Sigmund
Freud visited the United States for the first time, Stanley Hall founded the Children's Institute at
Clark University. "Stimulated by Hall's famous pamphlet, The Study of Children, published in
1883, child-study clubs, including the Child Study Association, sprang up in several American
communities, and these soon expanded into national groups like the National Congress of Mothers
(1897). Many new, special journals of child study were begun, among them The Pedagogical
Seminary in 1891 and The ChildStudy Monthly in 1895." WISHY, supra note 50, at 107; see also
Wishy's extended discussion of "The Society for the Study of Child Nature" founded in 1888
under the auspices of the Ethical Culture movement. Id. at 115.
138. See, e.g., L. EMMETT HOLT, THE CARE AND FEEDING OF CHILDREN (1894); L. EMMETT
HOLT, THE

TRAINING

OF

PARENTS (1900) (recommending strict schedules and no coddling).
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"mind"-the lexical grandparents of today's "stress," "anxiety," and

"depression"-begin appearing frequently in the custody opinions of the
early twentieth century. 3 9 Gradually, psychoanalytic ideas and terminology start appearing in law reviews, 40 eventually replacing the old
health and morality terminology.
The clinical gaze of psychology was also applied with increasing
scrutiny to individual cases. Hutchison v. Harrison14 1 is exemplary. In
that case, Susan Ish, a teenager, had been living predominantly with her
maternal grandparents since infancy. In finding that custody should
remain with the grandparents, the court determined that the established
ties between Susan Ish and her grandparents were strong enough to jeopardize her mental health if she were returned to her parents. 142 The

girl's physician gave expert testimony that with her grandparents, Susan

139. For example, a mother alleges that because of her son's "extremely nervous temperament,
.. . slight shocks to his nervous system or improper diet often produce convulsions and have
created such a physical condition that, unless he receives constant and watchful attention, the
Parrish v. Parrish, 82 S.E. 119, 120
result to his mind and body may be disastrous or fatal ....
(Va. 1914).
140. E.g., Albert Levitt, The Custody of an Infant: I: General Survey of The Interests
Involved, 92 CENT. L.J. 228, 233 (1921). Professor Levitt used a popularized version of Freudian
developmental theory to inform his discussion of the child's best interests. Levitt maintained that
"[e]ven when the trained psychologist has made his experiments and formulated his theories and
laws of social and spiritual existence, the judge is unable, because of time, temperament and
training, to apply this data to the concrete case before him." Id. at 233. He bemoaned the fate of
the boy whose father is bringing him up "in the old method of education and control through
... without sports, poetry, or
inflexible discipline and the repression of physical instincts.
dancing. Id. The boy, "becomes too repressed, unhealthy-minded, self-centered, unsocial and too
individualistic .... [o]r else, the gregarious instinct proves too strong, and the 'gang' is too great
an attraction, so that he breaks parental bounds, flouts paternal discipline and becomes a
'problem' and a juvenile delinquent." Id. Levitt's argument is strikingly simple and
contemporary. He concludes that bad parenting makes children maladjusted, and maladjustment
leads to lawlessness. Thus, to become a moral citizen requires psychologically correct parenting,
and the state, in its parenspatriae function, must protect the child's mental health by scrutinizing
the adult's parenting style.
141. 107 S.E. 742 (Va. 1921).
142. Id. at 749. It can scarcely be doubted that the 16 year old girl should have been able to
remain where she wanted, but what was important was the basis of the decision. The court relied
on Susan Ish's liberty interests-in a way which harked back to the habeas corpus decisions of the
previous century. It found: "There is no restraint of Susan Ish contrary to her wishes. If the
grandmother, or grandfather, or both, have refused to allow her to be taken by her parents, this
action has met with her full approval. She is under no constraint, save the constraint of affection."
Id. at 748.
Yet this did not resolve the issue in the same way as it would have a century earlier. The
court saw itself as bound to a two-fold determination. "Our task is to determine whether the
grandparents of this child should be required to deliver her to the parents contrary to the child's
expressed wishes, and whether such action would be to the best interests of the child?" Id. at 748.
The latter consideration was especially significant, for rather than relying on what the girl said she
wanted, it used her behavior as evidence of what she needed. Id. at 749.
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Ish was "in a much more desirable surrounding in every way."' 143 The
doctor's expert testimony subsumed emotion as a medical issue, spawning the psychotherapeutic paradigm; emotional stability was now mandated for the child's mental health. 144 Since both the parents and
grandparents were close to the moral, psychological, and social norm,
the court was obliged to closely examine familial relationships to find
differential mental health implications. Although the court purported to
act in the child's best interests, the child lost again in the power struggle
between the child and the state. The child's status as a person was
diminished; her status as a patient augmented.
In the decades between the first and second World Wars, Sigmund
Freud reformed the popular view of the human personality and claims
for custody became coated with a psychoanalytic glaze. The celebrated
Vanderbilt cases 141 moved one step beyond Hutchinson in the legal construction of the child-as-mental patient.
Following the death of her father, Gloria lived with her paternal
aunt. 14 6 Two years later, Gloria's mother obtained a writ of habeas
corpus, seeking custody of Gloria. 147 The court denied custody to the
mother, stating that to do so "operated against the welfare of the
infant." 148 At trial, three physicians and a nurse testified about Gloria's
hatred of her mother, her hysteria, nightmares, excitability, and nervous143. Id. The physician's testimony recalls the familiar nineteenth century description of the
"delicate" child:
She is not a strong child now, but she is much better than I have ever seen her. She
had a bad heart murmur, what we call a haemic murmur, and that has disappeared.
Her chest is not fully developed now, but it will be. She has much more flesh on
her, and she has certainly grown larger, taller and stronger.
Id.
144. In reversing the trial court, and allowing Susan to determine whether or not to leave her
grandparents, the court opined:
Evidently the trial court did not consider that the effect of removing Susan Ish to a
new environment would be seriously to the prejudice of her health or happiness ....
Nor does he seem to have attached much importance to the evidence as to her
nervous temperament, her extreme sensitiveness, the fluctuations in her health
attendant upon her trips to Tennessee, the strength of her attachment for her
grandparents, and her positively expressed wish to remain in Virginia .... So far
from advancing these interests, such action may permanently embitter the child's
relations to its parents, and change the whole current of its life. Should she pine for
the old home and fail to grow into the new, the parents will in time come to resent
that attitude, and a wall will be established between them and their child.
Id. at 750.
145. In re Vanderbilt, 281 N.Y.S. 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935); Vanderbilt v. Carew, 275 N.Y.S.
795 (N.Y. App. Div. 1934).
146. Vanderbilt, 275 N.Y.S. at 796.
147. Id. at 797.
148. Id.
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ness. 1 49 They claimed that under her aunt's care Gloria had steadily
improved, and advised against granting custody to Gloria's mother.'50
The Glendening case' 5' is another example of the characterization
of the child as a patient in the context of custody litigation. Alicia Maddox Dupont spent fifteen years attempting to obtain custody of her son,
Alan. At the time of the last hearing, Alan was almost seventeen,
52
socially well-adjusted, athletic, and at the top of his high school class.'
1 53
He testified emphatically that he wanted to live with his mother.
Despite his obvious high regard for Alan's achievements and maturity,
the judge gave no weight to Alan's preference. Moreover, the judge
granted custody to the father, presuming this was best for Alan. The
judge was persuaded by Alan's teachers, who testified that Alan's class
"standing is normally not achieved if the pupil lives in an essentially
unhappy home environment."' 54 Alan's competency was turned against
him. Rather than demonstrating Alan's capacity to make a mature decision, Alan's successes were used as clinical evidence of the excellent job
55
his father was doing as custodian.
Psychological terminology rapidly moved from common parlance
into custody decisions following the Hutchinson, Vanderbilt, and
Glendening cases.' 56 The child's words and actions became evidence,
requiring expert evaluation of what was best for the child, rather than a
dispositive statement of the child's custodial preference. 57 The psychological testimony in noteworthy cases such as Vanderbilt and Glenden149. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 358-59. Goldsmith posits the child's "illness" was
deliberately constructed. She alleges Gloria's maternal grandmother and baby nurse
overprotected her, poisoned her mind against her mother, and infused her with the fear that she
might be kidnapped like the Lindbergh baby, because of her vast wealth. Eventually, little Gloria
became hysterical whenever she thought about living with her mother. Id. at ix-xvii.
150. Vanderbilt, 281 N.Y.S. at 175.
151. New York ex rel. Glendening v. Glendening, 19 N.Y.S.2d 693 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940).
152. Id. at 698.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 700. The court forced Alan to stay in the custody of his father right up until
midnight on his eighteenth birthday.
156. E.g., Louisiana ex rel. Castille v. Cooke, 164 So. 153, 154 (La. 1935) (awarding custody
to paternal grandmother and aunt because child was likely to become "neurotic" living with her
"nervous and eccentric" mother); Pitts v. Pitts, 29 A.2d 300, 304 (Md. 1942) (granting mother
custody despite her having a serious bout of depression, because the court's chief medical officer
testified that he considered her "a normal person"); Minnesota ex rel. Ashcroft v. Jensen, 7 N.W.
2d 393, 395 (Minn. 1943) (granting custody to foster parents with whom child had been living
almost since birth because "serious emotional and psychological harm would result if the child
were transferred").
157. For example, In re Vardinakis, 289 N.Y.S. 355 (N.Y. Child. Ct. 1936), parents of
different faiths sought custody of their child. Rather than his custodial preference, "[tihe positive
choice of a religion by an intelligent child of thirteen or fourteen must, therefore, be seriously
considered in determining what is best for his own welfare." Id. at 361.
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ing came from physicians and educators. By the mid-1940s, however,
expert testimony by psychologists and psychiatrists was commonplace,
58
even for custody disputes among the ordinary middle-class.
C.

The Searchfor a Bright-line Psyche

In the twentieth century, physicians, psychologists, and child-development experts have written popular books on child care, rephrasing old
arguments about "tender years" and "established reciprocal ties" into

psychological terms such as "bonding" and "psychological parent."
Unfortunately, the underlying legal vision of the child has remained the
same; popular literature has portrayed children as sensitive and delicate
beings who require stability, security, and the status quo.

Until the 1970s, psychology impacted upon custody decisions
through case-by-case evaluations of the parents and children involved in
the suit. Parents based their claims for custody on allegations of flawed
child-raising. Fathers challenged the maternal custody presumption by
showing that the mother was either a "bad woman" (an unfaithful
60
wife)' 5 9 or a "bad mother" (her children possessed unstable psyches).
Mental health practitioners became ubiquitous as experts and evaluators;
their terminology infiltrated judicial decisions and their opinions
received ever-increasing deference.' 6 ' Many contested child custody
62
cases became clinical evaluations of both parents and the child.'
But prior to the 1970s, divorce was premised on moral fault; psy-

chological theories did not directly influence the substantive rules of
law. The shift in the popular view of divorce as a "life crisis" came as
an indirect consequence of two United States Supreme Court cases. In
158. E.g., Horsley v. Horsley, 175 P.2d 580 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946) (social worker,
psychologist, and physician testify in a change of custody proceeding involving a "middle-class"
couple).
159. E.g., Morrissey v. Morrissey, 154 N.W. 2d 66 (Neb. 1967) (mother who commits adultery
is unfit to have custody as a matter of law).
160. E.g., State ex rel. Castille v. Cooke, 164 So. 153 (La. 1935); In re Heller, 54 N.Y.S.2d
734 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945).
161. See Bender v. Bender, 304 N.Y.S. 2d 482, 483 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (where parents
stipulated that psychiatrist's report should be determinative of custody, appellate court allowed its
use provided in the stipulation, but held that its weight should rest in the judge's discretion).
162. See, e.g., Murphey v. Murphey, 99 S.E.2d 77, 78 (Ga. 1957) (finding a change of
circumstances sufficient for a change of custody where the children "are extremely nervous and
emotionally upset; that.., the condition of the children has deteriorated to the point that it now
threatens to become a permanent disordered mental and emotional condition or psychosis; that the
children are in desperate need of medical and psychiatric attention"); Barbara v. Barbara, 249
N.E.2d 269, 271 (1I1. App. Ct. 1969) (discussing psychiatrist's finding of symptomatology in both
mother and father which could cause clinical disturbances in their children); Seitz v. Seitz, 64
A.2d 87, 88-89 (N.J. 1949) (awarding custody to father despite maternal presumption, after
hearing conflicting testimony of pediatrician, a pre-school teacher, and five psychiatrists
regarding the boys "neurotic tendencies" and pathological thinking processes).
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Frontiero v. Richardson,163 the plurality applied strict scrutiny to discriminations based on sex, and in Craig v. Boren,' 64 the majority
adopted the standard of intermediate scrutiny for sex-based discrimina65
tions. Some states already had made the move to gender neutrality,1
but Frontiero and Craig became justifications for dramatic national
reform of the divorce laws. Most states eliminated moral fault as
grounds for divorce, and gender bias in the form166of the "tender years"
presumption as a basis for custodial allocations.
Thereafter, a psychological orientation pervaded all aspects of
divorce law. For adults, divorce was a psychological crisis in personal
development; for children, a psychological crisis in care. The infusion
of psychology into family law freed adults to make decisions in accordance with their personal morality and in conformity with liberal constitutional premises, 167 and had the precisely contrary effect on children.
What Professor Lee Teitelbaum characterizes as the change from teleological morality to empirical psychology' 68 served to reformulate the
Victorian vision of 69childhood as innocence and sensitivity in a psycho1
therapeutic model.
Accordingly, the courts were called upon to make custody decisions in a new legal climate. The "best interests" doctrine became
meaningless without the "tender years" presumption to serve as an operational rule of thumb. The courts were left with two alternatives: (1)
163. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
164. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
165. Between 1970 and 1973, New York, Florida, Wisconsin, and Colorado changed their
custody statutes to mandate gender neutrality. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 288 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1973); see also Danielson v. Board of Higher Educ., 358 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (finding
a colorable constitutional claim where city college by-law provided for maternal, but not paternal,
leave of absence).
166. See Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 289 ("The traditional and romantic view ... that nothing can
be an adequate substitute for mother love .... [is] out of touch with contemporary thought about
child development and male and female stereotypes.").
167. Professor Carl Schneider eloquently discusses the "psychologization" of family law
which accompanied no-fault divorce and the cessation of explicit judgments about parents' sexual
morals. Infusing the classic Freudian paradigm with a bit of 1980s "me generation" thinking,
Schneider argues that the change from the view of divorce as a social sin to divorce as a personal
life crisis placed emphasis on individual self-fulfillment and choice. This new view of personal
choice and fulfillment fits the constitutional view of a liberal society, emphasizing free choice.
Professor Schneider concludes that these changes moved the locus of decisionmaking
responsibility from the state to the people governed. Carl E. Schneider, MoralDiscourse and the
Transformation ofAmerican Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1845-63 (1985). But it did not
change the locus of decisions about children.
168. See generally Teitelbaum, supra note 84.
169. See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 9-10 (2d
ed. 1973). In this popular book on child custody law, the authors write that, "[c]hildren are
presumed by law to be incomplete beings during the whole period of their development .... The
legal status of the child is matched on the psychological side by a number of tenets." Id.
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struggle with a case-by-case analysis of each child's psyche; or (2) find
a new, gender-neutral presumption grounded in psychological theory.
Frontiero signalled a watershed change. The mental health approach
had previously been applied to individual cases. Later, psychological
170
theories were used to form general custody rules and presumptions.
Every rule, from sole custody, to joint custody, to broad judicial
discretion, has been justified in the name of the child's psychological
well-being, and rationalized by psychological theory. Yet, despite the
incompatibility of the rules, their references to psychology are biased in
a consistent way. In keeping with the legal vision of the child-aspatient, the law has asked psychology to identify custodial placements
offering the lowest risk of psychopathology, rather than offering the
greatest opportunity for self-determination.
In each case the law has asked: "Given the child's delicate, weak,
and sensitive nature, and her need for stability and security, what custody rule is best?" In each case the law has assumed that the child is
incompetent to answer this question for herself. Beginning with an
assumption of the child's incapacity, the law asks psychologists, "What
custodial placement will best shelter this child from harm?" A better
question would be, "What can you say about the abilities of this child
and how can your findings empower the child to exercise his fundamental freedoms of choice in family matters?" Psychology is used to reinforce court assumptions that children cannot choose for themselves
rather than to help formulate a more sensible legal vision of children.
In many jurisdictions courts are given broad power to determine
which form of custody is in the child's best interests by statutes enumerating a series of factors. Such factor statutes emphasize the child's

170. In child custody matters psychology and law have become welded together in four ways:
(1) parents and children are subject to psychological evaluation in individual cases; (2)
psychological theories (e.g., "psychological parent") have been converted into legal doctrines or
explicitly codified (as in the "primary caretaker" presumption); (3) psychologists (as custody
evaluators and mediators) have become part of the custody decision-making personnel; and (4)
child custody has spawned a plethora of psychological studies on children's adjustment to divorce
the results of which have directly influenced changes in child custody law.
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attachment to17 ' and continued contact with each parent;' 72 the child's
adjustment to home, school and community; 173 and maintaining the continuity of the pre-divorce environment.' 74 These statutes simply
rephrase, in contemporary psychological language, the same factors
courts have considered for two centuries. They allow judges to decide
cases based on what they believe will be "best" for the child. The result
is indeterminate outcomes and difficult settlement negotiations.
Further, the operation of such statutes increases the likelihood of
misunderstanding facts and circumstances and allowing biases to interfere with decisions. Without any explicit preferences or presumptions to
guide them, judges will make custodial decisions based on either a per171. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124(1.5)(c) (West 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911
(a)(5)(3) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(b) (West Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 32-717(3)
(Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 5/602 (a)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); IND. CODE.
ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21(a)(4) (Burns. Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(3)(B)(iv) (1983);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(l)(c) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 752(5)(B) (West. Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1)(a)(5) (West Supp. 1994);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(2)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(1)(c)
(1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364 (2)(a) (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4(c) (West 1993); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9(A)(3) (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(a) (1993); OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(C) (Anderson Supp. 1992); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.137(1)(a) (1992);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665 (b)(1) (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(3) (Michie Supp. 1994);
WiS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(5)(c) (west 1993).
172. Statutory provisions favoring continuing contact with both parents: ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.24.150(c)(6) (1994); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332(A)(6) (Supp. 1993); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124(1.5)() (West 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(a) (West Supp. 1994);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 5/602(a)(8) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 131
(C)(2)(j) (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 19, § 752(5)(H)(west Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 452.375.2(8) (Vernon Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.2 (2)(c) (Supp. 1990);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(b)(5) (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(5)(g) (west 1993).
173. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-332(A)(4) (Supp. 1993); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1410-124 (l.5)(d) (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722 (a)(4) (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16911(a)(5)(4) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(h) (West. Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 32-717(4)
(Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 5/602 (4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN.
31-1-11.5-21(a)(5) (Bums Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(3)(B)(v) (1983); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 403.270(l)(d) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 752(5)(G) (West Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375.2(4) (Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(1)(d) (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. 40-4-9 (A)(4) (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-06.2.1(h) (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(F)(l)(d) (Anderson
Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(b)(4) (1989).
174. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(5) (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(d) (West Supp.
1994); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 131 (C)(2)(d) (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17.1(a)(7)
(West Supp. 1994) (referring to "the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity"); IDAHO CODE § 32-717(6) (Supp.
1994) ("[t]he need to promote continuity and stability in the life of the child;"); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19 § 752(5)(D),(E) (West Supp. 1994) (focusing on duration and adequacy of the child's
current living arrangements, desirability of maintaining continuity and stability of proposed living
arrangement); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.137(1)(c) (1992) ("[tlhe desirability of continuing an existing
relationship;"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.002 (West Supp. 1994) (asserting child's best
interests are served if the existing pattern of interaction between parent and child is altered only to
the extent necessitated by the changed relationship of the parents).

19941

CHILDREN'S CHOICE

sonal view of what is best for the child or a standard which can be
"objectively" rationalized as necessary for the child's psychological
well-being. Unfortunately, "psychological well-being" can become a
shield which protects arbitrary judgments from review. Judges may misuse such psychological concepts to mask value-laden judgments about
cultural diversity as issues of a child's mental health and well-being. 175
Cultural differences between parents are often disguised as personality
conflicts which are likely to have detrimental effects on children. 1 76
Some courts have found that exposure to the minority mores of one parent places a child at risk psychologically,1 77 while other courts have
found children to be at risk if they are not isolated within a minority
178
community.

Unfortunately, the presumptive rules also have problems. The most
enduring of the "preference" rules is that custody should be given to the
"psychological parent," an idea generally associated with Joseph Gold175. E.g., Eric Harrison, Her Dream Becomes a Nightmare: A Mother Who Sought a New Life
in L.A. Loses Her Sons to Her Former In-Laws in Mississippi, L.A. TIMsS, Sept. 21, 1993, at Al
(describing a mother's loss of custody to the paternal grandparents because the mother "mentally
abused" the boys by subjecting them to her African-American boyfriend and her lesbian sister);
Elizabeth Mehren, New Salvo in Custody Wars, Courts: How Much Can a Single ParentRely on
Daycare? How Important is Carefrom a Family Member? A Michigan Case Raises Fears-and
Hackles, L.A. TiMEs, Aug. 3, 1994, at El (reporting on the award of custody to a father because
his mother would babysit the three year old child, which would provide more "security" than the
child's mother's plan to put the child in daycare).
176. The conflation of culture and psychology allows courts to avoid hard issues of ethnic,
religious, and lifestyle differences, either between parents, or between the parents and majority
norms. The problem is exacerbated when psychiatrists, psychologists, and members of the clergy
confuse the two in their testimony. See, e.g., Funk v. Ossman, 724 P.2d 1247, 1251 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1986) (rabbi testifying that a dual religious upbringing is not healthy for a child because it
creates a conflict); Andros v. Andros, 396 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding
decision by trial court to allow consulting psychologist's testimony on unhealthy effects of
parents' religious differences). The view that cultural diversity presents a "decision-making
problem" rather than an opportunity to develop a bicultural identity illustrates the difference
between the child-as-patient paradigm and the vision of the child as a developing person.
177. The Florida case of Mendez v. Mendez, 527 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) illustrates the
tendency of courts to find that a child should be mainstreamed. The appellate court issued a short
per curiam opinion affirming the custody award to the Catholic father instead of the Jehovah's
Witness mother. Experts testified unanimously that, were cultural issues equal, the mother should
get custody. Id. at 820. In her dissenting opinion, Judge Baskin criticized the majoritarian
assumptions behind the expert psychological testimony " that contact with the mother's Jehovah's
Witness religion is not in the best interests of the child, who needs 'to adapt herself to the
mainstream of culture.' " Id. at 821 (Baskin, J., dissenting).
178. Where the child is recognized as a "minority" group member, the court's preference is
often in favor of the more traditional or "visible" minority parent. See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Malak, 227 Cal. Rptr. 841, 847 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (enforcing a foreign custody award
directing the children, who resided with their mother in the United States, to be sent to live with
their father in the Middle East, based on difficulty of obtaining Islamic education in America);
Perlstein v. Perlstein, 429 N.Y.S.2d 896, 900 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (chastising the Jewish
custodial mother for failing to personally practice the ritual observances and dietary proscriptions
of the Orthodox Yeshivas and summer camps to which she had consented to send her son).
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stein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit's book Beyond the Best Interests
of the Child.179 This book recommends that courts award custody to the
person the child becomes attached to through a "psychological interplay
.. superimposed upon the events of bodily care."180 Calling this "the
least detrimental alternative"'' the authors proposed the "psychological

parent" be given exclusive, permanent, and unmodifiable custody,
82
including absolute control over the child's visits with the other parent. 1
Their rationale was the fostering of continuity in relationships, surroundings, and environmental influence that is essential for a child's normal
development.' 83 Further, they argue that children have a sense of time
which differs from adults so that even regularly scheduled visits may
seem like disruptive discontinuities.' 84 Although they recognize that
only very young children have a dramatically different time sense from
adults, they found a significant difference even for adolescents. 185 Next,
they maintain that children can freely love more than one adult only if
the adults feel positively towards one another; otherwise children
"become prey to severe and crippling loyalty conflicts."' 86 Finally, they
claim, "[w]here there are changes of parent figure or other hurtful interruptions, the child's vulnerability and the fragility of the relationship
become evident. The child regresses along the whole
line of his affec187
tions, skills, achievements, and social adaptation."'
Despite their extremism, 8 8 these works, and the "psychological
179. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 169. The authors also wrote two sequels, further
discussing the subject. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1979), and JosEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1986). The term
"psychological parent" actually appears in legal opinions prior to the date of the first book and has
earlier scientific antecedents, especially in the work of John Bowlby, who posited that the proper
development of human infants requires continuous care and contact with a primary parent. See
generally John Bowlby, The Nature of the Child's Tie to His Mother, 39 INT'L J.
PSYCHOANALYSIS 350 (1958).
180. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 169, at 18.
181. The least detrimental alternative, then, is that specific placement and procedure for
placement which maximizes, in accord with the child's sense of time and on the
basis of short-term predictions given the limitations of knowledge, his or her
opportunity for being wanted and for maintaining on a continuous basis a
relationship with at least one adult who is or will become his psychological parent.
Id.at 53.
182. Id.at 38.
183. Id.at 31-32.
184. Id.at 31-49.
185. Id.at 34.
186. Id.at 12.
187. Id.at 18.
188. Courts subscribed readily to the psychological parent concept, while avoiding the specific,
constitutionally problematic suggestions of the authors. The dictatorial powers recommended for
the custodial parent were tantamount to a termination of parental rights. It is unconstitutional to
terminate the rights of a fit parent who has maintained an actual parental relationship with the
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parent" preference found widespread support. I 9 Timing may have
influenced popularity. Beyond the Best Interests of the Child was published in 1973, the same year that Frontiero sounded the death knell to
the tender years presumption. In addition to being written by a prominent interdisciplinary team, it explicitly enunciated a bright-line rule for
child custody decisions that was gender-neutral and supported by psychological theory. The rule itself-award custody to the psychological

parent-was appealing because it combined the two arguments which
had been used to challenge gender-based parental rights for the preceding 150 years: parental nurture and established reciprocal affective
ties. 190 Gender neutrality and decisional certainty were achieved using
these familiar legal principles translated into the socially appropriate

lexicon of psychology, solving a major doctrinal problem, and satisfying
the law's penchant for predictability, stability, and finality of judgments.
The book significantly accelerated the legal construction of the
child-as-patient because it justified awarding custody to the "psychological parent"; the one who would avoid causing psychopathology in the
child. Not only "delicate" and "sickly" children were at risk in a divorcchild. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 444
(1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58
(1971). For Anna Freud, such extremism was nothing new. In the 1920s she was a leader in the
psychoanalytic pedagogy movement which strove to produce neurosis-free children through a
laissez-faire and instinct liberating school curriculum that involved a minimum of parent and
teacher intervention. The program was abandoned because the children showed obsessions,
depressions, and concealed anxieties. By the 1940s and 1950s, the members of the movement had
decided that they had misunderstood Freud's theories and that education required control over
instincts; lack of structure, authority, and limits would spoil children. PuRDY, supra note 9, at 9397.

See
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REGULATED

PSYCHOHISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

CHILDREN/LIBERATED

CHILDREN:

EDUCATION

IN

(Barbara Finkelstein, ed. 1979).

189. See, e.g., Davis v. Page, 714 F.2d 512, 529 (5th Cir. 1983) (dissenting opinion) (arguing

child's need for continuity lies in the preservation of his family so long as it is functional); In re
Revello, 606 P.2d 933, 941-42 (Idaho 1980) (noting law can destroy relationships but not compel
their development); Powers v. Hadden, 353 A.2d 641, 649 n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (placing
right of biological parent subordinate to those who have performed parental duties under theory of
least detrimental alternative for the child's development); Van Haren v. Van Haren, 407 A.2d
1242, 1245 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (deeming "right" custody decision elusive where
both parents are capable); Hoy v. Willis, 398 A.2d 109, 113 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)
(describing factors involved in creation of psychological parent-child bond); Mansukhani v.
Pailing, 318 N.W.2d 748, 753 (N.D. 1982) (asserting continuity in a child's life is one of the most
important factors determining the child's best interests); Filler v. Filler, 219 N.W.2d 96, 98 (N.D.
1974) (supporting idea that court should award sole custody to only one parent); Whaley v.
Whaley, 399 N.E.2d 1270, 1272 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (endorsing principle of finality in custody
cases as necessary for a continuing relationship between child and person who cares for him); In
re Tremayne Quame Idress R., 429 A.2d 40, 48 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (recognizing continuity
in environment is critical, particularly in early childhood); In re Carlita B., 408 S.E.2d 365, 375
(W. Va. 1991) (bemoaning delay by judicial system since continuity of relationships,
surroundings, and environmental influences are essential for a child's normal development).
190. See supra part II.B.
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ing family. All children, because of their "vulnerability" and "fragility,"
could potentially regress "along the whole line of their affections, skills,
achievements, and social adaptation."' 91 Childhood was characterized
as a time of chronic low-grade psychological symptomatology; the court
must take a firm physician's hand in allocating custody so as to ward off
92
acute episodes of illness with lifelong detrimental consequences.1
These fundamental psychological assumptions, that stability is the most
important factor in the child's well-being, and that variety, diversity, and
discontinuity are presumptively bad for children, have remained
enshrined as key legal principles of the best interests doctrine.
Although the "psychological parent" presumption is grounded in a
child-as-patient view, it does not always and inevitably diminish the
child's right of autonomy and self-determination. It is reasonable to
assume that, in most cases, people will choose to live among those with
whom they have the strongest emotional bonds. However, because the
child does not have the right to choose, the psychological parent presumption is oppressive, even a bit absurd. The child knows to whom
she feels closest, but cannot speak dispositively to her own emotions.
Rather, the court turns to mental health experts to diagnose the child's
93
emotions.
The "primary caretaker" presumption developed in the past decade
as a spin-off of the psychological parenthood idea. It is ostensibly easy
to prove by objective facts. Under the "primary caretaker" presumption,
custody is awarded to the parent who has assumed the bulk of child care
responsibilities, on the theory that reciprocal affection is strongest
between the child and the primary caretaker.' 94 The doctrine has been
191. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 169, at 18.

192. Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, supra note 168, claims that continuous and stable
environments and relationships are important for young children because they have a different
time sense and have not internalized parental images and attitudes. This idea is the opposite of the
view expressed by one court 50 years earlier, which found that younger children "will react to new
surroundings and adjust themselves to new conditions." Hutchison v. Harrison, 107 S.E. 742, 750
(Va. 1921). Grandparents and other de facto parents fought the Hutchison view for halfa century.
After 1970, the book's view dominated the mental health paradigm of child custody, making
possession of the child a de facto presumption of custody. Today the view is socially accepted.
America cried with two year old Jessica DeBoer when she was returned to her natural parents.
See DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S.Ct. 1 (1993). A Newsweek article written one year later, portrayed
Jessica as happy in her new home; she had not "regressed" at all. Michele Ingrassia & Karen
Springen, She's Not Baby Jessica Anymore, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 21, 1994, at 60. Without evidence
showing that children are better adjusted today than they were 50 years ago, this view of age
related plasticity seems to be merely a social construction.
193. The psychological parent presumption was originally intended to apply in foster care
situations where the child had established a close relationship with his foster parents and had only
minimal contact with the biological parents. Identification of the psychological parent is more
difficult in the nuclear family context because interfamilial bonds are both subtle and complex.
194. See Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710-11 (Minn. 1985) (adopting the primary
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favored by scholars, but has floundered in practice.1 95
There are major problems with the primary caretaker preference.
First, the quantity of child care may not correspond with either the quality of child care or the quality of the parent-child relationship.1 96 Second, the presumption is unworkable in families where parents share or
allocate parenting tasks or change parenting roles, either during marriage
or after separating.' 97 Finally, it has generated huge quantities of litigation revolving around such petty issues as who changes the diapers, who
does the supper dishes, or who makes the peanut butter sandwiches.' 9
The preference succeeds only in the easy case-where one parent is a
full-time homemaker caring for small children.
The psychological parent and primary caretaker presumptions seem
to be general guidelines for custody determinations grounded in appropriate psychological theory. Their interdisciplinary relationship, however, is spurious. The presumptions are psychologically sound only for
young children of preschool age. School age children neither have nor
need primary caretakers to wash and dress them. Furthermore, merely
because one parent is responsible for the washing, cooking, shopping,
and cleaning, he or she is not necessarily the psychological parent. Similarly, according to most traditional psychoanalytic theories, school age
children do not need constant contact with a psychological parent, nor
does their well-being decline under shared parenting routines. In
stretching the applicability of these presumptions to school age children,
the law has ignored these developmental truths. The reason is similar to
caretaker presumption as a workable index of the psychological parent); see also David L.
Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv.
477 (1984); O'Kelly, supra note 10, at 560 (recommending a primary caretaker preference except
where the primary caretaker is not the psychological parent). Others have espoused the
presumption on slightly different grounds. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981)
(listing specific parenting behaviors as indicia of primary caretaker preference); ELEANOR E.
MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF
CUSTODY 283-84 (1992) (asserting primary caretaker presumption increases bargaining advantage
of women and avoids the detrimental effects of mandating joint custody as a compromise solution
for parents in high conflict situations); Bartlett, supra note 10 (claiming primary parent has built
up earned equity credits towards custody); Scott, supra note 10 (arguing presumption is provable
and fair-primary caretaker, by acting as such, has proven competency and deserves to exercise
it); Woodhouse, supra note 8 (stating children have a right to proven good parents).
195. At least 16 states have flirted with the "primary caretaker" presumption, but only West
Virginia has retained it as a judicial preference. W. VA. CODE § 44-10-4 (1995). Minnesota
formerly had a statutory preference, but now includes it as part of a general factor-type statute.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (1994); see Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the
Child.- Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year
Experiment With the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REv. 427, 428-40 (1990).
196. Crippen, supra note 195, at 460-61.

197. Id. at 475-77.
198. Id. at 452-60.
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the explanations of tender years and established reciprocal affective ties
in the nineteenth century: legally children are "infants" under adult control, and the tendency of the legal system is to assume infantility.
The obvious alternative to the psychological parent/primary caretaker presumption is a presumption favoring shared or divided custody
and responsibility. In its strong form, this is the joint custody presumption-which has generated much psychological research, particularly
from a family systems perspective. 199 In its weak form, the presumption
is often phrased as a rule of frequent-and-continuing contact with both
parents.2 °0 The arguments both for and against joint custody and frequent-and-continuing-contact have been justified by the same "psychologized" doctrines supporting the "psychological parent" and "primary
caretaker" presumptions.20 '
Psychological research showing that children suffer due to loss of
contact with the noncustodial parent following divorce has been used to
support legal argument that joint custody is consistent with stability and
continuity of relationships.20 2 Arguments against joint custody are premised on the idea that moving between two homes and responding to
two domestic regimes disrupts the stability and continuity on which the
child depends.20 3 Moreover, opponents have argued that the detrimental
effects of unrelenting interparental conflict which occurs in some fami199. A family systems approach emphasizes the way each family member's emotions and
behavior affect those of the other members. See, e.g., E. Mavis Hetherington & W. Glenn
Clingempeel, Coping With Transitions: A Family Systems Perspective, 57 MONOGRAPHS SoC'Y
FOR REs. CHILD DEV. 1 (1992); E. Mavis Hetherington, An Overview of the Virginia Longitudinal
Study of Divorce and Remarriage With a Focus on Early Adolescence, 7 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 39
(1993). The joint custody presumption has been affected by psychological studies measuring
children's adjustment to divorce. The research of Judith S. Wallerstein and her group in the
California Children of Divorce Project has visibly influenced changes in California's child
custody law. See JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How
CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980).
200. See Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody, 4 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 121
(1994) (illustrating the similarity between these seemingly different rules).
201. Ironically, the same psychological studies have been cited by both sides. For example,
one work which is often alternatively cited is WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 199.
202. Joint physical custody facilitates continuing contact with the noncustodial parent. Joyce
A. Arditti, Differences Between Fatherswith Joint Custody and Noncustodial Fathers, 62 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYcHIATRY 186 (1992); Kelly, supra note 200, at 132. But see Paul R. Amato, Children's
Adjustment to Divorce: Theories, Hypotheses and Empirical Support, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
23, 27 (1993) ("The loss of support from the noncustodial parent may be a factor in the adjustment
of children, but limitations of previous studies restrict our ability to say so with certainty.");
Joseph M. Healy, Jr. et al., Children and Their Fathers After ParentalSeparation, 60 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 531 (1990); R. Neugebauer, Divorce, Custody, and Visitation: The Child's
Point of View, 12 J. DIVORCE 153 (1989) (concluding no blanket recommendation about fathers'
relationships with their children after separation can be offered; different children and different
situations demand different remedies).
203. MASON, supra note 49, at 130.
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lies outweighs the advantages of contact with both parents.2 "4
Thus the ease with which the same psychological premises, and
even the same psychological studies, can be marshalled in support of
contrary legal rules 20 5 exposes the inadequacy of psychology for these
purposes.
The data 20 6 are more subtle 20 7 and less conclusive than the advocates for and against joint custody would argue. 2 8 The real issue is how
to reach a balance between the advantages of joint custody/continuing
204. Numerous studies have found a correlation between inter-parental conflict and children's
adjustment. E.g., Kathleen A. Camara & Gary Resnick, InterparentalConflict and Cooperation:
Factors Moderating Children's Post-Divorce Adjustment, in IMPACT OF DIVORCE, SINGLE
PARENTING, AND STEPPARENTING ON CHILDREN 169 (E. Mavis Hetherington & Josephine D.
Arasteh, eds., 1988); Rex Forehand et al., Divorce and Marital Conflict: Relationship to

Adolescent, Competence and Adjustment in Early Adolescence, in IMPACT OF DIVORCE, SINGLE
PARENTING AND STEPPARENTING ON CHILDREN, at 155; Janet R. Johnston, Family Transitions and

Children's Functioning: The Case of Parental Conflict and Divorce, in FAMILY, SELF AND
SOCIETY: TOWARD A NEW AGENDA FOR FAMILY RESEARCH 197 (1993); Paul R. Amato, Life-Span

Adjustment of Children to Their Parents' Divorce 4 CHILDREN & DIVORCE 143, 151 (1994);
Amato, supra note 202; Charlene E. Depner et al., InterparentalConflict and Child Adjustment:
A Decade Review and Meta-Analysis, 3 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 323 (1992); Robert E.
Emery, InterparentalConflict and the Children of Discordand Divorce, 92 PSYCHOL. BULL. 310
(1982); John H. Grych & Frank D. Fincham, Marital Conflict and Children's Adjustment: A
Cognitive-Contextual Framework, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267 (1990); Janet R. Johnston, HighConflict Divorce, CHILDREN & DIVORCE 165 (1994);

Janet R. Johnston et al., Ongoing

Postdivorce Conflict: Effects on Children of Joint Custody and Frequent Access, 59 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHiATRY 576 (1989); Marsha Kline et al., The Long Shadow of Marital Conflict: A
Model of Children's Postdivorce Adjustment, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 297 (1991); David
Mechanic & Stephen Hansell, Divorce, Family Conflict, and Adolescents' Well-Being, 30 J.
HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 105 (1989); James L. Peterson & Nicholas Zill, Marital Disruption,
Parent-ChildRelationships, and Behavior Problems in Children, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 295
(1986); Daniel S. Shaw & Robert E. Emery, Parental Conflict and Other Correlates of the
Adjustment of School-Age Children Whose Parents Have Separated, 15 J. ABNORMAL CHILD
PSYCHOL. 269 (1987).

205. For examples, compare Cooper v. Cooper, 491 A.2d 606, 612 (N.J. 1984) with Hale v.
Hale, 429 N.E.2d 340, 345 n.8 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (both cases citing WALLERSTEIN & KELLY,
supra note 199, but as support for contrary propositions).

206. There are a vast number of studies. One article tested several hypotheses about children's
adjustment to divorce on the basis of 180 previously published statistical studies. Amato, supra
note 202, at 24. Another scholar criticized Amato for failing to include qualitative studies.
Katherine R. Allen, The Dispassionate Discourse of Children's Adjustment to Divorce, 55 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 46, 47 (1993).
207. For example, in high conflict families, children's adjustment is related to frequency of
access to the non-primary parent. Further, children's adjustment is more directly linked to the
adjustment of the primary parent than to conflict, and the detriment of ongoing conflict may be
indirect-operating through its effect on the adjustment of the primary parent. Johnston, supra

note 204, at 172-75.
208. Compare Forehand et al., supra note 204, at 159 ("Self-perceived cognitive and social
competence among adolescents from divorced homes was lower than that of adolescents from
nondivorced homes; however, no association was found for level of marital conflict") with
Camara & Resnick, supra note 204, at 169-70 (It is not the existence of conflict between parents
but the way that parents resolve conflict that is determinative.).
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contact and the detriment of conflict. The child-as-patient proponents
would request more and better studies to determine conclusively what
type and degree of conflict is risky for a statistically significant number
of children. They would then convert the psychological data to a legal
rule.
States have adopted various approaches. Some will not order joint
custody unless both parents agree to it. 20 9 Such a rule may be over or
under inclusive in any given case, and may fail to serve the child's best
interests. Another approach is to undertake a case-by-case inquiry with
its attendant likelihood of prolonged evaluation and litigation, and risk
inflaming the very conflict sought to be avoided. No joint custody rule
will be successful until it is known for which children joint custody promotes stability and continuity and for which it has the opposite effect.
There is no reason to believe that psychology will yield bright-line
answers about optimum custodial placements. First, as the leading
researchers admit, the substantial accumulation of longitudinal studies,
using statistical and clinical methods, conducted in different parts of the
country, has failed to yield any clear predictors of post-divorce adjustment. 21 Second, children's post-divorce adjustment depends upon the
evolving pattern of social relationships and interaction with age and gender that cannot be predicted by the "psychological snapshot" taken by
the court in the middle of the divorce crisis, 21 1 when familial conflict is
at its height and parenting competency at its nadir.212 Parent-child roles
and relationships inevitably change following divorce.213 How parents
and children will react to new challenges or what the compatibility of
209. E.g., Dodd v. Dodd, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
210. Dr. Judith Wallerstein, principal investigator of the California Children of Divorce Project

and director of the Center for the Family in Transition writes: "I was surprised to discover that the
severity of a child's reactions at the time of the parents' divorce does not predict how that child
will fare five, ten, and even fifteen years later . . . . One cannot predict long-term effects of
divorce on children from how they react at the outset." JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA
BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOWEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 15

(1989). Similarly, E. Mavis Hetherington, principal investigator of the Virginia Longitudinal
Study, finds that some children exhibit "delayed effects" while others "emerge as psychologically
enhanced and exceptionally competent and fulfilled individuals." E. Mavis Hetherington, Coping
with Family Transitions: Winners, Losers, and Survivors, 60 CHILD DEV. 1, 1 (1989).
211. Hetherington, supra note 199, at 39. ("[D]ivorce cannot be viewed as a single event but is
part of an extended chain of multiple transitions.").
212. The acute phase of the divorce is characterized by parents' diminished physical and

psychological ability and diminished capacity to provide nurturance and discipline. Judith S.
Wallerstein, Children of Divorce: An Overview, 4 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 105, 109 (1986).
213. This is especially true of relationships with noncustodial parents. Id. at 109-10. "Our
evidence is that the visiting parent-child relationship is likely to differ markedly from the

preexisting relationship during the marriage." Id; see also Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan B. Kelly,
Effects of Divorce on the Visiting Father-Child Relationship, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1534
(1980).
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personalities may be among children, stepparents, and stepsiblings is not
subject to measurement. Thus, no matter what statistics we have, each
individual life-course is unpredictable.
Third, children's adjustment to divorce is, in part, a function of the
prevalence of divorce in the society, societal trends, and the social and
economic conditions of a particular time period. This is known as the
"cohort effect." Since society is always changing, legal rules based on
the results of psychological studies will inevitably be obsolete.214 Further, law changes societal conditions, through its power to sanction and
model behavior, and thus indirectly affects research results. Law and
empirical research are engaged in a self-perpetuating cycle.
Fourth, cultural bias is inherent in both the measures used (such as
school achievement, discipline, and "adjustment") and in the acceptable
outcomes. This use of psychology devalues the child rearing styles of
parents who differ from the mainstream, and the behaviors of children
who deviate from the norm. Since experts cannot accurately predict
what factors "create" a well-adjusted child, the interests of children are
not served by denying their autonomy, personhood, and identity in the
name of their well-being. Implicit in today's "psychological" (and
therefore ostensibly "objective") standards is a social morality that is
similar to the nineteenth century normative morality. The clinical measures of the psychological studies are the contemporary idiom through
which the state exercises its parens patriae function to produce welladjusted, employed, moral citizens. The state uses child custody laws
not to meet children's needs, but to mold them into what the state thinks
they ought to be. And the legal construction of the child as patient justifies a reduction of children's liberty in the name of diagnosis, cure, and
mental health.
Such approaches are based on assumptions about the child which
denigrate his personhood. The first assumption is that the child is not a
competent gauge of his own emotions. Consider the question: How
much family conflict would one endure to remain close to one's most
important relatives? Should the state answer this for a person of six, or
ten, or twenty-five years? This is a very personal question. Some children may be delighted by the diversity of joint custody, while others
214. For example, older studies tend to yield larger differences between children from divorced
and non-divorced families than more recent ones, in relation to measures of academic
achievement, conduct, psychological adjustment, and quality of life. One explanation for this is
that divorce has become more common. See Amato, supra note 204, at 143; Paul R. Amato &
Bruce Keith, ParentalDivorce and the Well-Being of Children: A Meta-Analysis, 110 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 26 (1991); Paul R. Amato & Bruce Keith, ParentalDivorce and Adult Well-Being: A
Meta-Analysis, 53 J. MARuIoA & F~i. 43 (1991); cf Teitelbaum, supra note 84, at 437 (blaming
the current "instability" in family law on a combined commitment to empiricism and rights talk).
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may be disturbed by an arrangement that requires them to switch blankets and beds. The second is that the child's psychological adjustment
(as determined by such "objective" measures as school achievement,
gregariousness, or obedience to parents) is more important than the
child's identity. A child, acting as an autonomous individual, may
choose to suffer stress or disobey conventional mores to satisfy personal
goals and inclinations. The law protects such autonomous exercise of
identity in adults. Denying children similar protection assumes either
that children are at a significantly greater risk of damage, thereby justifying the parenspatriaefunction of the state, or that the parenspatriae
function of the state usurps the identity-defining choices of children.
Neither of these assumptions is justifiable.
To summarize, during the last quarter-century courts have used
psychology to support and justify their decisions. Applying psychological theories to bolster these approaches taken in the "best interests" of
the child adds a superficial air of scientific validity. Looking beneath
the psychological terminology of the decisions reveals that each of them
is grounded in the view of children as fragile, incompetent, and in need
of continuity and stability. These same legal arguments were made during the nineteenth century, long before the development of modem psychological research.
The answers which psychology gives the law are, in large part,
products of the questions which the law asks, and often the law asks
psychology the wrong question. Asking the right question results in a
different answer. Consequently, the seemingly different approaches discussed in the next section share a fundamental similarity-they are not
rules by which the court makes decisions about the child, but ways to
enable the child to decide.
III.

TowARDS THE CHILD AS PERSON

This section challenges the protectivist/patienthood vision of children with an empowerment vision of the child as a developing person. I
first argue that the parameters established by the U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence of the child demonstrate that the way to secure children's
rights is to empower them to exercise those rights as soon as they are
able to do so. Next, I explore psychological theories to determine when
a child is able to choose among fit custodial parents, and conclude that
developmental psychology, informed by the social context of divorce,
indicates that children can make those decisions competently from the
age of six years (the onset of middle childhood). Finally, I present an
argument for children's choice of custody based on the practical needs
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of custody litigation: children's choice combines fact specific sensitivity with the outcome certainty that promotes settlement and fairness.
A.

The Argument from ConstitutionalLaw

The state law governing child custody decisions in divorce articulates vaguely with the constitutional law of the family. Nonetheless,
from U.S. Supreme Court family law jurisprudence it is possible to discern a constitutional orientation towards the child 21 5 to inform and guide
an approach to custody determinations. The underlying concern is
whether the constitutional orientation favors the protectivist child-aspatient paradigm, or the empowering child-as-developing-person
paradigm.
The constitutional cases do not affirmatively mandate a protectivist
approach to children, and there is no constitutional right to a custodial
placement that is in the "best interests" of the child. The "best interests
of the child" doctrine does not rise to constitutional dimensions; it implicates neither substantive nor procedural due process rights. Further, it is
subject to limitation in the interests of the state, the interests of parents,
and the interests of children themselves.
In two cases decided during the 1993 term, the Court spoke directly
of "best interests." In Reno v. Flores,216 the Court considered the claims
of a class held in detention composed of more than 8500 alien juveniles
arrested on suspicion of being deportable. These children, many of
whom had no relatives in the United States to assume their custody,
mounted a substantive and procedural due process challenge to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regulations that permitted
possibly deportable alien juveniles to be detained 2 17 pending deportation
hearings.2 18 Arguing that qualified adults were ready and able to assume
215. It would be presumptuous to speak of anything more specific than an "orientation." Prior
to the passage of the Twenty-sixth Amendment in 1971 (prohibiting the denial or abridgment of

the right to vote to any citizen 18 years or older on account of age), nothing in the Constitution,
nor the records and debates leading to its drafting and ratification, mentioned children. Further,
the Supreme Court cases addressing or impacting upon the rights of children lack a consistent
vision of children or childhood. Homer H. Clark, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL.
L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1992).

216. 113 S.Ct. 1439 (1993).
217. Plaintiffs alleged that the children were kept in severe prison-like conditions. Id. at 1446.
However, before the case came before the Supreme Court, new regulations were issued requiring

the detention facilities to conform to the standards for foster-care institutions. Id. at 1445.
Therefore, the Supreme Court did not consider the actual conditions of the facilities, and treated
the procedural due process claim as a generic challenge to "institutional custody," as though it
might have applied to any child, whether a potentially deportable alien or not. Id. at 1448.
218. The immigration regulations governing children differ significantly from those governing
adults, who are generally released on their own recognizance unless deemed to constitute a threat
to national security. Under INS regulations, a child could be released only to a parent, legal
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their custody, the children asserted a constitutional right to "an individualized hearing on whether private placement would be in the children's
'best interests'-followed by such placement if the answer is in the
affirmative."2 19
The Court's opinion quickly dispensed with the claim that "best
interests" had constitutional status.220 The Court held that "best interests" could not be asserted as a constitutional right in claims for children
against parents by non-parents. 221 Neither could it be asserted as a constitutional claim for a particular standard of care by children against
their own parents.222 And finally, "best interests" could not be asserted
by children as a claim against the state. 223 The crux of Flores is clearthe constitutional standard of child care is adequate, not optimum, care,
and adequacy is to be determined by balancing the rights and interests of
the children, with the rights and interests of others.224 In other words,
there is no constitutional mandate to put a child first among others in the
family, nor to maximize the child's opportunities.
A few months after the Flores decision, the Supreme Court denied
an application for stay of an order requiring the prospective adoptive
parents to return two year old Jessica DeBoer to her natural parents.225
guardian, or other adult relative. The regulation placed children at a systematic disadvantage;
even where they had relatives in the United States, such relatives might not come forward if they,
too, were subject to arrest and detention. Id. at 1443-44.
219. Id. at 1448.
220. The Court did acknowledge that "best interests" was a proper (but not exclusive) standard
for resolving inter-parental custody disputes. Id.
221. Id. "Even if it were shown, for example, that a particular couple desirous of adopting a
child would best provide for the child's welfare, the child would nonetheless not be removed from
the custody of its parents so long as they were providing for the child adequately." Id.
222. Id. "Similarly, 'the best interests of the child' is not the legal standard that governs
parents' or guardians' exercise of their custody: so long as certain minimum requirements of child
care are met, the interests of the child may be subordinated to the interests of other children, or
indeed even to the interests of the parents or guardians themselves." Id.
223. "'The best interests of the child' is likewise not an absolute and exclusive constitutional
criterion for the government's exercise of the custodial responsibilities that it undertakes, which
must be reconciled with many other responsibilities. Thus, child-care institutions operated by the
state in the exercise of its parens patriae authority . . . are not constitutionally required to be
funded at such a level as to provide the best schooling or the best health care available ....
" Id.
224. Id.
225. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S.Ct. 1 (1993). The couple who wished to adopt Jessica was
fighting to retain custody despite their knowledge that the adoption was legally invalid because
the natural father had not given consent. Id. In the subsequent similar case of Baby Richard, the
U.S. Supreme Court denied the adoptive parents' petition for a stay of a writ of habeas corpus
directing that custody of the boy be returned to his biological father, who had believed the boy to
be dead for the first 57 days of his life. O'Connell v. Kirchner, 115 S.Ct. 891 (1995). Petitioners
argued a procedural due process claim that the adoptive parents and Baby Richard had substantive
liberty interests in their relationship with each other. A newly-enacted state statute would have
mandated a best interests hearing. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented from the
Court's denial of a stay. They would have waited until issuance of the state court opinion, to
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Justice Stevens reasoned that a grant of certiorari was highly improbable
because neither federal nor state law authorized nonrelatives to retain
custody of a child whose natural parents were fit and willing, merely
because the nonrelatives were potentially better able to provide for the
child.226 By denying the application for stay of enforcement, the
Supreme Court once again made it clear that "best interests" is not a
constitutional doctrine.
Flores and DeBoer are decisions of very different consequence,227
yet are both of one mind: there is no constitutional right to optimum
caretaking. Similarly, in Palmore v. Sidoti221 the Supreme Court found
that although the goal of granting custody in the best interests of the
child is a substantial government interest, 229 it cannot prevail against an
equal protection challenge based on racial discrimination. 230 The Palmore Court reversed a Florida state court decision changing custody of a
three year old European-American child from the mother to the father
when the mother married an African-American man. 23 ' The trial court's
rationale was that the child would suffer the stress of social stigmatization by her peers and classmates on account of her mother's interracial
marriage. 232 Significantly, the Supreme Court did not deny that such
stigmatization would occur, but found it less significant that the equal
protection challenge and the governmental interest in ending racial discrimination.2 33 The decision indicates that a child's psychological wellbeing is not the only factor to consider in custodial placement when
constitutional rights are implicated.2 34 In sum, Flores,DeBoer, and Paldetermine whether constitutional grounds for a hearing existed. O'Connell v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct.
1084 (1995) (O'Conner, J. dissenting from denial of application for stay). The split among the
states between the best interests and parental rights approaches to flawed adoptions may prompt
the Court to consider, at some future time, the substantive issue of whether the best interests
approach is in conflict with parents' fundamental liberty interest in raising their children.

226. Id. at 2.
227. Flores denied the children much more than their right to an "optimum" custodial
placement. The Court held that there was no substantive due process right to be free from
physical restraint that would have required a blanket release of all these children into adult

custody. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1447. The Court, quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265
(1984), found that juveniles are always in some kind of custody, and where the custody of the
parent or legal guardian fails the government must either exercise custody or appoint someone

else to do it. Id. DeBoer, on the other hand, was a correct and courageous decision to reunite a
child with her natural parents.
228. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
229. Id. at 433.
230. Id. at 434.
231. Id. at 434.

232. Id. at 431.
233. Id. at 432.
234. The Court held:
The goal of granting custody based on the best interests of the child is indisputably a
substantial governmental interest for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. It
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more together delineate an approach to children's custody in which "best
interests" is unmandated, minimalist, and of insubstantial weight against
such fundamental constitutional rights as parental liberty and equal
protection.
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Serv-

ices,23 5 the Supreme Court went further, rejecting the Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process claim of four year old Joshua
DeShaney, who had been beaten into a permanent state of mental retar-

dation by his violently abusive custodial father.236 Joshua had been
removed and subsequently returned to his father's custody by the county
authorities. The social worker meticulously documented her suspicions
of abuse, but, despite Joshua's numerous emergency room visits, took
no affirmative steps to intervene.237 In deciding the case, the Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause afforded no
right of protection against private violence.2 38 The majority refused to
would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic prejudices do not exist or that
all manifestations of those prejudices have been eliminated. There is a risk that a
child living with a stepparent of a different race may be subject to a variety of
pressures and stresses not present if the child were living with parents of the same
racial or ethnic origin. The question, however, is whether the reality of private
biases and the possible injury they might inflict are permissible considerations for
removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother. We have little
difficulty concluding that they are not .... The effects of racial prejudice, however
real, cannot justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the custody
of its natural mother found to be an appropriate person to have such custody.
Id. at 433-34. The Court's opinion did not address the issue of whether the change of custody
violated the mother's fundamental liberty to raise her child as she saw fit.
In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), the Court upheld a
strict interpretation of provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act the (ICWA) granting exclusive
jurisdiction to the Indian tribal courts over non-parental custodial placements of Indian children
domiciled on the reservation. The issue was whether the twin babies of an Indian couple, who had
deliberately left the reservation to give birth to the children with the intention of having them
adopted by a prosperous, non-Indian couple, were reservation domiciliaries under the Act. Id. at
37-39. In finding the babies to be reservation domiciliaries, the Court considered the purposes of
the ICWA: " 'protection of the rights of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian
community and tribe in retaining its children in its society.' " Id. at 37 (quoting the statute).
Congress concluded that it would be in the best interests of Indian children and Indian society that
the children remain under the jurisdiction of the tribe. The ICWA and the holding in Mississippi
Band are not inconsistent with the "child-as-patient" paradigm. The Act was based in part on the
findings that Indian children reared in non-Indian society suffered stigma, prejudice, and identity
confusion. Id. at 33 n. 1. The children were losing their identity, as the tribe was losing its existence by removal of its children. The tribe needed the children for its cultural survival, and the
children needed the tribe to survive because of their psychological need for cultural identity.
Thus, cultural and psychological aspects were fused. Palmore and MississippiBand demonstrate
that maximization of the psychological health of the individual child may be constitutionally
subordinated to the good of the group (at least a minority group).
235. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
236. Id.at 193.
237. Id. at 193.
238. Id. at 197.
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accept the argument that, because of their knowledge of the abusive situation and their proclaimed intentions to help him, the county social services department assumed a "special relationship" with Joshua which
imposed upon it an affirmative duty of intervention.2 3 9 The Court reasoned that Joshua's situation was not comparable to that of a prisoner or
an involuntarily committed psychiatric patient, where the "State's
affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own
behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar
restraint of personal liberty ...." triggers an affirmative duty to provide the services necessary for survival and safety.2 4 ' Although subsequent federal cases relying on DeShaney have held that a special
relationship and affirmative obligation to provide minimally safe care
may exist where the state has imposed a foster care placement upon a
child,242 these courts have not recognized that the placement of children
in the custody of parents imposes a similar affirmative duty upon the
state to protect the child from violence. Nor have the courts imposed
upon the state an affirmative obligation to place children in custodial
situations that maximize their best interests.243
While these cases make it clear that children qua children have no
affirmative constitutional right to a "best interests" level of care, they do
not resolve whether the minimum standards of adequacy they allow represent a constitutional floor or ceiling. When is it permissible for the
state, in its parenspatriaecapacity, to order a custodial placement in the
child's "best interests," and when may the court choose such a placement for the child? 244 While "best interests" does not prevail over certain constitutional rights, the question as to how those rights are
implicated in interparental custody disputes remains. The answer
requires a two step analysis. First, how does the Constitution address
239. Id. at 197-98.
240. Id. at 200.

241. Id.
242. See Karen M. Blum, DeShaney: Custody, Creation of Danger, and Culpability, 27 Loy.

L.A. L. REv.435, 439-44 (1994), and cases cited therein. See also Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton,
115 S.Ct. 2386 (1995) (despite some in loco parentis function, public schools do not exercise
such control over children as to give rise to a duty to protect).
243. Gary B. Melton comments cynically that
[a]t least since 1979, decisions in children's cases have been typified by a passing
(begrudging?) acknowledgement that minors are 'persons' entitled to the protection
of the Bill of Rights, and then by extended discussion of why these rights should not
be fulfilled. To reach this conclusion, the Court has often had to adopt a curiously
narrow vision of minors as vulnerable to all sorts of threats-except threats to their
liberty or privacy.
MELTON, supra note 14, at 239 (citations omitted).
244. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (justifying pretrial detention for juvenile
delinquents to protect them from the physical dangers they might encounter by continued
disobedience, and from the risks of a life beyond the law).
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the fundamental liberty of adults regarding family and family choices?
Second, do children possess a lesser right, simply because they are
children?
The durability and diversity of constitutionally protected familial
bonds is demonstrated in decisions about whether to have a family, 245
household composition and makeup,2 46 education, 47 ethnic and religious identity, 248 and intimate association. 249 Further, the parent-child
bond is sacrosanct against attack from outsiders claiming an interest in
the child.25° Parents' rights cannot be terminated involuntarily except
upon stringent grounds subject to the strictest due process safeguards.
Each parent-child relationship, once established, is entitled to the highest
constitutional protection. 2 1' The state has no parens patriae interest in
separating fit parents from their children, 2 2 and no right to intrude into
relationships between fit parents and their children on the grounds of the
children's "best interests. 253
While the rearrangement of parent-child relationships at divorce
undoubtedly constitutes a weaker parenspatriaeintrusion on fundamen245. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
246. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding a European-American woman cannot
lose custody of her child simply because she marries an African-American man); Moore v. City of
E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a city ordinance limiting housing to
specific categories of relatives who may live together).
247. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (exempting Amish parents from criminal
penalty for failure to send children to secondary school and authorizing traditional training in nonmechanized farming and community values as means of enculturating Amish adolescents into the
Amish community); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding that prohibiting
parochial primary school education is unconstitutional provided school meets minimum state
educational requirements); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding prohibition of
primary school education in the German language is unconstitutional).
248. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
249. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (protecting communication in
intimate associations as both the source and the result of deep, enduring interpersonal attachments,
fundamental to human life); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
250. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S.Ct. 1 (1993) (requiring return of child to her natural parents
where adoption procedure was flawed, in spite of the mutual affection which had grown between
adoptive parents and child); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977)
(subordinating custodial rights of foster parents to those of fit parents).
251. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (requiring a "clear and convincing"
evidentiary standard for parental rights termination); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
(requiring fitness hearing before unwed father can lose custody of his children); cf.Lassiter v.
Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (affirming case-by-case determination of right to
appointed counsel in parental termination proceedings).
252. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767; see also Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652 ("We observe that the State
registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from the custody of fit
parents. [T]he State spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates him from his
family.").
253. Cf Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 (holding both parents and state share an interest in
preventing the erroneous termination of the parental relationship).
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tal liberties than does a parental-rights termination proceeding, the same
concerns are implicated. "Best interests" decisions, based upon evaluations of the quality and content of parenting, impose significant restrictions on parental decision-making and time and contact with children.
Under the line of case law leading from Meyer v. Nebraska through
Wisconsin v. Yoder,2" 4 such court imposed restrictions would be impermissible state interference with married parents' fundamental liberties to
raise their children. At divorce, however, custody has historically been
treated differently. Traditionally, parents' child-rearing rights have been
viewed as derivative of the right to marry. 2" Divorce weakens or evaporates those rights. Furthermore, divorce diminishes the right of familial
privacy that normally shields the parent-child relationship from outside
interference.256
Under contemporary jurisprudence, however, fundamental parental
254. See supra note 247.
255. The linkage between the fundamental liberty to raise a famiily and marital status derives
from Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a Nebraska statute prohibiting teaching children below the eighth grade a
foreign language (other than Latin, Greek, or Hebrew). Id. at 399. The target of the legislation,
passed in the xenophobic aftermath of World War I, was the German-American community. The
statute's purpose "was to promote civic development by inhibiting training and education of the
immature in foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English and acquire American
ideals .
Id.
I..."at 401. The Court held that the statute was arbitrary as applied, and unrelated to
an end within the state's competency. Id. at 403. Justice McReynolds, writing for the majority,
stated that the Fourteenth Amendment "[w]ithout doubt.., denotes•., the right of the individual
•.. to marry, establish a home and bring up children .... " Id. at 399. In the cultural context of
America between the World Wars, the question of whether married and divorced parents should
have equal rights to determine the upbringing of their children was not yet a social concern.
Justice McReynold's influential dicta linking marital and parental rights was probably a reflection
of a period when divorce rates were low and out-of-wedlock childbirth was considered immoral.
The language of Meyer contains the germ of the later constitutional theory that parental
substantive due process rights attach only within the shell of privacy surrounding the intact family
unit.
256. In the third quarter of this century, while divorce rates soared, substantive due process
retreated temporarily to the background of constitutional discourse, and the right of privacy, which
subsumed the fundamental liberty to raise a family, moved center stage. See Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (upholding right of married adults to use contraceptives based
on the zone of privacy that surrounds the marital relationship). Professor Kenneth L. Karst
explains, "[t]he Court's opinion located that right within a generalized 'zone of privacy,' created
in part by the First Amendment, but by the Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments as well."
Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624-25 (1980) (footnote
omitted). More important than the source of the right was its subject. "[T]he main object of
constitutional protection in Griswold was the marital relationship." Id. at 625. Griswold viewed
the decision of whether to procreate as the first of many that a married couple makes about raising
a family. Cases dealing with marriage, divorce, and family relationships after Griswold employ
the discourse of equal protection, procedural and substantive due process to create a shell of
privacy around the marital relationship. Id. at 653. This right of privacy includes the right of
married couples to raise their children as they see fit, but excludes equivalent rights for divorced
parents who are outside the marital relationship. See Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition
from Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEo. L.J. 1519, 1539 (1994) (explaining that the
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liberty is grounded in the dyadic relationship between a parent and a
child, independent of the horizontal bond of matrimony. The Supreme
Court has erased distinctions between children of married and unmarried
parents and has recognized the fundamental parental rights of unmarried
parents who have established relationships with their children as equal to
those of married parents.2 57

Moreover, implicit in the Meyer and Yoder line of cases is the
assumption that, within marriage, husbands and wives act as a single
parental unit. This assumption, lingering from the days of coverture, is
incompatible with the present constitutional jurisprudence of marriage as
2 58
an association of two autonomous individuals. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,
the Supreme Court enunciated a new view of marriage, stating, "the
marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. 25 9 Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter quoted Eisenstadt approvingly in their joint majority opinion in
PlannedParenthoodv. Casey260 finding a statutory provision requiring a
pre-abortion husband notification provision to be unconstitutional. Even
within marriage, they wrote, each person individually exercises "a person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood"; 26 ' and individually makes "personal decisions relating to ... family relationships,
child rearing, and education. '262 Casey signaled an important change in

the discourse on familial liberty from privacy (and freedom from state
interference) towards affirmative protection of individual autonomous
decisionmaking and self-determination.263 Under the Casey view of
parental rights, when divorce cracks the shell of marital privacy, that
which already exists becomes visible: each parent's individual liberty to
make decisions about how the child should be raised. Thus, the fundarights granted in Griswold protect the family unit against state intrusion, but do not safeguard the
rights of the individuals in the family).
257. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (holding unwed father has right to refuse
consent to adoption of his children by stepfather); Stanley v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1971)
(finding unconstitutional a law presuming unmarried fathers to be unfit parents). But cf Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1983) (finding against natural fathers because of their failure to
establish an actual parental relationship); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (holding
natural father's authority to veto adoption not measured by same standard as divorced father).
258. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
259. Id. at 453; see Dolgin, supra note 256, at 1545-46 (arguing that Eisenstadt replaced the
unitary hierarchical definition of marriage that had dominated since medieval times with a modem
view based on individual autonomy).
260. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2830 (1992).
261. Id. at 2806.
262. Id. at 2797 (citations omitted).
263. What Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the seminal abortion case, actually protects,
declared the Casey Court, is the "right to make the ultimate decision .... " Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2821.
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mental liberty to raise one's child deserves the same protection after
264
divorce as during marriage.

Imposition of a court's judgment under the guise of "best interests"
is no less an infringement on constitutional liberty when a parent is
divorced than when a parent is married. Undeniably, a modifiable custodial allocation which provides both fit parents frequent contact with a
child is a minimal intrusion compared to abolishing parental rights in a
termination proceeding. Under Santosky v. Kramer,26 5 however, the
state's interest is de minimis to nonexistent. It would be impermissible
for the state to intrude in this relationship on its own initiative. Courts
use the "best interests" standard in inter-parental custody proceedings
only because it seems to be fair when parents, having failed to negotiate
a settlement between themselves, bring their case before the court, inviting the state to decide.26 6
Given this analysis of the relationship between parental liberties
and "best interests," should children not have the reciprocal right to
make choices regarding their parents and custody? In articulating the
jurisprudence of familial liberty, the Supreme Court has focused on parents-not on children. In doing so, the Court has assumed the interests
of parents and children are identical.26 7 On the other hand, the Supreme
Court has often stated that children are entitled to the protection of the
Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Bill of Rights.26 8
264. Further, central to the concept of liberty envisioned by the Casey Court are the beliefs and
values, the elements of personhood, shown to be the hallmarks of cultural identity. The Court
explains: "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Id. at 2807.
265. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
266. Although "best interests" is a ubiquitous standard, I remain dubious about its
constitutionality. Consider whether joint custody is not constitutionally required wherever both
parents want custody, unless there is an affirmative showing that joint custody is detrimental to
the child. "Best interests" seems to be a fair standard to decide between parents of equal right
who have affirmatively sought the aid of a court. But is it fair, or even constitutional, as applied to
the parent who would willingly remain married or negotiate but has been hauled to court by an
intransigent spouse?
267. See. e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971) (considering only the testimony of
parents in granting Amish children an exemption from high school).
268. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding children of undocumented aliens are
entitled to a public school education); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977)
(invalidating law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to minors on grounds that children
have Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from government interference with decision to bear a
child); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (invalidating statute requiring
parental consent as condition for unmarried minor to obtain an abortion); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (upholding the First Amendment rights of
children to protest the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands at school); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967) (extending right to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings); Brown v. Board of Ed.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (implicitly finding children to be covered by the Equal Protection Clause).
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Since no provision of the Constitution, nor any Supreme Court case
denies that children are persons within the contemplation of the Constitution, a basic assumption must be that children have the same constitutional right to a relationship with a fit parent as that parent has with his
or her child.2 69
Assuming that children have the same fundamental liberties regarding their families as adults have, are these rights implicated in the same
or a different way in interparental child custody proceedings? Arguably
the "best interests" standard, as presently construed to substitute a
court's judgment for the child's choice, infringes more seriously on the
rights of children than on the rights of parents.
From the child's perspective, a custody proceeding has practical
implications of finality not present from the parent's perspective, and
which, for the child, make it very similar to a parental rights termination
proceeding. When one parent is awarded sole or primary custody, and
the other lives in a different place or loses interest, the child will have
neither the money nor the wherewithal to initiate phone conversations
and long visits, to move or to select a school close to the other parent, or
to make other efforts to keep that parent involved. By contrast, a noncustodial parent who wants greater involvement with the child can
choose to live close by, call frequently, or bring a motion for change of
custody.
269. In his vigorous dissent in Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987), Justice Brennan
reasoned that heightened scrutiny is required when the state interferes with children's fundamental
liberty to have relationships with their parents. The majority affirmed a state statute requiring
remittance to the state of child support payments received by custodial parents from noncustodial
parents, where federal support was also received. Brennan wrote:
The Government has told a child who lives with a mother receiving public
assistance that it cannot both live with its mother and be supported by its father.
The child must either leave the care and custody of the mother, or forgo the support
of the father and become a Government client. The child is put to this choice not
because it seeks Government benefits for itself, but because of a fact over which it
has no control: the need of other household members for public assistance. A child
who lives with one parent has, under the best of circumstances, a difficult time
sustaining a relationship with both its parents. A crucial bond between a child and
its parent outside the home, usually the father, is the father's commitment to care for
the material needs of the child, and the expectation of the child that it may look to
its father for such care. The Government has thus decreed that a condition of
welfare eligibility for a mother is that her child surrender a vital connection with
either the father or the mother.
The Court holds that the Government need only show a rational basis for such
action .... Plaintiff child support recipients in this case, however, are children who
wish not to receive public assistance; but to continue to be supported by their
noncustodial parent. Their claim is not that the Government has unfairly denied
them benefits, but that it has intruded deeply into their relationship with their

parents. More than a mere rational basis is required to withstand this challenge ....
Id. at 610-11 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
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Furthermore, the child's participation in a divorce related custody
proceeding is entirely involuntary, while the parents voluntarily choose
to bring their dispute to the court for resolution.2 70 If the "best interests"
standard is constitutional because parents have voluntarily invoked the
powers of the court, and because the custodial allocation is a relatively
minimal and modifiable intrusion on parental liberties, then the standard
may well be unconstitutional regarding children unless they have a
choice as to their custodian.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that children are always in
some kind of custody: the custody of fit parents or parent substitutes or,
failing that, the custody of the state. 27 ' If anything, a child's inability to
"escape" from some kind of custody should push the equities towards
recognizing his freedom of choice. Finally, the nature and quality of the
child's custodian is often the key to the child's ability to exercise his
other rights. While under the DeShaney line of cases a child who is in
the custody of his parent is in "free society, 27 2 under Meyer,27 3
Prince,227427
I and Yoder,2 75 the parents make the decisions about the child's
educational, community, and religious affiliations which will contextualize the child's developing identity. Even many common law rights are
exercised by the parents for the child. For example, a child may have a
substantive right to be free from bodily harm, but only his parents can
decide whether to exercise that right by bringing a tort action. For children, exercising freedom of choice in family matters is important not
only for its own sake, but because such choice necessarily becomes the
vehicle for ensuring the child's other rights, and creating the environment in which the child's identity will develop.
270. Constitutional problems may also exist in regard to the parent who is an entirely unwilling
participant in a divorce and custody action. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
271. Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1447 (1993) (deciding detention of juvenile aliens is
constitutional, on grounds that children are always in some form of custody); Schall v. Martin,
467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (finding "protective" pre-hearing detention for delinquent juveniles
constitutional because children are always in some form of custody); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 617-19 (1979) (denying counsel to a child committed to mental hospital on theory that
children are always in some kind of custody). The Supreme Court's perpetual custody theory,
used to justify prison-like detention situations for children, has produced an ironic result: parental
custody is the same as state custody. The Court took the opposite position in the nineteenth

century regarding the use of habeas corpus in child custody proceedings. The concept of

"custody" today is used to constrain children against their will, but in the nineteenth century,
could be used to free them from improper constraint. The Court's decisions in Parham,DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs. 489 U.S. 189 (1989), and their progeny militate
against imputing any protectivist dimension to the Supreme Court's conceptualization of
children's rights.
272. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
273. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
274. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
275. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971).
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The fact that parents have a right to privately determine the custody
of their child prior to voluntarily seeking the court's assistance, while
children are involuntary participants who lack any rights of choice raises
an Equal Protection question. The answer, however, is not clear,
because the Supreme Court has extended rights to and withheld rights
from children on a case-by-case basis, in accordance
with its view of
276
their maturity to exercise the right in question.
The child's right to make decisions may be constitutionally limited
to those for which she exhibits the requisite maturity. Although the
Court has not enunciated a generally applicable test for determining
maturity, the doctrine of the "mature minor" has crystallized out of the
reproductive freedom and abortion cases. 77 The mature minor doctrine
developed to allow a child with the maturity of an adult to make decisions that would normally be made by an adult. Read expansively, it
implies the right of children to make decisions and exercise liberties for
which adults receive constitutional protection, provided they possess the
requisite maturity.278 Applying the mature minor doctrine to
interparental custody contests would allow any child mature and experienced enough to balance the options and evaluate the possible consequences of her choice, the constitutional right to choose between fit
parents.

279

The Supreme Court's failure to directly address children's fundamental familial liberties leaves the issue vulnerable to ambiguities in
interpretation consistent with either a personhood paradigm or a
276. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (upholding a public school
program of drug testing student athletes, the Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment applies to
the extent consistent with educational purposes). In his opinion in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), Justice Kennedy stated,

"[tihe law does not give to children many rights given to adults, and provides, in general, that
children can exercise the rights they do have only through and with parental consent." Id. at 482

(citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 621 (1979). This statement actually involves two issues.
The first is whether a child is mature enough to exercise a particular right. The second is whether
the parent has the authority to exercise such right instead of the child. The abortion rights cases
generally implicate both issues, in addressing the question of whether a minor can consent to an
abortion without parental consent or notification. In this article, the parental control aspect of the

mature minor doctrine is not implicated. Under the suggested rule, the child's choice is
subordinate to the parents'-and is determinative only when the parents are unable to reach a
satisfactory custody agreement. The issue is whether the child, rather than the state, should be
allowed to make the decision.
277. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2832 (1992); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417 (1990); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647-48 (1979).
278. See Leslie A. Fithian, Forcible Repatriationof Minors: The Competing Rights of Parent
and Child, 37 STAN. L. REv. 187, 203-09 (1984).
279. See Edith Friedler, From Extreme Hardship to Extreme Deference: United States
Deportationof Its Own Children, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491 (1995) (suggesting extending the
use of the mature minor doctrine in the deportation context to protect the constitutional
relationship between children and parents against state intrusion).
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patienthood paradigm, its refusal to constitutionalize "best interests" or
affirmative protections of children tips the balance in favor of the former. Given the liberal vision of the child which informs Supreme Court
jurisprudence, 280 influenced by the mature minor doctrine, 2 1 1 and ratio-

nalized by the idea of family choices as fundamental liberties pertaining
to adults and children alike, the doctrine of children's choice should prevail. The question remains: based on knowledge of child development,
at what age can children appropriately exercise such a choice?
B.

The Argument from Developmental Psychology

Constitutional context, if not constitutional command, points
towards recognizing children's right to make autonomous decisions in
the area of fundamental familial liberties as soon as they are able. But
when is that? Psychoanalytic and family systems models, as incorporated into custody law to support the child-as-patient paradigm, do not
provide the answer. The child-as-patient paradigm, however, is not the
inevitable end result of a collaboration between law and psychology on
questions of child custody. Rather it is an artifact produced by the legal
vision of the child as delicate and incompetent. There is another way to
use psychology as a legal resource. Developmental psychology, which
focuses on moral, intellectual and emotional development and is concerned with the child's progress towards autonomy, identity, and selfdetermination, may shed much light on the issue.
In this Section, I argue, based on the work of the major developmental theorists, that the child is mature enough to choose her own custodian by the beginning of middle childhood-roughly the age of six
years. The argument is both less and more than a scientific justification
280. The argument that children should be granted liberal expressive rights of selfdetermination because the United States Constitution is grounded in liberal theory does not derive
only from philosophical consistency. Given the legal, political, and economic disempowerment of
children, it is more realistic for children to participate in the existing structure of "negative" rights,
at an appropriate age, than that they be granted different, "affirmative" rights which are without
any existing constitutional basis. See Clark, supra note 215, at 40 ("[T]he Supreme Court's
treatment of children ... is generally to accord them the rights extended to adults. But... where
children need special treatment for the very reason that they are not adults... the Court is often
oblivious to their interests. An obvious reason for this... is that the Constitution has nothing to
say about children ....
).
281. The child's right to choose a custodian should be a reciprocal of the adult's right of choice
in family matters. It does not confer full adult freedom and responsibility; rather, it enables the
child to select the adult who will exercise a panoply of rights on the child's behalf and in the
child's interests. Consistent with the concept of the child as a "developing person" or "maturing
minor," the child's choice puts her in the custody of a parent, not vice versa. See John Eekelaar,
The Interests of the Child and the Child's Wishes: The Role of Dynamic Self-Determinism, 8
INT'L J. L. & FAm. 42 (1994) (arguing, with reference to the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, that children's rights and children's needs can be reconciled through
developmentally appropriate self-determinism).
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of the right of choice in middle childhood. It is less because "development" (like "adjustment") is sensitive to context, environment, and individual variation, so that general theories cannot explain the individual
case; because the mid-range theories relating development to gender,
class, and culture which yield population specific statistics 28 2 suitable
for generating decisional guidelines are not addressed; because this section is not a comprehensive review of the pertinent scientific literature;
and because contorting psychological theories into legal principles for
ulterior purposes is the evil this Article criticizes.
It is more than a mere justification because this exercise will illustrate how the answers that psychology gives the law are conditioned
upon the questions asked; will demonstrate that the appropriate question
is, "When can the child choose?"; and will show that, despite the lack of
detailed research on the question, the substantial agreement among
diverse developmental theories provides sufficient support for legal recognition of the right of choice in middle childhood.
Developmental theory is particularly suitable to the articulation of
children's rights. Developmental psychology envisions the child as a
person growing towards a morally competent, rational, responsible,
autonomous decisionmaker-in short, developing toward our collective
vision of a legally competent adult. This is not coincidental. Developmental psychology and American constitutional theory both have their
intellectual antecedents in Enlightenment philosophy, 283 a tradition in
which the delineation of rights derived from the nature of human beings
plays a central role. Even if both are merely products of a common
metaphor, it is a metaphor of individual human empowerment. Psychoanalytic and family systems theories, by contrast, find their origins,
respectively, in the unconscious and in social relations. They are suited
to "cure" intrapsychic pathology and to "adjust" dysfunctional behavior.
But it is through expressive rights, not through affirmative rights, cures,
282. One study of 144 children between the ages of nine and 14 evaluated the degree to which
they were able to employ a rational decision making process to arrive upon a custodial preference
between divorcing parents. A group of 18-year-olds was included to provide the perspective of
legal adults and 44 domestic relations judges evaluated the decisions reached by the children.
Pro ess-oriented problem solving skills and knowledge about divorce better predicted children's
competence to participate in making decisions on custody than age, IQ, sex, or socioeconomic
factors. "Children who were able to isolate relevant aspects of the problem and to generate
alternative solutions, and those who were familiar with what a divorce involves exercised.., the
soundest judgment." Gerald P. Koocher, Children Under Law: The Paradigmof Consent, in
REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 3, 21-22 (Gary B. Melton ed.,

1987).
283. See MICHAEL COLE & SHEILA R. COLE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN 12-13 (2d ed.
1993) (tracing contemporary developmental theory to Locke and Rousseau); PATRICIA H. MILLER,
THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 20-23 (2d ed. 1989) (crediting Locke, Leibnitz, and
Rousseau as the intellectual ancestors of developmental theory).
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or legal entitlement, that our Enlightenment-derived legal system
functions.
The psychology of the child-as-person and the psychology of the
child-as-patient may yield equally valid answers to the questions the law
asks. In the absence of certainty as to which question or answer is
"true," however, it is best to build the law of custody on a psychological
theory of the child which comports with our legal theory of the person,
and to err on the side of equality.
The argument, then, from the developmental psychology perspective is as follows. At about the age of six years, cerebral changes take
place which result in increased physical and cognitive capacities,284
enabling children to think more deeply and logically, and to simultaneously keep track of many aspects of a situation.28 5 In virtually all cultures, 28 6 at the time of this onset of "social intelligence," children
receive increased independence and responsibility and are expected to
understand and conform more nearly to societal norms.287 The common
theme among the diverse developmental theories is that children acquire
the majority of their morality and reasoning skills during middle
childhood.
Pioneering psychologist Jean Piaget developed the theory that children progress through a series of "operational" stages in their moral and
cognitive capacities. 288 At the age of seven, or slightly earlier, children
enter the stage of "concrete operations," so-called because children in
this stage are able to mentally merge, isolate, categorize, and alter
objects and actions when such objects are in their presence, or create
mental representations of them.28 9 In the concrete operational stage
children become adept at coordinating their experiences into a cohesive,
284. These changes include "proliferation of brain circuitry, changing relationships between
different kinds of brain-wave activity, and the greatly expanded influence of the brain's frontal

lobes in guiding behavior." COLE & COLE, supra note 283, at 560.
285. Id. at 440.
286. For example, by the age of six, the Ifaluk of Micronesia expect their children to have
attained "social intelligence," which includes a knowledge and ability to work, follow social

standards, and exhibit compassion for others-all attributes associated with mature adult conduct.
Catherine Lutz, Goals, Events, and UnderstandingIfaluk Emotion Theory, in CULTURAL MODELS
IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 240 (Dorothy Holland & Naomi Quinn eds., 1987).
287. See, e.g., Barbara Rogoffet al., Transitionsin Children'sRoles and Capabilities, 15 INT'L
J. PSYCHOL. 181, 182 (1980).
288. An "operation" is an internalized mental action that fits into a logical system. MILLER,

supra note 283, at 59.
289. Jean Piaget has articulated his theory of the stages of mental development in a number of
books including, JEAN PIAGET, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THOUGHT (Arnold Rosin trans., 1977); THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE (Malcolm Piercy & D.E. Berlyne trans., 1950); THE
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY IN THE CHILD (Margaret Cook trans., 1954); THE ORIGINS OF
INTELLIGENCE IN CHILDREN (Margaret Cook trans., 1952); THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD
(MaIjorie Gabian trans., 1932); THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD (Joan & Andrew
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logical format which, in turn, leads to more systematic and constructive
thought patterns. The most vital skill of the stage is the mastery of
"reversibility"-that is, the understanding that certain operations can
negate or reverse the effect of others. This understanding enables children to mentally organize past, present, and future situations.
During this stage, children are also able to participate in games
according to preexisting socially constructed rules. They gain practice
in weighing their own objectives against the values of society, modifying their personal behavior, and comprehending that social rules produce
a format that makes possible viable interactions with others. Consequently, children are better able to regulate their social relations.
Because of children's newly acquired comprehension of "constancy,"
the world becomes more predictable. Because children can now grasp
the notion of "prerogatives," they understand that things are not purely
right or wrong. In addition, they account for "intentions" when judging
others' behavior, an ability which Piaget called "autonomous moral
reasoning. '

29°

Lawrence Kohlberg modified Jean Piaget's ideas about moral
thinking to provide a more complete theory of how reasoning develops
in relation to children's changing cognitive abilities and social experiences. 29' According to Kohlberg, in the stage most relevant to middle
childhood,292 children's concepts of morality are based on mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships, and interpersonal conformity, and
are in accordance with the "Golden Rule. 293 Children draw conclusions based on their view of themselves in relation to society as a whole;
perceiving majority opinions and consensus as having importance
beyond personal interest. They are able to acknowledge that their
actions cause reactions.29 4

William Damon, another psychologist who contributed significantly to the understanding of moral development in children, studied
Tomlinson trans., 1929); JUDGMENT AND REASONING IN THE CHILD (Marjorie Warden trans.,
1928). For an analytic summary, see MILLER, supra note 283, at 29-105.
290. MILLER, supra note 283 at 63-64.
291. See LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, 2 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE NATURE
AND VALIDITY OF MORAL STAGES (1984); Lawrence Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization:

The Cognitive-DevelopmentalApproach, in Moral Development and Behavior (1976) [hereinafter
Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization]; Lawrence Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The
Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY
AND RESEARCH 347 (David A. Goslin ed., 1969).
292. Kohlberg would recognize this as Stage 3 of Level 2 of his six stages of moral

development. Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization, supra note 291, at 32-33.
293. Id.
294. In Kohlberg's classic formulation, Stage 3 is only half way up the ladder to full moral
maturity. It is followed by Stage 4 in which relationships are subordinated to rules, and Stages 5

and 6 in which rules are subordinated to universal principles of justice. Id. at 32-41.
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children's development of a sense of fairness, which he termed "positive
justice. 2 95 During middle childhood, this sense develops in two steps.
First, at the age of six or slightly later, children begin to develop a sense
of "merit and deserving," and begin to understand the concept of "reciprocity in actions." Second, at about the age of eight, they come to
understand "moral relativity;" realizing that while other people's views
of justice may differ from their own, these views may be equally valid.
Children in this stage begin to analyze circumstances independently of
one another. They are also able to weigh the needs of others against
their own, and to conclude that fair does not necessarily mean equal.296
The theories of Erik Erikson suggest the same conclusion: that
children of six are developmentally ready to choose their custodian.297
Erikson posited that children develop a sense of identity 298 by favorably
resolving a series of eight crises, or developmental stages, occurring
throughout the life cycle.29 9 Of these stages, two are especially relevant.
Between the ages of four and five years old, children pass through
the stage of "initiative versus guilt,' '3°" in which they develop drive and
imagination, °1 fostering accomplishment and a sense of conscience that
is "the ontogenetic cornerstone of morality. ' 30 2 During this stage, children develop an inner sense of right and wrong, and preservation of the
295. William Damon, Patterns of Change in Children's Social Reasoning: A Two-Year
Longitudinal Study, 51 CHILD DEV. 1010 (1980).
296. For full elaboration of Damon's theories, see WILLIAM DAMON & D. HART, SELFUNDERSTANDING IN CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE (1988); WILLIAM DAMON, SOCIAL AND
PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT: INFANCY THROUGH ADOLESCENCE (1983); WILLIAM DAMON, THE
SOCIAL WORLD OF THE CHILD (1977).

297. See generally ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY:

YOUTH AND CIsIS (1968) [hereinafter

ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS]; ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY
[hereinafter ERIKSON, CHILDHO6D AND SOCIETY].

(1950)

298. For Erikson, identity is "a conscious sense of individual identity; ... an unconscious
striving for a continuity of personal character; . . . a criterion for the silent doings of ego
synthesis; ...[and] a maintenance of an inner solidaritywith a group's ideals and identity." Erik
H. Erikson, The Problem of Ego Identity, 1 PSYCHOL. ISSUES 101, 102 (1959).

299. The eight stages are: basic trust versus basic mistrust; autonomy versus shame and doubt;
initiative versus guilt; industry versus inferiority; identity versus role confusion; intimacy versus
isolation; generativity versus stagnation; ego integrity versus despair. EIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND
SOCIETY, supra note 297, at 247-69.
300. Erikson locates the stage of initiative vs. guilt in early childhood between the third and
sixth year.

In this stage children learn to initiate their own activities, enjoy their own

accomplishments, and become purposeful. They feel guilty for their attempts to become
independent if they are not allowed to follow their own initiative. Guiding children to make their
own decisions, and respecting the decisions they have made, leads to the successful completion of
this stage and toward a healthy, mature personality. Id. at 255-58.
301. The "sense of initiative" permits the child "to forget many failures rather quickly and to
learn to approach new areas that seem desirable, even if they also seem dangerous, with
undiminished zest and some increased sense of direction." ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND
CRISIS, supra note 297, at 115.
302. Id. at 119.
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potential for fairness and accomplishment depends upon an "experience
of essential equality in worth [with adults], in spite of the inequality in
developmental schedule.

3 '0

The subsequent stage of "industry versus

inferiority," that commences at six and lasts until adolescence, is a time
for learning, planning, and producing. 30 4 To triumph in this stage, to

avoid developing "a sense of inferiority, the feeling that one will never
be 'any good,' ",305 children must attain a sense of accomplishment and
fruition in their plans and projects. Erikson's theories confirm that by
middle childhood children have both the moral judgment and the reasoning skills to make choices about such important matters as their custody
and residence. Moreover, Erikson's theory adds an imperative: not only
30 6
are children able to make such decisions, but guidance and facilitation
are critical to their ultimate psychological well-being and participation
in democratic society. 0 7
The work of Piaget on cognitive development, and Kohlberg on

moral development, reveals that children must "learn by doing" to
develop through the requisite stages; Erikson's theories suggest that

independent decision making is a requisite to the acquisition of democratic participatory ideals, which depend on mutual respect for autonomous wills. 30 8 Drawing upon these theorists in his study of children's
competency to consent, Gary Melton concludes, "[t]he implication of
these analyses is that a requisite of enhanced moral development is the
'3 9
opportunity for... independent moral decision making by children.
Further, ample evidence indicates that control over a situation, or at least
a perception of control, correlates positively with increased life satisfac303. Id. at 121. For Erikson, the adult's respect for the child was critical to fostering the
child's sense of equality. The development of the conscience was fraught with risk and it was
important for adults to respect the child's moral judgments during this formative period. "[From
the point of view of human vitality, we must point out that if this great achievement is
overburdened by all too eager adults, it can be bad for the spirit and for morality itself." Id. at
119. For Erikson, respect for the developing identity of the child plays a vital role in raising
children to sustain democracy rather than support dictatorship.
304. Id. at 122-23.
305. Id. at 124-25.
306. "[C]hildren at this age do like to be mildly but firmly coerced into the adventure of
finding out that one can learn to accomplish things... which owe their attractiveness to the very
fact that they are not the product of play and fantasy but the product of reality, practicality, and
logic .
I..."
Id. at 127.
307. "(T]his is socially a most decisive stage.... [T]he configurations of culture ...must...
[support] ...the free exercise of dexterity and intelligence in the completion of serious tasks
unimpaired by an infantile sense of inferiority. This is the lasting basis for co-operative
participation in productive adult life." Id. at 126.
308. Gary B. Melton, Decision Making by Children: Psychological Risks and Benefits, in
CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENr 21, 27-28 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983).
309. Id. at 27.
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tion and psychological and physical health. 3 10 Recent psychological
studies employing measures such as locus of control (who has responsibility for decision making?) and personal causation (who makes the
result happen?) indicate that children who are given decision-making
responsibility mature in their ability to make decisions; while those who
are sheltered from such responsibilities develop habits of "learned helplessness" and "acting-out" behavior.31 '
To summarize, a survey of developmental psychology suggests that
from early middle childhood on, children have the maturity to choose
their custodians. The law's recognition of their right to do so contributes to children's psychological well-being and prepares them to be
responsible citizens of a democracy: two goals that have been most
important to the defenders of the child-as-patient paradigm for two
centuries.
Arguably, permitting children to choose their custodians may exacerbate the guilt that some feel about their parents' divorce. This view,
though consistent with conventional wisdom, lacks supporting
research. 31 2 Further, even assuming arguendo that guilt is an issue, it is
equally problematic under the present rule allowing children to state a
preference while affording that preference limited dispositive weightthus conferring the harm without any corresponding benefit. Also, the
present preference rule is complex and rarely explained to children,
many of whom may believe that they are being asked to choose a custodial parent even when they are questioned indirectly.313 Explaining that
he is not choosing "between" parents, but deciding what is most important in his own life-residence, community, school, friends, activities,
responsibilities, and opportunities, may minimize a child's guilt. Furthermore, emphasizing that no determination is final, and no parent is
being lost 314 would relieve children's minds.
310. See generally CHOICE AND PERCEIVED CONROL (L.C. Perlmuter & R.A. Monty eds.,
1979) (containing twenty-three studies on control and perceived control).

311. Melton, supra note 308 and studies cited therein.
312. I have found no study comparing the "guilt" (or any other measure of mental health or
behavior) experienced by children who have expressed a custodial preference with those children

who have not.
313. The present rule could be explained to a child as follows. "The judge is going to ask you
what you want. If he thinks you are old enough and sensible enough he may consider your
request-if he thinks it is a good idea." The child will be required to talk to the judge about his
parents without necessarily receiving the corresponding benefits of initiative, empowerment,
responsibility, or even simply getting what he wants. If the court's order is different from the

child's preference, the child may misunderstand the legal rule, and feel disappointed,
disillusioned, or guilty. The child may reason the judge's failure to grant his wish indicates that
his opinion is foolish and immature. The child may suffer a decrease in self-esteem, and/or
disillusionment with the legal system.

314. Children are better able to understand and handle such direct choices than adults think.
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Whether to permit children to make legally significant choices
affecting their own lives creates a tension between self-esteem, control,
and power on one hand, and stress and guilt on the other.3 1 Resolving
such tension with certainty or universality is impossible. Adults making
legally significant statements in court face the same conflict. Because
our legal system values individual autonomy, liberty, and freedom of
choice,316 exercising this right is not only worth the stress and guilt
involved, but is basic to legal and social personhood in the United
States. When we deny these same choices to children to protect them
from "stress," we are denying their personhood. Such a protective attitude might be justified if the data conclusively showed that choosing
one's custodial parent riddled children with guilt and stress. But the
data is, at best, ambiguous. In such circumstances, we should err on the
side consistent with our fundamental values and constitutional rights; let
the child exercise her fundamental liberty to choose the family she sees
fit, even at the risk of guilt and stress.

Further, encouraging and facilitating the early maturation of
responsible decision making in children whose parents are divorcing
may benefit society. One consistent finding in the divorce research is
that children in single parent families have more egalitarian relationships
with their parents, and exercise greater autonomy, decision-making

Judicial practice, and even some scholarly and practical articles, recommend indirectly asking
children to choose. See, e.g., RiCHARD A. GADNER, FAMILY EVALUATION IN CHILD CUSTODY
LITIGATION 173 (1982). But whose sensibilities are protected by these indirections-the child's
or the judge's? Ambiguous choices foster anxiety rather than relieving it. Melton, supra note
308, at 35. Between 1991 and 1993, I conducted an observational study of court sponsored
mediation at the Los Angeles Superior Court, Conciliation Services. When mediators spoke
privately with children, they did not directly ask children to make a choice. They typically asked
younger children "to make three wishes;" and older ones how they "felt" about the situation. But
the children were not deceived. They freely expressed explicit custodial preferences and their
reasons for them that were based as much in their interests and friendships as they were in their
love for one particular parent. If indirect questioning succeeds in masking the court's motives,
then these children are deceived as well as confused, for they might have answered very
differently if they had known the consequences. No adult witness would be expected to make a
legally consequential choice without understanding the question. This practice is acceptable, even
preferable, only because we regard their words as "evidence" of hidden psychological needs,
rather than as expressions of volitional choices.
315. See id. at 22-24; Michael S. Wald, Legal Policies Affecting Children: A Lawyer's
Request for Aid, 47 CHILD DEV. 1, 5 (1976).
316. Adults who move to the United States from countries where they are allowed fewer
choices experience stress. I have heard Indian women complain about the stress involved in
choosing one's future spouse rather than trusting parents to choose for them; Chinese complain of
the strain of choosing a career direction rather than letting the government tell them what to do.
Learning to make stressful and significant choices about one's future is part of growing up in the
United States.
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power3 17 and genuine responsibility 318 in their households. In light of
this, promoting a child's making and accepting responsibility for important decisions is sensible. Thinking of the child as a person rather than a
patient transforms the choice of a custodial parent into a significant decision on the path towards adulthood.
In sum, by middle childhood, children are able to make reasoned
decisions which balance their own interests against those of others,
weigh individual norms of fairness and justice against societal norms
and rules, and understand the long range consequences of their decisions. According to the generally accepted insights of mainstream
developmental theory, they should have the rationality and reasonableness to make their own choice as between or among fit parental
custodians.
Although the onset of middle childhood does not coincide with an
exact chronological age, and not all children mature at the same rate,
children should have the right of custodial choice at the age of six years.
At this age, society imposes a host of new social roles, responsibilities,
and rituals on children, making it appropriate to accord them increased
rights of decisional autonomy. At age six, all children are required to
attend school. Spending large portions of the day away from home, they
develop new networks, friends, and interests, and take on social roles
and responsibilities important to their developing personhood distinct
from their relationship to family. By this age, children have an
independent interest in where and how they want to live. This interest
deserves recognition as distinct from their choice of a "favorite" custodian or the interests of the family unit. In addition, serious societal
responsibilities attach at approximately this age. A child is deemed sufficiently responsible for his actions to be prosecuted in juvenile proceedings of the age of seven.319 If society considers children to have the
requisite moral judgment to subject them to quasi-criminal proceedings,
and the requisite mental abilities to participate in five full days of formal
learning each week, then they should also be capable of making decisions about their personal lives, especially in the context of a choice
317. Hetherington & Clingempeel, supra note 199, at 9.
318. More than 60% of the mothers of school age children work. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CURRENT POPULATION SuRvaY (1991). The percentage among

divorced parents is even higher. These parents place more trust in the good judgment and
developing independence of their children. Further, in some unfortunate instances, children
provide emotional and practical support to parents who have difficulties adjusting to divorce.
Judith S. Wallerstein, Children of Divorce: An Overview, 4 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 105, 111 (1986);
Judith S. Wallerstein, The Overburdened Child: Some Long-Term Consequences of Divorce, 30
SOCIAL WORK 116, 116 (1985).

319. Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but Not Heard: Reflections on Legal
Representationfor Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 76, 86 n.32 (1984) (citation omitted).
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0
between fit custodians. 32

Of course, not every child matures into middle childhood by age
six. However, the legal age for children to exercise custodial choice
should be younger rather than older, because children are the relatively
disempowered parties as compared to parents in custodial proceedings,
and children therefore deserve the benefit of an advantage. I have no
doubt that where their child wants to live with the co-parent, there will
be parents who strive to prove that the child is not mature enough to
exercise choice. Such a scenario would be no more than a replay of the
nineteenth century struggle over "tender years." Some of those parents
may be right. Yet undoubtedly, the efforts of parents to prove their
child's immaturity would succeed more often than efforts of children
trying to prove their capacity to exercise choice ahead of schedule.
Given the legal disadvantage children face, the age of choice is most
appropriately set at the youngest reasonable age.
C. The Argument from Pragmatics
Child custody cases present peculiar practical problems for courts.
Unlike most civil cases, which require retrospective judgments about
past facts, child custody cases require prospective judgments about
ongoing human relationships. Further, the adversarial nature of divorce
inevitably exacerbates the very tensions it strives to resolve. In this context, a rule of child custody should meet three pragmatic criteria. First,
it should be consistent with the child's best interests. Second, it should
be substantially fair to the parents. And third, it should be predictable
and clear enough to facilitate negotiation and settlement, reducing the
amount of stressful and costly litigation, and responding to the unique
facts and circumstances of each case. The rule of children's choice
meets all three concerns.
While the state properly acts in its parens patriae function to
remove a child from the custody of an abusive or neglectful parent to
whom the child remains stubbornly loyal, the typical divorce-related
custody dispute involves two fit parents. When both parents are eager to
be active custodians of the child and are competing for custody, any
choice the child makes is necessarily consistent with his best interests.
In this context the child's exercise of self-determination poses no greater
risk to his well-being than if the choice were made by the parents.
320. Guggenheim argues that for children seven years and older, the right to counsel
guaranteed by In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), should include the right to direct counsel, and that
counsel is bound by the client's instructions (when consistent with the law) and to act to achieve
the client's objectives. He reasons that where the responsibility attaches, rights should also attach.
Guggenheim, supra note 319, at 78-79.
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While no choice can possibly maximize all benefits (for affection and
discipline, work and recreation, adventure and stability) "best interests"
practice never strives for this impossible ideal. Rather, the majority of
custodial allocations are arranged through interparental negotiations and
routinely "so ordered." Any choice the child makes would be acceptable
if made by the parents. The difference is that the child exercises the
right of choice, thus facilitating his development as a person.
Some might argue that children are too nearsighted to assess the
long-range implications of their choices, and too young to be held to the
long-range consequences of their decisions. However, custodial placements may always be changed upon a showing of changed circumstances; and children are at least as likely to choose wisely as parents
engaged in a heated custody battle, or judges lacking firsthand knowledge of the family. Others contend that children's choices may be motivated by concern for the needs and feelings of one parent or anger at the
other, rather than by pure, rational egocentrism. But these are the same
emotions that propel divorcing parents. Thus, to deny children the right
to choose because that choice is based on altruism or animosity discriminates against them.
Further, a rule of children's choice would encourage out-of-court
settlements of custody disputes, thereby decreasing the number of children who would experience any anxiety or guilt about testifying as to
their preference. Most parents know what the child's choice is without
even having to ask.321 Where parents are unaware of their child's
wishes they could consult the child in an intimate family setting or, at
worst, in an informal setting with the lawyers present. The child would
have time to decide or to change her mind. Rarely would a parent then
go to court knowing that the child's preference, it being dispositive of
322
the case, was against her.
Moreover, under the rule of children's choice, the child's preference is not merely evidence, but is treated as dispositive, eliminating the
need for pointed questioning or stressful examination and cross-examination.3 23 The child need only be asked simple, straightforward questions regarding his life and relationship with his parents following the
321. GADNER, supra note 314, at 173.
322. The need for a child to state a preference in court could be further reduced by a rule that
required parents to make a showing, prior to bringing the matter to court, that the child had stated
inconsistent preferences, that the child was unable to decide, or that, for good reason, neither they
nor their attorneys had been able to ask the child.
323. Undoubtedly, some parents will challenge the child's right of choice on the basis of undue
influence, manipulation, parent alienation syndrome, or some similar theory. Consistent with both
the respect for the child's choice expressed in this article, and the concern for the emotional stress
on children (and adults) involved in court appearances, I would require a steep preliminary
showing before granting an evidentiary hearing on such a motion.
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divorce.324
The rule of children's choice may serve the children's interests during the period of divorce by involving them in discussions of domestic
rearrangements.325 Research shows that parenting competency diminishes during a divorce (parents becoming more dictatorial or more laissez-faire in their style) as parents tend to ignore their children's needs
and concentrate on their own problems. Parents' knowledge that children play a significant role in the ultimate custody question may lead
them to take their children more seriously, and
show them increased
326
concern and respect during this difficult time.
The rule of children's choice is also fair to parents. Where there is
a significant disparity in the strength of the parent-child bonds, a child
will, in all likelihood, choose to live with the psychological parent,
unless she has a reason for feeling a need to separate from that parent.
Often, the psychological parent will also be the primary caretaker. The
child will recognize and the choice will reflect the difference in the quality of caretaking time between the parents. The rule of children's choice
is likely to reward a parent's investment of love and shared experiences
with a child in a way which the judicial eye can only approximate.
Unfairness to one parent is a risk if the other parent tries to "unduly
influence" the child's choice. 327 However, if "influence" consists in
showering attentions on the child during the divorce period (spending
quality time in shared activities or providing extra help with homework),
it should be encouraged rather than lamented. Another possibility is that
a parent tries to influence a child by "buying her off" with toys,
presents, or permissiveness without any corresponding sincere effort to
establish a quality relationship. I think it is unlikely children will be
324. E.g., "Where do you want to live? What interests, activities, concerns are most important
to you? When do you want to be with mom? With dad?"
325. See Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and
Visitation Disputes Arisingfrom Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1163-64 (1978) (stating exclusion
from the decision-making process may make children angry and depressed).
326. Furthermore, parents may cope better by focusing on their children rather than on their
own inner turmoil.
327. See Siegel & Hurley, supra note 4, in which the authors state:
In determining the appropriate weight to give an expressed preference, the courts
will closely scrutinize those factors which have influenced the child in making his
choice, since the possibility exists that the preference was based on undesirable or
improper influences. The young child in making a choice can easily be influenced
by immature desires for less discipline although such discipline is reasonable and is
in the child's best interests. Other more insidious influences on the child's choice
involve conduct by the parents to manipulate the decision.
Id. at 10-11. For cases discounting the child's choice because of the parents' behavior, see Gregory v. Gregory, 292 So. 2d 50, 51-52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Smith v. Smith, 133 N.W.2d 677, 681
(Iowa 1965); Wallis v. Wallis, 200 A.2d 164, 166 (Md. 1964); Davis v. Davis, 355 P.2d 572, 57475 (Okla. 1960); Neal v. Medcalf, 244 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
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fooled by their parents. There is no reason to suspect that children cannot perceive who really cares about them. They are at least as likely to
reject pandering without genuine affection as they are to fall for it.
However, it may be that one genuinely involved parent has significantly
greater financial resources to provide things and activities for the child
during the divorce period than the other, and uses those resources to
make an appeal to the child for custody. The undue influence of financial inducement can be curtailed during the divorce period through
pendente lite support orders, and/or by a stipulation or order that any
such special presents or activities come from both parents.
Even if parents "compete" in the provision of quality parenting
time, the child may still benefit from their involvement. Such competition is likely to be a healthier experience for the child than more hostile
forms of rivalry and argument in which the parents might otherwise
engage. True, a child may choose a previously disinterested parent who
deliberately lavishes attentions during the divorce period while the other
parent (who may previously have been the primary caretaker) is too
busy, preoccupied, or emotionally distraught. But unless we replace the
child's "best interests" with parental rights based on "sweat equity," this
should not be negate the validity of the rule. A parent who attempts to
win custody to spite the co-parent may be indifferent to the child after
the divorce. This seems unlikely. A parent who seeks custody only as a
financial bargaining chip or to get revenge on the co-parent is likely to
drop the custody claim before the divorce is settled. In the unusual
event such a parent wins custody, the other parent may motion the court
to change custody.
More serious, yet presently more speculative, risks are posed by the
possibility of a lasting taint to the emotional relationship between the
child and the parent. For example, one parent may "poison the child's
mind" against the other parent.32 8 Parents efforts at mental manipulation
occur even under present custody rules, and are difficult, perhaps impossible, to police. However, they can be curtailed by strict sanctions for
contempt. 329 A still more serious risk is that the parent whom the child
does not choose as primary custodian may remain hurt and resentful for
328. See, e.g., Bhama v. Bhama, 425 N.W.2d 733 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). Several colleagues
who have read or heard earlier versions of this article find the possibility of "mind poisoning" to

be the most problematic aspect of"children's choice." While I have given serious attention to this
concern, I remain convinced that the risk of such manipulation would not be significantly greater
than it is under the present rule.
329. The rule of children's choice might indirectly affect the parents' negotiations about assets
and support. A parent who was known to be the child's chosen one, could use that knowledge to
extract financial concessions from the other parent. However, since such leverage would mean
more funds for the primary custodial parent, any interparental unfairness would be balanced by the
advantage to the child's interest.
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a long time, rejecting or distrusting the child rather than being the
involved parent she otherwise would have been. Under present custody
rules, such resentment is usually directed less malignantly at the exspouse or at the court.
On balance, despite some risk that one parent might unduly influence a child against the other parent, the rule of children's choice would
basically work substantive justice for parents because of the likelihood
that a parent's investment of love and labor in the child will be rewarded
in the child's choice. The rule of children's choice is also likely to
improve the procedural fairness of the child's input from the parents'
perspective. Typically, children are interviewed in camera by the judge
through indirect questions, usually without the parents' attorneys present, and often no transcript (or even notes) of the interview are made. 3 0
This practice, usually rationalized as protecting the child from courtroom induced trauma, raises genuine concerns of due process for parents. Through indirect questioning, judges may misinterpret children's
preferences, or garner information beyond the scope of the case which
influences their decision-all shielded from cross-examination and
appellate review. The rule of children's choice would protect the child
from lengthy cross-examination, while safeguarding the parents' due
process rights.
A rule of children's choice would certainly be sensitive to the specific facts-and-circumstances of each case. Judges can only strive to
understand the dynamics of family relationships and the desires and
needs of the children in a time of heightened stress, through the exaggerated scenarios of the family presented by adversary attorneys, and upon
the recommendations of mental health experts who may have briefly
seen the members of the family. On the other hand, the child has known
his parents for a lifetime, and has experienced the family divorce from
the eye of the storm. It takes only a minimal respect for the child to
realize that the choice of the child reflects a more profound sensitivity to
the particular case than any expert or judge can claim.331
330. A survey of 26 Michigan judges found that more than 50% asked indirect questions

designed to elicit information inferentially; 64% would not allow attorneys to be present; and 54%
made no stenographic record of the interview. Of this 54%, 29% kept no record whatever of the
interview. Frederica K. Lombard, Judicial Interviewing of Children in Custody Cases: An
Empirical and Analytical Study, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 807, 813-816 (1984).

331. One of the most interesting and least predictable results is what effect the rule of
children's choice might have on sibling relationships. Sibling relationships, like children's choice,

is an understudied area and it is possible only to suggest possibilities. Although there is virtually
no conclusive research on sibling relationships in the divorce context, some research indicates
that, during the circum-divorce period, siblings behave more antagonistically and aggressively
than cooperatively towards each other. See, e.g., E. Mavis Hetherington, Coping with Marital
Transitions: A Family Systems Perspective, in CoPInG WITH MARITAL TRANSITIONS 1,7 (E.
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The rule of children's choice, however, should be subject to certain
limitations. It should be triggered only where the parents cannot agree
to a custodial allocation. Because adults unwilling or unable to accept
caretaking responsibilities are likely to perform them half-heartedly or
inadequately, custodial choices should be posed to children only in the
form that parents are willing to accept. If one or both parents is unwilling to have joint custody, the choice should be posed as an alternative
between maternal and paternal custody. Finally, a child who is definitely unable or unwilling to state a preference should not be forced to
make one. The jurisdiction's best interests test would be a default rule
when parents cannot agree and the child cannot state a preference.332
IV.

CONCLUSION

In this Article I have suggested a rule of children's choice in custody determinations: as between fit parental custodians who cannot
agree on the child's custody, the choice of children six years old and
older should be legally dispositive as to their custody. I have demonMavis Hetherington & W. Glenn Clingempeel eds., 1992). Yet, common sense tells us that
strong, supportive sibling bonds may develop where the home environment is tempestuous. A
rule of children's choice in the multiple siblings context opens up the possibility for real "kiddie
power." On the one hand, by standing united in their choice of custodian, the children may exert a
considerable amount of power over the constellation and style of their post-divorce family.
Children typically feel powerless during a divorce which they have neither caused nor desired, and
the strength of group selection may be a meaningful antidote to such feelings. On the other hand,
children who feel they want to be away from each other might choose different custodians.
332. The rule of children's choice inevitably raises questions about actions for change of
custody. The subject deserves an article of its own, but I venture a few tentative remarks. On the
one hand, the right of choice certainly includes the right to change one's residence. The
likelihood that children's preferences may change over the course of years, in ways which they
cannot predict at the time of the divorce, militates for allowing children standing to initiate
motions for change of custody. On the other hand, children's choice in the post-divorce context
raises different issues about family harmony and parental authority. At the time of divorce the
household is necessarily disrupted, and some custodial allocation must be made. Thereafter,
knowledge of one's standing to seek a change of custody may become a weapon to manipulate the
family group when residential moves, remarriages, or school changes become issues. While I
have no hesitation in empowering children to make custodial decisions as against the state, I am
reluctant to give children that power vis-a-vis their parents during middle childhood. I would not
give children the right to petition for a change of their own custody until adolescence (perhaps at
the age of 11 or 12) when genuine conflicts of identity and independence between children and
their custodial parents may be more deserving of legal protection. By 11 or 12 years of age,
however, I believe children should have full standing to petition for a change of custody. The
right is meaningful only if children are allowed to petition in their own name, without the benefit
of a next friend or guardian ad litem. At such time, children should have counsel of their own
choosing, whose responsibility it is to follow their directions, and represent their interests
consistently within the bounds of the law. While it is unreasonable to assume that courts will
appoint counsel to children in this situation, I would provide children with a means to hire their
own. Children should have a right to bring a motion for attorneys' fees against the parent
contesting the change of custody, just as spouses have a right to seek attorneys' fees from each
other at the time of divorce.
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strated that constitutional jurisprudence and the insights and theories of
developmental psychology support the rule of children's choice. I have
also shown that the rule has practical advantages over existing discretionary or presumptive variants of the "best interests" doctrine. It is
simultaneously sensitive to the facts and circumstances of each case,
predictable and certain enough to foster settlement, fair to the parents,
and good for the child.
I have also used the proposed rule of children's choice to illustrate
a deep disservice to children in the present marriage of law and psychology. I have shown that, despite the seeming objectivity of this interdisciplinary union, the answers which the law gets from psychology are
significantly shaped by the questions asked, and these questions are
determined by a legal vision of the child as delicate, incompetent, and at
risk. I have called this vision the protectivist/patienthood paradigm and,
tracing its roots through the nineteenth century, I have shown that it
unjustifiably denigrates the personhood of the child, depriving children
of their fundamental liberty and decision-making autonomy. I propose
an alternative empowering vision of the child as a developing person-a
view more compatible with fundamental constitutional values of identity
and autonomy-and show, using the rule of children's choice as an
example, that when the law poses questions to psychology from the
basis of the empowerment/personhood paradigm, it gets very different
answers.

